Chapter 1. "Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities in 50 democracies, 1948-2020"

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Tables and Figures

Main figures and tables

Table 1	A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities
Figure 1	The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies
Figure 2a	The reversal of educational divides in English-speaking and Northern European countries
Figure 2b	The reversal of educational divides in Continental and Southern European countries
Figure 3a	The stability/decline of income divides in English-speaking and Northern European countries
Figure 3b	The stability/decline of income divides in Continental and Southern European countries
Figure 4	The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020
Figure 5	The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures
Figure 6	The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies
Figure 7	Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies
Figure 8a	Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries
Figure 8b	Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries
Figure 9	Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America
Figure 10	Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia
Figure 11	The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies
Figure 12	The Muslim vote in Western democracies
Figure 13	Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective
Figure 14	The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective
Figure 15	Rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies
Figure 16	Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective
Figure 17	Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant parties by geographical location
Figure 18	Regional cleavages in comparative perspective
Figure 19	Regional cleavages in historical perspective
Figure 20	Class and regionalism: Vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by income group
Figure 21	Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies
Figure 22	The reversal of the educational cleavage in Western democracies by generation

Figure 23	Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant party by age group
Figure 24	Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: Vote for selected parties by age group
Figure 25	The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies
Appendix A - Income, Education, and Class	
Figure A1	The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, small panel
Figure A2	The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, unbalanced panel
Figure A3	The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies
Figure A4	The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies, after controls
Figure A5	The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies
Figure A6	The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies, after controls
Figure A7	The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies (quadrant representation), all countries
Figure A8	Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1950s
Figure A9	Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1960s
Figure A10	Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1970s
Figure A11	Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1980s
Figure A12	Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1990s
Figure A13	Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2000s
Figure A14	Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2010s
Figure A15	Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Detailed party families
Figure A16	Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Green vs. Anti-immigration parties
Figure A17	Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Social-Democrats / Socialists vs. Conservatives / Christians
Figure A18	Vote for Green parties by education group
Figure A19	Vote for Green parties by income group
Figure A20	Vote for Green parties by self-perceived class
Figure A21	Vote for anti-immigration parties by education group
Figure A22	Vote for anti-immigration parties by income group
Figure A23	Vote for anti-immigration parties by self-perceived class
Figure A24	Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies
Figure A25	Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies (after controls)
Figure A26	Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies
Figure A27	Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies (after controls)
Figure A28	The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (before controls)
Figure A29	The strength of income divides in non-Western democracies
Figure A30	The strength of educational divides in non-Western democracies
Figure A31	Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after controls for income/education)

Figure A32	Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after all controls)
Appendix B - Religious, Sociocultural, and Ethnic Cleavages	
Figure B1	Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 1970s
Figure B2	Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 2010s
Figure B3	Vote for left-wing parties among voters with no religion in Western democracies
Figure B4	Vote for left-wing / secular parties by religion in Latin America, last election
Figure B5	Vote for left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies, 2010s
Figure B6	The strength of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective
Figure B7	The strength of sociocultural inequalities in comparative perspective
Appendix C - Regional and Rural-Urban Cleavages	
Figure C1	The strength of rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective (after controls)
Figure C2	The strength of rural-urban inequalities in comparative perspective
Figure C3	Vote for Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies
Figure C4	Vote for anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies
Figure C5	Vote for left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies
Figure C6	Vote for Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies
Figure C7	Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies
Figure C8	Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies (after controls)
Figure C9	Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in selected Western democracies
Figure C10	Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in selected Western democracies, after controls
Figure C11	The strength of regional inequalities in comparative perspective
Figure C12	Vote for nationalist parties among top-income voters in Catalonia, Flanders, Québec, and Scotland
Appendix D - Generational Cleavages	
Figure D1	Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies
Figure D2	Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies
Figure D3	Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies (after controls)
Figure D4	Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies (after controls)
Figure D5	Vote for Green parties by age group in Western democracies
Figure D6	Vote for anti-immigration parties by age group in Western democracies
Figure D7	The strength of generational cleavages in comparative perspective
Appendix E - Gender Cleavages	
Figure E1	Vote for left-wing parties among women in Western democracies (after controlling for religion)
Figure E2	Gender cleavages and sectoral specialization in Western democracies
Figure E3	Vote for Green parties by gender in Western democracies
Figure E4	Vote for anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies

Figure E5	The strength of the gender cleavage in comparative perspective
Appendix Tables	
Table A1	A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities (all countries)

Table 1.1 - A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities

	Time period	Elections	Data quality	Avg. sample size	Low-income party / coalition / candidates
Western Europe					
Austria	1971-2017	10	Medium	3831	Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left
Belgium	1971-2014	14	High	4817	Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Agalev, PTB
Denmark	1960-2015	21	High	2819	Social Democrats, SF, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance
Finland	1972-2015	11	High	2452	Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left
France	1956-2017	17	High	3208	Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left
Germany	1949-2017	19	High	2782	Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke
Iceland	1978-2017	12	High	1488	Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party
Ireland	1973-2020	13	Medium	7115	Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Other left
Italy	1953-2018	14	High	2147	Democratic Party, Free and Equal
Luxembourg	1974-2018	9	Low	3890	Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left
Netherlands	1967-2017	15	High	2068	Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left
Norway	1957-2017	15	High	1964	Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party
Portugal	1983-2019	10	High	1822	Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition
Spain	1979-2019	14	High	8996	Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left
Sweden	1956-2014	19	High	3088	Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party
Switzerland	1967-2019	14	High	3328	Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party
United Kingdom	1955-2017	16	High	5262	Labour Party
Post-communist Eastern Europe					
Czech Republic	1990-2017	7	High	1565	Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Greens, Pirate Party
Hungary	1998-2018	6	High	1679	Fidesz, Jobbik
Poland	1991-2015	8	High	2555	Law and Justice
North America / Oceania					
Australia	1963-2019	18	High	2382	Labor Party, Greens
Canada	1963-2019	17	High	3302	Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party
New Zealand	1972-2017	16	High	2555	Labour Party, Greens, Other left

United States	1948-2020	18	High	2179	Democratic Party
Asia					
Hong Kong	1998-2016	5	Low	864	Pro-Beijing camp
India	1962-2014	10	High	13412	Indian National Congress, left-wing parties, other center / left
Indonesia	1999-2014	4	High	1850	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, NasDem, Golkar
Japan	1953-2017	14	Medium	1909	Constitutional Democratic Party, Communist Party, Soc. Dem. Party
Malaysia	2004-2013	3	Low	1213	Barisan Nasional
Pakistan	1970-2018	8	High	3682	Pakistan Peoples Party
Philippines	1998-2016	4	Medium	1200	Grace Poe, Jejomar Binay
South Korea	2000-2016	5	Medium	1160	Liberty Korea Party
Taiwan	1996-2016	6	Medium	1744	Democratic Progressive Party
Thailand	2001-2011	3	Low	1431	Pheu Thai
Latin America					
Argentina	1995-2019	6	Medium	2056	Peronist parties
Brazil	1989-2018	8	High	10225	Workers' Party
Chile	1989-2017	7	Medium	1135	Broad Front, Progressive Party, País
Colombia	2002-2018	5	Medium	3340	Democratic Center, Mejor Vargas Lleras
Costa Rica	1974-2018	12	Medium	1083	National Liberation Party
Mexico	1952-2018	9	Medium	1339	Institutional Revolutionary Party
Peru	1995-2016	5	Medium	1592	Popular Force
Africa and Middle East					
Algeria	2002-2017	3	Low	1226	National Liberation Front, Democratic National Rally
Botswana	1999-2019	5	Low	1680	Botswana Democratic Party
Ghana	2000-2016	4	Low	2600	National Democratic Congress
Iraq	2005-2018	5	Low	1984	Shia lists
Israel	1969-2019	15	High	1381	Likud, Other conservative / ultra-orthodox
Nigeria	1999-2019	6	Low	2853	All Progressives Congress
Senegal	2000-2019	4	Low	1800	Alliance for the Republic
South Africa	1994-2019	6	High	3514	African National Congress
Turkey	1991-2018	7	Medium	1564	Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Source: authors' elaboration using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the table presents, for each country, the time coverage of the dataset, the number of elections covered, the quality of electoral surveys, the average sample size of these surveys, and the main significant party or group of parties whose support is concentrated among the bottom 50% of income earners in the last election available (see corresponding case studies).

Figure 1.1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (democratic / labor / social-democratic / socialist / green) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system". Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies.
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies. Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.
Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.4 - The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s. Communist parties saw their average scores collapse from 7% to less than 0.5%, while green and anti-immigration parties have risen until reaching average vote shares of 8% and 11% respectively. Decennial averages over all Western democracies except Spain and Portugal (no democratic elections before 1970s) and the United States and the United Kingdom (two-party systems).

Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel A. 1960-1980



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s-1980s, socialist and social democratic parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel B. 2000-2020



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income most clearly distinguishes conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.6 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.7 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected "pro-poor parties" (see table 1.1) on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis in non-Western democracies. South Africa and Botswana display particularly strong income and educational divides, while education and income only play a minor role in determining electoral behaviors in Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Income and education are shown as identical for Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal given lack of data on income.

Figure 1.8 (panel a) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Protestants declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, Protestants have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure 1.8 (panel b) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure 1.9 - Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters declaring belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing / secular parties (Peronist parties in Argentina) in the last election available (Argentina 2015, Brazil 2018, Chile 2017, Colombia 2018, Costa Rica 2018, Mexico 2018, Peru 2016). Non-religious voters are more likely to vote for left-wing / secular parties in all countries, but this gap is large in Costa Rica and almost insignificant in Argentina. See case studies for more details on classification of parties.

Figure 1.10 - Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the evolution of the vote of religious minorities or non-religious voters in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia. In the past decades, religious cleavages have risen in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, while they have remained stable at high levels in Indonesia, Turkey, and Israel. INC: Indian National Congress; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; DAP: Democratic Action Party; PKR: People's Justice Party; PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party.

Figure 1.11 - The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrants are much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lack of data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure 1.12 - The Muslim vote in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially more likely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure 1.13 - Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of specific sociocultural minorities and the share of other voters voting for selected "pro-poor" parties in the last election available. The Turkish AKP corresponds to a "social-exclusive party": it is supported by low-income voters of the majority but not by the disadvantaged Kurdish minority. The Democratic Party in the United States is a "social-inclusive party", supported by both low-income voters and disadvantaged Black voters. Ethnic minorities correspond to non-Tswana groups in Botswana and speakers of Fulani / Serer / Mande languages in Senegal.

Figure 1.14 - The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of a specific sociocultural group and the rest of the electorate voting for selected parties or groups of parties. In the United States in the 1940s, Black voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic Party by 12 percentage points, compared to 49 percentage points in the 2010s. Sociocultural cleavages have risen or remained stable at high levels in the majority of represented countries. They are highest in South Africa and lowest in Indonesia. For India, the gap corresponds to SCs/STs vs. Upper castes.

Figure 1.15 - The rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.16 - Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset. In the majority of countries, parties oriented towards low-income voters also tend to make significantly higher scores in rural areas than in cities. Western democracies: cross-country average over all countries with data.

Figure 1.17 - Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant parties by geographical location



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by geographical location in a selected number of countries and time periods. In all these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties systematically receive greater support from rural areas than from cities. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan). Centers correpond to Alger (Algeria), Gaborone (Botswana), Delhi (India), Wards (Japan), the Central region (Malaysia), the Center region (Mexico), the Western region (Senegal), Gauteng and Western Cape (South Africa), and the North region (Taiwan).

Figure 1.18 - Regional cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in the last election available. Thailand, Iraq, India, and Belgium are the countries with the deepest regional cleavages, with over a quarter of political cleavages amounting to regional differences in vote choices. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Figure 1.19 - Regional cleavages in historical perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in a selected number of countries. Regional divides have grown significantly in India, Belgium, Pakistan, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the past decades, driven by the regionalization of existing coalitions and the formation of new regionally based parties. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Figure 1.20 - Class and regionalism: vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by income group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the share of votes received by selected nationalist parties by income group in Flanders, Catalonia, Québec, and Scotland. Nationalist parties receive greater support from top-income voters in Flanders and Catalonia and from low-income voters in Québec and Scotland. Parties and time periods represented: VU / N-VA in Flanders in the 2010s, nationalist parties in Catalonia in the 2010s, Bloc Québécois in Québec in the 1990s, and Scottish National Party in Scotland in the 2010s.

Figure 1.21 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last election available. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist Left Party) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case of far-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.

Figure 1.22 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: the role of generational replacement



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties within specific cohorts. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties than higher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantly less likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Figure 1.23 - Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant party by age group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by age group in a selected number of countries and time periods. In the majority of these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties receive greater support from older voters than from younger generations. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan).

Figure 1.24 - Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: vote for selected parties by age group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan in the 1960s, the Saenuri Party in South Korea in 2016, the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong in 2016, and the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in 2017 by age group. All these parties received significantly higher support among older generations than among the youth, which can be linked to the particular strength of cleavages over foreign policy and national integration in these party systems (war memory and remilitarization in Japan, attitudes towards the North Korean regime in South Korea, attitudes towards Mainland China in Hong Kong, and attitudes towards Brexit in the United Kingdom).

Figure 1.25 - The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.

Table 1.1 - A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities

	Time period	Elections	Data quality	Avg. sample size	Low-income party / coalition / candidates
Western Europe					
Austria	1971-2017	10	Medium	3831	Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left
Belgium	1971-2014	14	High	4817	Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Agalev, PTB
Denmark	1960-2015	21	High	2819	Social Democrats, SF, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance
Finland	1972-2015	11	High	2452	Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left
France	1956-2017	17	High	3208	Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left
Germany	1949-2017	19	High	2782	Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke
Iceland	1978-2017	12	High	1488	Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party
Ireland	1973-2020	13	Medium	7115	Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Other left
Italy	1953-2018	14	High	2147	Democratic Party, Free and Equal
Luxembourg	1974-2018	9	Low	3890	Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left
Netherlands	1967-2017	15	High	2068	Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left
Norway	1957-2017	15	High	1964	Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party
Portugal	1983-2019	10	High	1822	Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition
Spain	1979-2019	14	High	8996	Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left
Sweden	1956-2014	19	High	3088	Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party
Switzerland	1967-2019	14	High	3328	Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party
United Kingdom	1955-2017	16	High	5262	Labour Party
Post-communist Eastern Europe					
Czech Republic	1990-2017	7	High	1565	Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Greens, Pirate Party
Hungary	1998-2018	6	High	1679	Fidesz, Jobbik
Poland	1991-2015	8	High	2555	Law and Justice
North America / Oceania					
Australia	1963-2019	18	High	2382	Labor Party, Greens
Canada	1963-2019	17	High	3302	Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party
New Zealand	1972-2017	16	High	2555	Labour Party, Greens, Other left

United States	1948-2020	18	High	2179	Democratic Party
Asia					
Hong Kong	1998-2016	5	Low	864	Pro-Beijing camp
India	1962-2014	10	High	13412	Indian National Congress, left-wing parties, other center / left
Indonesia	1999-2014	4	High	1850	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, NasDem, Golkar
Japan	1953-2017	14	Medium	1909	Constitutional Democratic Party, Communist Party, Soc. Dem. Party
Malaysia	2004-2013	3	Low	1213	Barisan Nasional
Pakistan	1970-2018	8	High	3682	Pakistan Peoples Party
Philippines	1998-2016	4	Medium	1200	Grace Poe, Jejomar Binay
South Korea	2000-2016	5	Medium	1160	Liberty Korea Party
Taiwan	1996-2016	6	Medium	1744	Democratic Progressive Party
Thailand	2001-2011	3	Low	1431	Pheu Thai
Latin America					
Argentina	1995-2019	6	Medium	2056	Peronist parties
Brazil	1989-2018	8	High	10225	Workers' Party
Chile	1989-2017	7	Medium	1135	Broad Front, Progressive Party, País
Colombia	2002-2018	5	Medium	3340	Democratic Center, Mejor Vargas Lleras
Costa Rica	1974-2018	12	Medium	1083	National Liberation Party
Mexico	1952-2018	9	Medium	1339	Institutional Revolutionary Party
Peru	1995-2016	5	Medium	1592	Popular Force
Africa and Middle East					
Algeria	2002-2017	3	Low	1226	National Liberation Front, Democratic National Rally
Botswana	1999-2019	5	Low	1680	Botswana Democratic Party
Ghana	2000-2016	4	Low	2600	National Democratic Congress
Iraq	2005-2018	5	Low	1984	Shia lists
Israel	1969-2019	15	High	1381	Likud, Other conservative / ultra-orthodox
Nigeria	1999-2019	6	Low	2853	All Progressives Congress
Senegal	2000-2019	4	Low	1800	Alliance for the Republic
South Africa	1994-2019	6	High	3514	African National Congress
Turkey	1991-2018	7	Medium	1564	Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Source: authors' elaboration using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the table presents, for each country, the time coverage of the dataset, the number of elections covered, the quality of electoral surveys, the average sample size of these surveys, and the main significant party or group of parties whose support is concentrated among the bottom 50% of income earners in the last election available (see corresponding case studies).

Figure 1.1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (democratic / labor / social-democratic / socialist / green) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system". Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies.
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies. Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.
Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.4 - The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s. Communist parties saw their average scores collapse from 7% to less than 0.5%, while green and anti-immigration parties have risen until reaching average vote shares of 8% and 11% respectively. Decennial averages over all Western democracies except Spain and Portugal (no democratic elections before 1970s) and the United States and the United Kingdom (two-party systems).

Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel A. 1960-1980



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s-1980s, socialist and social democratic parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel B. 2000-2020



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income most clearly distinguishes conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.6 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.7 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected "pro-poor parties" (see table 1.1) on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis in non-Western democracies. South Africa and Botswana display particularly strong income and educational divides, while education and income only play a minor role in determining electoral behaviors in Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Income and education are shown as identical for Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal given lack of data on income.

Figure 1.8 (panel a) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Protestants declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, Protestants have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure 1.8 (panel b) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure 1.9 - Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters declaring belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing / secular parties (Peronist parties in Argentina) in the last election available (Argentina 2015, Brazil 2018, Chile 2017, Colombia 2018, Costa Rica 2018, Mexico 2018, Peru 2016). Non-religious voters are more likely to vote for left-wing / secular parties in all countries, but this gap is large in Costa Rica and almost insignificant in Argentina. See case studies for more details on classification of parties.

Figure 1.10 - Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the evolution of the vote of religious minorities or non-religious voters in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia. In the past decades, religious cleavages have risen in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, while they have remained stable at high levels in Indonesia, Turkey, and Israel. INC: Indian National Congress; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; DAP: Democratic Action Party; PKR: People's Justice Party; PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party.

Figure 1.11 - The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrants are much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lack of data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure 1.12 - The Muslim vote in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially more likely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure 1.13 - Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of specific sociocultural minorities and the share of other voters voting for selected "pro-poor" parties in the last election available. The Turkish AKP corresponds to a "social-exclusive party": it is supported by low-income voters of the majority but not by the disadvantaged Kurdish minority. The Democratic Party in the United States is a "social-inclusive party", supported by both low-income voters and disadvantaged Black voters. Ethnic minorities correspond to non-Tswana groups in Botswana and speakers of Fulani / Serer / Mande languages in Senegal.

Figure 1.14 - The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of a specific sociocultural group and the rest of the electorate voting for selected parties or groups of parties. In the United States in the 1940s, Black voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic Party by 12 percentage points, compared to 49 percentage points in the 2010s. Sociocultural cleavages have risen or remained stable at high levels in the majority of represented countries. They are highest in South Africa and lowest in Indonesia. For India, the gap corresponds to SCs/STs vs. Upper castes.

Figure 1.15 - The rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.16 - Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset. In the majority of countries, parties oriented towards low-income voters also tend to make significantly higher scores in rural areas than in cities. Western democracies: cross-country average over all countries with data.

Figure 1.17 - Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant parties by geographical location



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by geographical location in a selected number of countries and time periods. In all these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties systematically receive greater support from rural areas than from cities. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan). Centers correpond to Alger (Algeria), Gaborone (Botswana), Delhi (India), Wards (Japan), the Central region (Malaysia), the Center region (Mexico), the Western region (Senegal), Gauteng and Western Cape (South Africa), and the North region (Taiwan).

Figure 1.18 - Regional cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in the last election available. Thailand, Iraq, India, and Belgium are the countries with the deepest regional cleavages, with over a quarter of political cleavages amounting to regional differences in vote choices. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Figure 1.19 - Regional cleavages in historical perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in a selected number of countries. Regional divides have grown significantly in India, Belgium, Pakistan, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the past decades, driven by the regionalization of existing coalitions and the formation of new regionally based parties. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Figure 1.20 - Class and regionalism: vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by income group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the share of votes received by selected nationalist parties by income group in Flanders, Catalonia, Québec, and Scotland. Nationalist parties receive greater support from top-income voters in Flanders and Catalonia and from low-income voters in Québec and Scotland. Parties and time periods represented: VU / N-VA in Flanders in the 2010s, nationalist parties in Catalonia in the 2010s, Bloc Québécois in Québec in the 1990s, and Scottish National Party in Scotland in the 2010s.

Figure 1.21 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last election available. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist Left Party) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case of far-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.

Figure 1.22 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: the role of generational replacement



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties within specific cohorts. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties than higher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantly less likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Figure 1.23 - Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant party by age group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by age group in a selected number of countries and time periods. In the majority of these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties receive greater support from older voters than from younger generations. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan).

Figure 1.24 - Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: vote for selected parties by age group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan in the 1960s, the Saenuri Party in South Korea in 2016, the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong in 2016, and the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in 2017 by age group. All these parties received significantly higher support among older generations than among the youth, which can be linked to the particular strength of cleavages over foreign policy and national integration in these party systems (war memory and remilitarization in Japan, attitudes towards the North Korean regime in South Korea, attitudes towards Mainland China in Hong Kong, and attitudes towards Brexit in the United Kingdom).

Figure 1.25 - The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.

Figure A1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, small panel



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system. Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A2 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies, unbalanced panel



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system. Figures correspond to five-year averages over all countries available for a given time period (unbalanced panel of all 25 Western democracies). The estimates are presented before and after controlling for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A3 - The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A4 - The reversal of educational divides, all Western democracies, after controls



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries, after controlling for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for right-wing parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for left-wing parties.

Figure A5 - The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters.

Figure A6 - The decline/stability of income divides, all Western democracies, after controls



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A7 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies (quadrant representation), all countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available). Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Figure A8 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1950s



Figure A9 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1960s



Figure A10 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1970s



Figure A11 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1980s



Figure A12 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 1990s



Figure A13 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2000s



Figure A14 - Income and educational divides in Western democracies, 2010s



Figure A15 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Detailed party families



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income distinguishes most clearly conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies over the 2000-2020 period. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

FIgure A16 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Green vs. Anti-immigration parties



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A17 - Decomposing multi-elite party systems: Social-Democrats / Socialists vs. Conservatives / Christians



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A18 - Vote for Green parties by education group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

Figure A19 - Vote for Green parties by income group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

Figure A20 - Vote for Green parties by self-perceived class



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class.

Figure A21 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by education group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by education group.

Figure A22 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by income group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by income group.

Figure A23 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by self-perceived class



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by self-perceived social class.

Figure A24 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of union members and the share of non-union members voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies.

Figure A25 - Vote for left-wing parties among union members in Western democracies, after controls



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of union members and the share of non-union members voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies. Estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A26 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of private sector workers voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies.

Figure A27 - Vote for left-wing parties among public sector workers in Western democracies, after controls



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of private sector workers voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies. Estimates control for education, income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure A28 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies (before controls)



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties.

Figure A29 - The strength of income divides in non-Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).

Figure A30 - The strength of educational divides in non-Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).

Figure A31 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after controls for income/education)



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis, respectively after controlling for education and income. Costa Rica: 2014 election represented.

Figure A32 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies (after all controls)



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis. Costa Rica: 2014 election represented. Figures control for income/education, age, gender, religion, religiosity, rural/urban, region, sociocultural identity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure B1 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 1970s



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 1970s in Western democracies.

Figure B2 - Vote for left-wing parties by religion in Western democracies, 2010s



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religion in the 2010s in Western democracies.

Figure B3 - Vote for left-wing parties among voters with no religion in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. Non-religious voters have remained significantly more left-wing than the rest of the electorate since the 1950s.

Figure B4 - Vote for left-wing / secular parties by religion in Latin America, last election



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing and secular parties in Latin America by religion in the last election available in the dataset.

Figure B5 - Vote for left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies, 2010s



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by country of birth in Western democracies in the 2010s.
Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland. Covers 2007 and 2012 elections in France (no data in 2017).

Figure B6 - The strength of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by ethnic or sociocultural divides in the last election available. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of sociocultural identity on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not stricly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Figure B7 - The strength of sociocultural inequalities in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations combining data from the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and data from the World Inequality Database (wid.world). Figures need to be interpreted with care given low quality of underlying income data.
Note: the figure represents the % difference in income between a specific low-income sociocultural group and the rest of the population in the last year available.

Figure C1 - The strength of rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective (after controls)



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status.

Figure C2 - The strength of rural-urban inequalities in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations combining data from the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and data from the World Inequality Database (wid.world). Figures need to be interpreted with care given low quality of underlying income data.
Note: the figure represents the % difference in income between urban areas and rural areas in the last year available

Figure C3 - Vote for Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

Figure C4 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by rural-urban location in Western democracies.

Figure C5 - Vote for left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure C6 - Vote for Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure C7 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by center-periphery location in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure C8 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living the in the capital city and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure C9 - Vote for left-wing parties among capital cities in Western democracies, after controls



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living the in the capital city and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status. Centers correspond to the Australian Capital Territory (Australia), Vienna (Austria), Brussels (Belgium), Copenhagen (Denmark), Paris (France), Reykjavík (Iceland), Dublin (Ireland), Auckland and Wellington (New Zealand), Lisbon (Portugal), Madrid (Spain), and London (United Kingdom).

Figure C10 - The strength of regional inequalities in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations combining data from the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and data from the World Inequality Database (wid.world). Figures need to be interpreted with care given low quality of underlying income data.
Note: the figure represents the share of income inequality that can be explained by regional inequalities. This is measured using the adjusted R-squared of a linear regression of regional location on the income rank (quintiles + top decile).

Figure C11 - Vote for nationalist parties among top-income voters in Catalonia, Flanders, Québec, and Scotland



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for nationalist parties in Catalonia, Flanders, Québec and Scotland, before and after controlling for education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, and rural-urban location.

Figure D1 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies.

Figure D2 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies.

Figure D3 - Vote for left-wing parties among young voters in Western democracies, after controls



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 25 and the share of voters aged 25 or above voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

Figure D4 - Vote for left-wing parties among old voters in Western democracies, after controls



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of the 10% oldest voters and the share of the youngest 90% voters voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies, after controlling for income, education, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status.

Figure D5 - Vote for Green parties by age group in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties in Western democracies in the last election available by age group.

Figure D6 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by age group in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties in Western democracies in the last election available by age group.

Figure D7 - The strength of generational cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of voting behaviors that can be explained by age. This is measured using the adjusted R-squared of a linear regression of support for the pro-poor party on a full set of age dummies.

Figure E1 - Vote for left-wing parties among women in Western democracies (after controlling for religion)



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing (socialist, social-democratic, communist, and green) parties in Western democracies, after controlling for religion and church attendance. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more right-wing to being significantly more left-wing than men.

Figure E2 - Gender cleavages and sectoral specialization in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties in Western democracies in the last election available, before and after controlling for occupation (employment status + private/public sector of employment).

Figure E3 - Vote for Green parties by gender in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Green parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available.

Figure E4 - Vote for anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by anti-immigration parties by gender in Western democracies in the last election available

Figure E5 - The strength of the gender cleavage in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset.