

**Table 1.1 - A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities**


	Time period	Elections	Data quality	Avg. sample size	Low-income party / coalition / candidates
<b>Western Europe</b>					
Austria	1971-2017	10	Medium	3831	Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left
Belgium	1971-2014	14	High	4817	Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Agalev, PTB
Denmark	1960-2015	21	High	2819	Social Democrats, SF, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance
Finland	1972-2015	11	High	2452	Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left
France	1956-2017	17	High	3208	Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left
Germany	1949-2017	19	High	2782	Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke
Iceland	1978-2017	12	High	1488	Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party
Ireland	1973-2020	13	Medium	7115	Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Other left
Italy	1953-2018	14	High	2147	Democratic Party, Free and Equal
Luxembourg	1974-2018	9	Low	3890	Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left
Netherlands	1967-2017	15	High	2068	Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left
Norway	1957-2017	15	High	1964	Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party
Portugal	1983-2019	10	High	1822	Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition
Spain	1979-2019	14	High	8996	Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left
Sweden	1956-2014	19	High	3088	Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party
Switzerland	1967-2019	14	High	3328	Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party
United Kingdom	1955-2017	16	High	5262	Labour Party
<b>Post-communist Eastern Europe</b>					
Czech Republic	1990-2017	7	High	1565	Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Greens, Pirate Party
Hungary	1998-2018	6	High	1679	Fidesz, Jobbik
Poland	1991-2015	8	High	2555	Law and Justice
<b>North America / Oceania</b>					
Australia	1963-2019	18	High	2382	Labor Party, Greens
Canada	1963-2019	17	High	3302	Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party
New Zealand	1972-2017	16	High	2555	Labour Party, Greens, Other left

United States	1948-2020	18	High	2179	Democratic Party
<b>Asia</b>					
Hong Kong	1998-2016	5	Low	864	Pro-Beijing camp
India	1962-2014	10	High	13412	Indian National Congress, left-wing parties, other center / left
Indonesia	1999-2014	4	High	1850	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, NasDem, Golkar
Japan	1953-2017	14	Medium	1909	Constitutional Democratic Party, Communist Party, Soc. Dem. Party
Malaysia	2004-2013	3	Low	1213	Barisan Nasional
Pakistan	1970-2018	8	High	3682	Pakistan Peoples Party
Philippines	1998-2016	4	Medium	1200	Grace Poe, Jejomar Binay
South Korea	2000-2016	5	Medium	1160	Liberty Korea Party
Taiwan	1996-2016	6	Medium	1744	Democratic Progressive Party
Thailand	2001-2011	3	Low	1431	Pheu Thai
<b>Latin America</b>					
Argentina	1995-2019	6	Medium	2056	Peronist parties
Brazil	1989-2018	8	High	10225	Workers' Party
Chile	1989-2017	7	Medium	1135	Broad Front, Progressive Party, País
Colombia	2002-2018	5	Medium	3340	Democratic Center, Mejor Vargas Lleras
Costa Rica	1974-2018	12	Medium	1083	National Liberation Party
Mexico	1952-2018	9	Medium	1339	Institutional Revolutionary Party
Peru	1995-2016	5	Medium	1592	Popular Force
<b>Africa and Middle East</b>					
Algeria	2002-2017	3	Low	1226	National Liberation Front, Democratic National Rally
Botswana	1999-2019	5	Low	1680	Botswana Democratic Party
Ghana	2000-2016	4	Low	2600	National Democratic Congress
Iraq	2005-2018	5	Low	1984	Shia lists
Israel	1969-2019	15	High	1381	Likud, Other conservative / ultra-orthodox
Nigeria	1999-2019	6	Low	2853	All Progressives Congress
Senegal	2000-2019	4	Low	1800	Alliance for the Republic
South Africa	1994-2019	6	High	3514	African National Congress
Turkey	1991-2018	7	Medium	1564	Justice and Development Party (AKP)

**Source:** authors' elaboration using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the table presents, for each country, the time coverage of the dataset, the number of elections covered, the quality of electoral surveys, the average sample size of these surveys, and the main significant party or group of parties whose support is concentrated among the bottom 50% of income earners in the last election available (see corresponding case studies).


**Figure 1.1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (democratic / labor / social-democratic / socialist / green) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system". Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).


**Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies.  
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).


**Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies.  
Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).


**Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.  
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

**Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.  
Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries**




**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).




**Figure 1.4 - The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s. Communist parties saw their average scores collapse from 7% to less than 0.5%, while green and anti-immigration parties have risen until reaching average vote shares of 8% and 11% respectively. Decennial averages over all Western democracies except Spain and Portugal (no democratic elections before 1970s) and the United States and the United Kingdom (two-party systems).


**Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel A. 1960-1980**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s-1980s, socialist and social democratic parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).


**Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel B. 2000-2020**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income most clearly distinguishes conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).


**Figure 1.6 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).


**Figure 1.7 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected "pro-poor parties" (see table 1.1) on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis in non-Western democracies. South Africa and Botswana display particularly strong income and educational divides, while education and income only play a minor role in determining electoral behaviors in Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Income and education are shown as identical for Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal given lack of data on income.


**Figure 1.8 (panel a) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure displays the difference between the share of Protestants declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, Protestants have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.


**Figure 1.8 (panel b) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

**Figure 1.9 - Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America**




**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of voters declaring belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing / secular parties (Peronist parties in Argentina) in the last election available (Argentina 2015, Brazil 2018, Chile 2017, Colombia 2018, Costa Rica 2018, Mexico 2018, Peru 2016). Non-religious voters are more likely to vote for left-wing / secular parties in all countries, but this gap is large in Costa Rica and almost insignificant in Argentina. See case studies for more details on classification of parties.




**Figure 1.10 - Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the evolution of the vote of religious minorities or non-religious voters in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia. In the past decades, religious cleavages have risen in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, while they have remained stable at high levels in Indonesia, Turkey, and Israel. INC: Indian National Congress; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; DAP: Democratic Action Party; PKR: People's Justice Party; PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party.


**Figure 1.11 - The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrants are much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lack of data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.


**Figure 1.12 - The Muslim vote in Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially more likely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.


**Figure 1.13 - Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of specific sociocultural minorities and the share of other voters voting for selected "pro-poor" parties in the last election available. The Turkish AKP corresponds to a "social-exclusive party": it is supported by low-income voters of the majority but not by the disadvantaged Kurdish minority. The Democratic Party in the United States is a "social-inclusive party", supported by both low-income voters and disadvantaged Black voters. Ethnic minorities correspond to non-Tswana groups in Botswana and speakers of Fulani / Serer / Mande languages in Senegal.


**Figure 1.14 - The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of a specific sociocultural group and the rest of the electorate voting for selected parties or groups of parties. In the United States in the 1940s, Black voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic Party by 12 percentage points, compared to 49 percentage points in the 2010s. Sociocultural cleavages have risen or remained stable at high levels in the majority of represented countries. They are highest in South Africa and lowest in Indonesia. For India, the gap corresponds to SCs/STs vs. Upper castes.


**Figure 1.15 - The rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).


**Figure 1.16 - Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset. In the majority of countries, parties oriented towards low-income voters also tend to make significantly higher scores in rural areas than in cities. Western democracies: cross-country average over all countries with data.

**Figure 1.17 - Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems:  
vote for dominant parties by geographical location**




**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by geographical location in a selected number of countries and time periods. In all these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties systematically receive greater support from rural areas than from cities. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan). Centers correspond to Alger (Algeria), Gaborone (Botswana), Delhi (India), Wards (Japan), the Central region (Malaysia), the Center region (Mexico), the Western region (Senegal), Gauteng and Western Cape (South Africa), and the North region (Taiwan).




**Figure 1.18 - Regional cleavages in comparative perspective**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in the last election available. Thailand, Iraq, India, and Belgium are the countries with the deepest regional cleavages, with over a quarter of political cleavages amounting to regional differences in vote choices. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).


Figure 1.19 - Regional cleavages in historical perspective



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in a selected number of countries. Regional divides have grown significantly in India, Belgium, Pakistan, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the past decades, driven by the regionalization of existing coalitions and the formation of new regionally based parties. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).


**Figure 1.20 - Class and regionalism: vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by income group**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure displays the share of votes received by selected nationalist parties by income group in Flanders, Catalonia, Québec, and Scotland. Nationalist parties receive greater support from top-income voters in Flanders and Catalonia and from low-income voters in Québec and Scotland. Parties and time periods represented: VU / N-VA in Flanders in the 2010s, nationalist parties in Catalonia in the 2010s, Bloc Québécois in Québec in the 1990s, and Scottish National Party in Scotland in the 2010s.


**Figure 1.21 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last election available. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist Left Party) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case of far-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 corresponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.


**Figure 1.22 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: the role of generational replacement**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties within specific cohorts. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties than higher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantly less likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.


**Figure 1.23 - Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems:  
vote for dominant party by age group**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by age group in a selected number of countries and time periods. In the majority of these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties receive greater support from older voters than from younger generations. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan).


**Figure 1.24 - Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: vote for selected parties by age group**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure represents the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan in the 1960s, the Saenuri Party in South Korea in 2016, the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong in 2016, and the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in 2017 by age group. All these parties received significantly higher support among older generations than among the youth, which can be linked to the particular strength of cleavages over foreign policy and national integration in these party systems (war memory and remilitarization in Japan, attitudes towards the North Korean regime in South Korea, attitudes towards Mainland China in Hong Kong, and attitudes towards Brexit in the United Kingdom).

**Figure 1.25 - The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies**



**Source:** authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.