



Figure 12.1 - Election results in Thailand, 2001-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Thailand between 2001 and 2019.


Figure 12.2 - Regional inequalities in Thailand



Source: authors' computations using Thai political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups (quintiles (Q1 to Q5) and the top decile (D10)) by region in 2011. In 2011, 45% of top 10% income earners lived in Bangkok, compared to only 12% in the Northeast. This region concentrated alone more than half of bottom 20% income earners.


Figure 12.3 - The educational cleavage in Thailand, 2001-2011



Source: authors' computations using Thai political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% educated voters and the share of top 50% educated voters voting for the Thai Rak Thai, the Pheu Thai, and other pro-Thaksin parties, before and after controls. In 2001, bottom 50% educated voters were 6 percentage points more likely to vote for these parties, compared to 26 percentage points in 2011.


Figure 12.4 - The rural-urban cleavage in Thailand, 2001-2011



Source: authors' computations using Thai political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the Thai Rak Thai, the Pheu Thai, and other pro-Thaksin parties, before and after controls. In 2001, the vote share of these parties was 3 percentage points lower in rural areas than in urban areas; by 2011, it had become 28 percentage points higher.


Figure 12.5 - Election results in the Philippines, 1992-2016



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received in the first round of presidential elections by selected parties, group of parties, or candidates in the Philippines. The candidate Rodrigo Duterte received 39% of votes in the 2016 election.


Figure 12.6 - The educational cleavage in the Philippines, 1998-2016



Source: authors' computations using Filipino electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for Joseph Estrada (1998, 2010), Fernando Poe (2004), Grace Poe (2016), and Jejomar Binay (2016) in the first round of presidential elections, before and after controls. These candidates all received higher support among the least educated. In 2004, higher-educated voters were less likely to vote for Joseph Estrada by 22 percentage points.

Figure 12.7 - The regional cleavage in the Philippines, 1998-2016



Source: authors' computations using Filipino electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in the Visayas geographical zone and the share of voters living in other regions of the Philippines voting for the candidates Joseph Estrada (1998, 2010), Fernando Poe (2004), Grace Poe (2016), and Jejomar Binay (2016) in the first round of presidential elections, as well as the same difference between Mindanao and the rest of the country, before and after controlling for education, employment status, age, gender, religion, religious attendance, income, and rural-urban location. In 2016, the vote share of Grace Poe and Jejomar Binay was 20 percentage points lower in Mindanao than in other regions.


Table 12.1 - Structure of the vote in the 2016 Filipino presidential election

	Rodrigo Duterte <i>PDP-Laban</i>	Mar Roxas <i>Liberal Party</i>	Grace Poe <i>Independent</i>	Jejomar Binay <i>UNA</i>
Education				
Primary	42%	24%	19%	13%
Secondary	35%	24%	24%	12%
Tertiary	43%	21%	21%	12%
Region				
National Capital Region	33%	16%	27%	19%
Luzon	29%	26%	27%	16%
Visayas	39%	31%	17%	8%
Mindanao	62%	16%	12%	7%
Religion				
Catholic	37%	25%	22%	12%
Protestant	31%	21%	30%	18%
Muslim	75%	5%	3%	13%
Location				
Urban areas	43%	15%	21%	15%
Rural areas	36%	30%	22%	11%

Source: authors' computations using Filipino electoral surveys.

Notes: the table shows the share of votes received by the main Filipino presidential candidates by selected individual characteristics in 2016. Rodrigo Duterte received his highest vote share in Mindanao (62%) and in urban areas (43%).


Figure 12.8 - Election results in Malaysia, 1955-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main Malaysian parties in general elections held between 1955 and 2018. The National Front coalition (Barisan Nasional, BN) received 34% of the vote in 2018.


Figure 12.9 - The ethnoreligious cleavage in Malaysia, 2004-2013
The Barisan National vote by religious affiliation



Source: authors' computations using Asian Barometer surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Barisan Nasional by religious affiliation. In 2013, 29% of Buddhist and Taoist voters voted BN, compared to 53% of Muslim voters and 62% of Hindu and Sikh voters.


Figure 12.10 - Vote and income in Malaysia, 2004-2013



Source: authors' computations using Asian Barometer surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the Barisan Nasional, before and after controls. In 2013, bottom 50% income earners were 17 percentage points less likely to vote BN. After controls (all other things being equal), this difference is reduced to 5 percentage points.


Figure 12.11 - Ethnoreligious cleavages and class cleavages in Malaysia, 2004-2013



Source: authors' computations using Asian Barometer surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Barisan Nasional by income group among Muslims and non-Muslims. The BN has been most strongly supported among bottom 50% income earners within these two groups. In 2013, 53% of the bottom 50% of Muslim income earners voted BN, compared to 16% of the top 10% of Muslim income earners.


Figure 12.12 - Election results in Indonesia, 1977-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected Indonesian political parties or groups of parties in legislative elections between 1977 and 2019. The PDI-P received 19% of votes in 2018. PD: Democratic Party; PDI: Indonesian Democratic Party; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; NasDem: National Democratic Party; Islamic Parties: PAN, PBB, PBR, PKB, PKNU, PKS, and PPP.


Figure 12.13 - The PDI-P / NasDem vote by religious affiliation in Indonesia, 1999-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indonesian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the National Democratic Party (NasDem) by religious affiliation. In 2014, 51% of non-Muslims supported these two parties, compared to 22% of practicing Muslims (reporting participating "Often" or "Very often / Always" to collective prayers).


Figure 12.14 - The religious cleavage in Indonesia, 1999-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indonesian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of practicing Muslims voting for Islamic parties and the share of non-practicing Muslims and non-Muslims voting for Islamic parties, and the same difference for Golkar / Gerindra / Hanura and PDI-P / NasDem, after controlling for income, education, rural-urban location, employment status, age, and gender. Religious cleavages have weakened in Indonesia in the past decades: practicing Muslims were 25 percentage points less likely to vote PDI-P / NasDem in 1999, compared to 5 percentage points in 2014.

Figure 12.15 - Vote and income in Indonesia, 1999-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indonesian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for Islamic parties, and the same difference for Golkar / Gerindra / Hanura and PDI-P / Nasdem, after controlling for religion, education, rural-urban location, employment status, age, and gender. The link between income and the vote has weakened in Indonesia in the past decades: top 10% earners were 9 percentage points less likely to vote PDI-P / NasDem in 1999, while they were 2 percentage points more likely to do so in 2014.