Figure 11.1 - Election results in Japan, 1946-2017

Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Japan between 1946 and 2017. The Liberal Democratic Party received 33% of votes in 2017.
Figure 11.2 - The conservative vote by education in Japan, 1953-2017

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by education level. The conservative vote has been concentrated among primary-educated voters since the 1950s, a cleavage that has persisted until the 2010s.
Figure 11.3 - The educational cleavage in Japan, 1953-2017: between decline and persistence

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Liberal Democratic Party and other conservative parties, before and after controls. In 1953, university graduates were 20 percentage points less likely to vote conservative, compared to 8 percentage points over the 2012-2017 period.
Figure 11.4 - The conservative vote by degree of urbanization in Japan, 1963-2017

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by rural-urban location. In 1963-1967, the LDP received 60% of votes in rural areas, compared to 37% in big cities. The difference in conservative votes between cities and rural areas has declined over time.
Figure 11.5 - The decline of the rural-urban cleavage in Japan, 1963-2017

Difference between (% of big cities) and (% of other areas) voting LDP / Other conservative

After controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, union membership

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of big cities and the share of other cities and rural areas voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties, before and after controls. The vote share received by conservative parties in big cities was 18 percentage points lower than in other cities and rural areas in the 1960s, compared to 6 percentage points in the 2010s.
Figure 11.6 - The conservative vote by income in Japan, 1963-2017

Source: author’s computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by income decile. In the 1960s, the LDP was supported by 57% of bottom 10% income earners (D1) and 65% of top 10% income earners (D10).
Figure 11.7 - The conservative vote among top-income earners in Japan, 1963-2017

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties, before and after controls. In the 1960s, top 10% earners were 16 percentage points more likely to vote conservative, compared to 0 percentage points in the 2010s.
Figure 11.8 - The depoliticization of inequality in Japan, 1963-2017

- Support for the LDP and other conservative parties among upper-class voters
- Support for the LDP and other conservative parties among homeowners
- Support for the LDP and other conservative parties among wage earners
- Support for the LDP and other conservative parties among union members

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference in the vote share received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties between specific categories of voters (upper-class voters, homeowners, wage earners, and union members) and other voters. In the 1960s, upper-class voters were 29 percentage points more likely to vote conservative than the rest of the electorate, compared to 5 percentage points in the 2010s. Upper classes are defined as the top 10% of social classes, based on survey questions on the self-perceived position of respondents on the social ladder.
Figure 11.9 - The reversal of the generational cleavage in Japan, 1953-2017

The figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties, before and after controls. In 1953, voters younger than 39 were 19 percentage points less likely to vote conservative. In the 2010s, they had become 5 percentage points more likely to do so.

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties, before and after controls. In 1953, voters younger than 39 were 19 percentage points less likely to vote conservative. In the 2010s, they had become 5 percentage points more likely to do so.
Figure 11.10 - The conservative vote and generational renewal in Japan, 1953-2017

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by decade of birth. In 1953, 89% of voters born in the 1890s voted conservative, compared to 52% of those born in the 1930s. In the 2010s, by contrast, new generations had become more likely to vote conservative than the post-war generations, with 60% of voters born in the 1990s supporting the LDP and other conservative parties.
### Table 11.1 - Composition of the Japanese electorate, 1953-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>61%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns and villages</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-sized cities</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big cities</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-39</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** author’s computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

**Note:** the table shows the evolution of the structure of the Japanese electorate between 1953 and 2017. This period has been marked by a strong increase in the general level of education, urbanization, and the ageing of the population. In 2012-2017, 33% of voters lived in big cities and 25% had an university degree.