



**Figure 13.1 - Election results in South Korea, 1985-2020**



**Source:** authors' computations using official election results (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of South Korean political parties in legislative elections between 1985 and 2020. The results correspond to those of single-member constituencies. Other names of the Hannara Party include United Future, Saenuri, Democratic Justice, Democratic Liberal, New Korea, and Liberty Korea. The conservatives (United Future) received 41% of votes in 2020.


**Figure 13.2 - The generational cleavage in South Korea, 2000-2016**  
**The conservative vote by age group**



**Source:** authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Hannara / Saenuri Party by age group. Generational cleavages rose considerably in South Korea between 2000 and 2016. In 2016, 82% of voters aged over 70 voted for the Saenuri Party, compared to only 15% of voters aged 18 to 29.


**Figure 13.3 - The regional cleavage in South Korea, 2000-2016**  
**The conservative vote by region**



**Source:** authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Hannara / Saenuri Party by region. In 2016, the conservatives received 51% of the vote in Gyeongsang, while they only received 1% in Honam. Honam represented in 2016 approximately 10% of the electorate, Chungcheong 10%, Gangwon 4%, Seoul-Gyeonggi 50%, and Gyeongsang 26%.


**Figure 13.4 - The educational cleavage in South Korea, 2000-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Hannara / Saenuri Party, before and after controls. The educational cleavage has significantly increased over time. In 2016, university graduates were less likely to vote conservative by 19 percentage points.


**Figure 13.5 - Vote and income in South Korea, 2000-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners and the share of top 50% earners voting for the Hannara / Saenuri Party, before and after controls. Bottom 50% income earners were 6 percentage points less likely to vote conservative in 2000, while they were 3 percentage points more likely to do so in 2016.


**Figure 13.6 - Presidential election results in Taiwan, 1996-2020**



**Source:** authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by selected parties or groups of parties in presidential elections held in Taiwan between 1996 and 2020. The vote share of the Democratic Progressive Party increased from 21% in 1996 to 57% in 2020.


**Figure 13.7 - The DPP vote by ethnic group in Taiwan, 1996-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) by ethnic group. In 2016, the DPP was supported by 62% of Minnan voters, compared to only 16% of Mainlanders.

**Figure 13.8 - The ethnic cleavage in Taiwan, 1996-2016**




**Source:** authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the relative support of Minnan voters and Mainlanders for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), before and after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment, marital status, union membership, religion, and region of residence. In 2016, Minnan voters were 27 percentage points more likely to vote DPP, while Mainlanders were 43 percentage points less likely to do so.




**Figure 13.9 - The regional cleavage in Taiwan, 1996-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of Southern region residents and the share of residents of other regions voting for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), before and after controls. In 2016, the vote share of the DPP was 10 percentage points higher in the Southern region than in the rest of the country.


**Figure 13.10 - Vote, income, and education in Taiwan, 1996-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the relative support of low-income and lower-educated voters for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after controlling for income/education, ethnicity, age, gender, occupation, marital status, union membership, religion, and region. In 2016, bottom 50% income earners were 3 percentage points more likely to vote DPP.


**Figure 13.11 - Election results in Hong Kong, 1991-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using official election results (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of political parties in geographical constituencies in Legislative Council elections held in Hong Kong between 1991 and 2016. The Pro-Beijing camp received 40% of votes in the 2016 elections.


**Figure 13.12 - The generational cleavage in Hong Kong, 1998-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 39 or younger and the share of voters aged 40 or more voting for the pro-democracy camp, before and after controls. Generational cleavages have considerably risen in Hong Kong. In 2016, voters younger than 40 were 32 percentage points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp.


**Figure 13.13 - The generational cleavage in Hong Kong, 1998-2016**  
**The pro-democracy vote by decade of birth**



**Source:** authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the pro-democracy camp by decade of birth. In 2016, 89% of voters born in the 1990s voted for the pro-democracy camp, compared to only 31% of those born in the 1930s.

**Figure 13.14 - The native-mainlander cleavage in Hong Kong, 2012-2016**




- Difference between (% born in Hong Kong) and (% born in Mainland China / Other) voting pro-democracy
- After controlling for education, age
- After controlling for education, age, income, gender, employment, marital status, union, religion

**Source:** authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the relative support of voters born in Hong Kong for the pro-democracy camp, before and after controls. In 2016, natives were 25 percentage points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp. This difference is reduced to 15 percentage points after controlling for education and age (at a given education level and age, natives are 15 points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp). Voters born outside of Hong Kong are mostly Mainlanders (born in continental China).


**Figure 13.15 - The pro-democracy vote by income and education in Hong Kong, 1998-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for the pro-democracy camp. In 2016, top 10% educated voters and top 10% income earners were respectively 18 and 5 percentage points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp.

**Figure 13.16 - Attitudes towards Hong Kong identity, immigration, and integration with China by age, 2015**



**Source:** authors' computations using the Hong Kong Election Study 2015 (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure decomposes by age group the share of voters who (1) think that closer integration with Mainland China would not be beneficial for Hong Kong, (2) consider themselves more Hong Konger than Chinese, Hong Konger-Chinese, Chinese-Hong Konger or Other, (3) believe that Hong Kong does not have a democratic political system, (4) think that there are too many immigrants coming from Mainland China and (5) consider that income inequality is among the three most important problems in Hong Kong today. In 2015, 72% of voters aged 18 to 25 considered closer integration with Mainland China would not benefit Hong Kong, compared to 43% of voters older than 56.