



Figure 15.1 - Election results in Argentina, 1995-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Argentinian political parties in general elections between 1995 and 2019. Peronist parties received 48% of votes in the 2019 election. Anti-peronist parties are the Radical Civic Union (UCR), the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO), Acción por la Republica, Coalición Cívica ARI, Cambiemos, Frente de Izquierda, and Recrear.

Figure 15.2 - The Peronist vote by income and education in Argentina, 1995-2019



Source: authors' computations using Argentinian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for Peronists, after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, employment status, marital status, occupation, rural-urban location, region, ethnicity, and perceived social class. In 2015-2019, top 10% income earners were 8 percentage points less likely to vote for Peronists.


Table 15.1 - The structure of political cleavages in Argentina, 2015-2019

	Share of votes received (%)	
	Peronists	Non-Peronists
Education		
Primary	55%	45%
Secondary	51%	49%
Tertiary	38%	62%
Income		
Bottom 50%	55%	45%
Middle 40%	44%	56%
Top 10%	34%	66%
Occupation		
Public worker	39%	61%
Private worker	34%	66%
Entrepreneur	27%	73%
Self-employed	38%	62%
Subjective social class		
Working class	57%	43%
Upper/Middle class	32%	68%
Location		
Urban area	47%	53%
Rural area	40%	60%

Source: authors' computations using Argentinian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by Peronists and non-Peronists by selected individual characteristics in 2015-2019. 55% of primary-educated voters voted for Peronists in this period, compared to only 38% of university graduates.


Figure 15.3 - Election results in Chile, 1989-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Chilean political parties in presidential elections between 1989 and 2017. The Communists are included inside the Concertación in 2013 and 2017, as they run together in the election and the DC is included inside the Concertación in 2017, even though they run separately for the first time in that election. The right bloc received 45% of the vote in 2017.


Figure 15.4 - The left-wing vote by income and education in Chile, 1989-2017



Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for center-left and left-wing parties, after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, employment status, marital status, union membership, ethnicity, and region. In 2013-2017, top 10% income earners were 7 percentage points less likely to vote for the left. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left alliance.


Figure 15.5 - Vote and income in Chile, 1993-2017



Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Chilean parties or group of parties. In 2013-2017, top 10% income earners were 5 percentage points more likely to vote for the Independent Democratic Union and National Renewal.

Figure 15.6 - Vote and education in Chile, 1989-2017



Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Chilean political parties or groups of parties. In 2013-2017, top 10% educated voters were 10 percentage points less likely to vote for Concertación.


Table 15.2 - The structure of political cleavages in Chile, 2017

Share of votes received (%)				
	Communist Party / Humanist Party / Broad Front / Other left	The Force of the Majority (excl. Communists)	Christian Democratic Party	Independent Democratic Union / National Renewal
Education level				
Primary	19%	27%	6%	48%
Secondary	27%	23%	5%	45%
Tertiary	24%	29%	4%	43%
Income group				
Bottom 50%	26%	24%	5%	45%
Middle 40%	21%	26%	6%	47%
Top 10%	16%	31%	3%	51%
Region				
North	25%	26%	2%	47%
Center	26%	27%	5%	42%
South	21%	25%	4%	51%
Age				
20-39	33%	19%	2%	47%
40-59	21%	29%	5%	44%
+60	16%	34%	9%	42%

Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Notes: the table presents the share of votes received by the main Chilean political groups in the 2017 election by selected individual characteristics. In 2017, 48% of primary-educated voters voted for the Independent Democratic Union or National Renewal, compared to 43% of university graduates.


Figure 15.7 - Election results in Costa Rica, 1953-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected Costa Rican political parties and groups of parties in presidential elections between 1953 and 2018. The National Restoration Party received 26% of the vote in 2018.

Figure 15.8 - Vote and income in Costa Rica, 1974-2018



Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Costa Rican political parties. In 2010-2018, top 10% income earners were 16 percentage points more likely to vote for the Citizens' Action Party.

Table 15.3 - The structure of political cleavages in Costa Rica, 2010-2018


Share of votes (%)						
	FA	PAC	PLN	ML	PUSC	PRN
Education						
Primary	4%	27%	40%	4%	5%	15%
Secondary	6%	34%	26%	4%	6%	17%
Tertiary	8%	40%	20%	4%	14%	9%
Postgraduate	5%	46%	25%	3%	10%	7%
Income						
Bottom 50%	6%	28%	32%	3%	6%	20%
Middle 40%	5%	34%	27%	5%	8%	15%
Top 10%	5%	47%	25%	4%	12%	5%
Region						
Metropolitan Area of San José	7%	33%	27%	2%	10%	13%
Central-Urban	5%	42%	29%	4%	6%	8%
Central-Rural	3%	31%	34%	6%	6%	14%
Lowlands-Urban	6%	27%	33%	5%	7%	19%
Lowlands-Rural	5%	28%	33%	3%	5%	21%
Worker type						
Business owner/partner	6%	37%	21%	4%	10%	14%
Wage earner	7%	34%	28%	4%	8%	13%
Self-employed	4%	33%	29%	5%	7%	15%
Sector of employment						
Private/mixed sector	6%	34%	28%	4%	7%	15%
Public	8%	37%	28%	5%	10%	9%
Ethnicity						
White	6%	31%	33%	4%	7%	13%
Mestizo	5%	35%	29%	4%	8%	14%

Indigenous	7%	34%	31%	2%	6%	11%
Black / Mulatto	5%	38%	25%	2%	5%	18%
Other	5%	35%	25%	3%	4%	26%

Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Costa Rican political parties by selected individual characteristics over the period 2010-2018. 40% of primary-educated voters voted PLN during this period, compared to 25% of postgraduates.


Figure 15.9 - Election results in Colombia, 2002-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Colombian political parties in general elections between 2002 and 2018. Right-wing parties (Uribists): Partido de la U (2010), Partido Conservador, Cambio Radical, Primero Colombia, Movimiento Si Colombia, and Centro Democrático. Left-wing parties (Anti-Uribists): Polo Democrático, Partido de la U (2014), Partido Liberal, Alianza Social Independiente, Partido Verde, Colombia Humana, and Compromiso Ciudadano. Left-wing parties received 51% of the vote in 2018.


Figure 15.10 - The anti-uribist vote by income and education in Colombia, 2002-2018



Source: authors' computations using Colombian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of tertiary-educated and top-income voters for left-wing (anti-uribist) parties, after controlling for age, gender, region, rural-urban location, employment status, marital status, sector of employment, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. In 2018, university graduates were 9 percentage points more likely to vote for anti-uribists.


**Figure 15.11 - The anti-uribist vote in Colombia, 2002-2018:
public workers, new generations, and urban areas**



Source: authors' computations using Colombian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of public workers, young voters, and urban areas for left-wing (anti-uribist) parties, after controlling for income, education, gender, region, employment status, marital status, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. In 2018, voters aged 20 to 39 were 12 percentage points more likely to vote for anti-uribists.


**Figure 15.12 - The anti-uribist vote in Colombia, 2002-2018:
non-religious voters, Afro-Colombians, and women**



Source: authors' computations using Colombian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of non-religious voters, Afro-Colombians, and women for left-wing (anti-uribist) parties, after controlling for income, education, age, region, rural-urban location, employment status, marital status, and sector of employment. In 2018, non-religious voters were 19 percentage points more likely to vote for anti-uribists.


Figure 15.13 - Election results in Mexico, 1952-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Mexican political parties in presidential elections between 1952 and 2018. The Institutional Revolutionary Party received 16% of the vote in 2018.


Figure 15.14 - The social democratic vote by income and education in Mexico, 1979-2018



Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for social democratic parties (PRD / MORENA / Other social democrats and progressives), after controlling for age, gender, religion, employment status, marital status, occupation, perceived class, union membership, rural-urban location, region, and ethnicity. Over the period 2012-2018, university graduates were 6 percentage points more likely to vote for social democratic and progressive parties.


Figure 15.15 - Vote and education in Mexico, 1952-2018



Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Mexican political parties. Over the 2012-2018 period, top 10% educated voters were 12 percentage points less likely to vote for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

Figure 15.16 - Vote and income in Mexico, 1952-2018



Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Mexican political parties. Over the 2012-2018 period, top 10% income earners were 10 percentage points less likely to vote for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).


Table 15.4 - The structure of political cleavages in Mexico, 2018

	Share of votes received (%)		
	PRI	PAN	PRD / Morena
Education			
Primary	25%	19%	48%
Secondary	17%	18%	57%
Tertiary	13%	26%	50%
Income			
Bottom 50%	19%	19%	54%
Middle 40%	18%	20%	55%
Top 10%	14%	26%	53%
Age			
20-39	16%	21%	52%
40-59	20%	20%	54%
60+	21%	19%	53%
Region			
North	20%	22%	53%
Center West	15%	25%	46%
Center	22%	20%	49%
South	12%	14%	69%
Ethnic group			
White	25%	30%	39%
Mestizo	18%	17%	56%
Indigenous	6%	14%	74%
Other	19%	28%	48%

Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Mexican political parties by selected individual characteristics in the 2018 election. 25% of primary-educated voters voted for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2018, compared to only 13% of university graduates. PAN: National Action Party; PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution.


Figure 15.17 - Election results in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected Peruvian political parties or groups of parties in presidential elections between 1995 and 2016. Note that the APRA still exists in the 2010s but does not appear separately in the survey. Fujimorists (Keiko Fujimori, Popular Force) received 40% of the vote in 2016.


Figure 15.18 - The socialist / progressive vote by income and education in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for center-left and left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left), after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, employment status, marital status, rural-urban location, ethnicity, and region. In 2016, university graduates were 5 percentage points more likely to vote for socialists / progressives.


Figure 15.19 - Vote and education in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Peruvian political parties. In 2016, the top 10% educated were 10 percentage points less likely to vote for Fujimorists (Keiko Fujimori, Popular Force).


Figure 15.20 - Vote and income in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Peruvian political parties. In 2016, top 10% income earners were 12 percentage points less likely to vote for Fujimorists (Keiko Fujimori, Popular Force).


Figure 15.21 - The socialist / progressive vote by region, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left and left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left) by region. The socialists and progressives received 29% of the vote in the South in 2016.

Figure 15.22 - The ethnic cleavage in Peru, 2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left) by ethnic affiliation. In 2016, 36% of Quechua voters voted for the socialists and progressives, compared to 9% of White voters.