



**Figure 17.1 - Election results in Botswana, 1965-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using official election results (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of political parties in Botswana in general elections between 1965 and 2019. The Botswana Democratic Party received 53% of votes in 2019.


**Figure 17.2 - Ethnolinguistic educational inequalities in Botswana**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the composition of education groups by language in Botswana in 2019. Speakers of Sotho-Tswana languages represented 80% of voters with no diploma and 83% of tertiary-educated voters. Illiterates represented about 11% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 18%, secondary-educated respondents 49%, and tertiary-educated respondents 22%.


**Figure 17.3 - Vote for the Botswana Democratic Party  
by language, 2004-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) by language. In 2019, 55% of speakers of Sotho-Tswana languages voted BDP, compared to 70% of Kalanga speakers. Sotho-Tswana then represented about 81% of the electorate, Kalanga 10%, Kgaladi 5%, and other languages 5%.


**Figure 17.4 - The rural-urban cleavage in Botswana, 1999-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of voters from rural areas and the share of voters living in cities voting for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), before and after controls. The BDP always made better scores in rural areas than in urban areas throughout the period considered. Rural areas represented about 32% of the electorate in 2019, down from 55% in 1999.


**Figure 17.5 - The educational cleavage in Botswana, 1999-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), before and after controls. In 2019, university graduates were less likely to vote BDP by 35 percentage points. Tertiary-educated voters represented about 22% of the electorate in 2019, compared to 9% in 1999.


**Figure 17.6 - Presidential election results in Ghana, 1960-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using official election results (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of political parties in Ghana in the first round of presidential elections between 1960 and 2016. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) received 44% of votes in 2016.


**Figure 17.7 - Regional educational inequalities in Ghana**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the composition of education groups by region in Ghana in 2016. The Northern region includes the Upper East and the Upper West. In 2016, 46% of voters with no diploma lived in the Northern region, compared to 10% of tertiary-educated individuals. Illiterates then represented 18% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 16%, secondary-educated respondents 38%, and post-secondary-educated respondents (including high school graduates) 28%.

**Figure 17.8 - The NDC vote by linguistic group in Ghana, 2000-2016**




**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) by language. In 2016, 22% of Akan speakers voted NDC, compared to 79% of Ewe speakers. Ewe speakers then represented about 15% of the electorate, speakers of Gur languages 19%, speakers of Ga-Dangbe languages 8%, and Akan speakers 53%.




**Figure 17.9 - The NDC vote by region in Ghana, 2004-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) by region. The Northern region includes the Upper East and the Upper West. In 2016, the NDC received 80% of votes in the Volta region, compared to 13% of votes in the Ashanti region. The Ashanti region then represented about 19% of the electorate, Brong Ahafo 9%, Eastern 10%, Central 9%, Western 9%, Greater Accra 18%, Northern 16%, and Volta 9%.


**Figure 17.10 - The rural-urban cleavage in Ghana, 2000-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in rural areas and the share of voters living in cities voting for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), before and after controls. In 2016, rural areas were more likely to vote NDC by 12 percentage points. Rural areas then represented about 46% of the electorate, down from 63% in 2000.


**Figure 17.11 - The educational cleavage in Ghana, 2000-2016**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of secondary/tertiary-educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), before and after controls. In 2016, higher-educated voters were less likely to vote NDC by 6 percentage points. They then represented about 28% of the electorate.


**Figure 17.12 - Presidential election results in Nigeria, 1999-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using official election results (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Nigerian political parties in presidential elections between 1999 and 2019. The People's Democratic Party received 41% of votes in 2019, down from 63% in 1999.


**Figure 17.13 - Ethnoreligious educational inequalities in Nigeria**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).

**Note:** the figure shows the composition of education groups by religion in Nigeria in 2019. Muslims then represented over 85% of voters with no diploma, compared to 32% of university graduates. Overall, Muslims represented about 41% of the electorate, Catholics 5%, and other Christians 53%. Illiterates represented 14% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 13%, secondary-educated respondents 45%, and tertiary-educated respondents 28%.


**Figure 17.14 - The PDP vote by religion in Nigeria, 2003-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) by religious affiliation. In 2019, the PDP was supported by 12% of Muslims, compared to 90% of Catholics. Muslims then represented about 41% of the electorate, Catholics 5%, and other Christians 53%.


**Figure 17.15 - The ethnoreligious cleavage in Nigeria, 2003-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslim voters voting for the People's Democratic Party (PDP), and the same difference for Catholics, before and after controls. In 2019, Muslims were less likely to vote PDP by 51 percentage points. Muslims then represented about 41% of the electorate, Catholics 5%, and other Christians 53%.

**Figure 17.16 - The educational cleavage in Nigeria, 1999-2019**




**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of secondary- and tertiary-educated voters and the share of primary-educated voters and illiterates voting for the People's Democratic Party (PDP), before and after controls. In 2019, highest-educated voters were more likely to vote PDP by 34 percentage points. Illiterates then represented 14% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 13%, secondary-educated respondents 45%, and tertiary-educated respondents 28%.




**Figure 17.17 - Presidential election results in Senegal, 2000-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using official election results(voir wpid.world).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the main parties of groups of parties in presidential elections held in Senegal between 2000 and 2019. The Alliance for the Republic (Macky Sall) received 58% of votes in 2019.


**Figure 17.18 - Ethnolinguistic educational inequalities in Senegal**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the composition of education groups by linguistic group in Senegal in 2019. Fulani speakers then represented 31% of voters with no diploma, compared to 17% of university graduates. Overall, Wolof represented about 44% of the electorate, Fulani 28%, Serer 12%, Mande 7%, and other languages 8%. Illiterates represented 51% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 18%, secondary-educated respondents 23%, and tertiary-educated respondents 9%.


**Figure 17.19 - Vote PDS / APR by language in Senegal, 2000-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and/or the Alliance for the Republic (APR) by language. In 2019, 69% of Fulani speakers voted APR, compared to 55% of Wolof speakers. Wolof then represented about 44% of the electorate, Fulani 28%, Serer 12%, Mande 7%, and other languages 8%.


**Figure 17.20 - The rural-urban cleavage in Senegal, 2000-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and/or the Alliance for the Republic (APR) by rural-urban location. The APR received 48% of votes in urban areas in 2019, compared to 67% of votes in rural areas. Rural areas then represented about 54% of the electorate.

**Figure 17.21 - The educational cleavage in Senegal, 2000-2019**



**Source:** authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see [wpid.world](http://wpid.world)).

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and/or the Alliance for the Republic (APR), before and after controls. In 2019, university graduates were less likely to vote APR by 27 percentage points. University graduates then represented about 9% of the electorate, up from 6% in 2000.