Figure 18.1 - Legislative election results in Israel, 1949-2019

Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by different political blocs in Israel. The definition of each party by bloc and a historical breakdown of blocs by party are given in appendix Table A1 (see wpid.world).
**Figure 18.2 - Class cleavages in Israel, 1969-2019**

- **Blue line**: Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 50%) voters in terms of social class voting left.
- **Red line**: Difference between (% of bottom 50%) and (% of top 50%) voters in terms of social class voting left.

**Source:** Author’s computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).

**Note:** The figure shows how the vote for left-wing parties depends on self-reported social class, after controlling for age, gender, education, and household size. Until the late 1980s, lower classes were as likely to vote left (including center and Arab parties) as the general public. They became much less likely to do so during the last three decades. The opposite occurred, to a lower extent, among the top 10% upper classes.
Figure 18.3 - Vote for right and left in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1949-2019

Vote for right-wing and ultra-orthodox parties
Vote for left-wing, centrist, and Arab parties

Source: author's computations using historical election results (multiple sources) (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of votes received by right-wing parties (including ultra-orthodox parties) in Tel Aviv and the share of votes received by right-wing parties in Israel as a whole, as well as the same difference for left-wing parties (including center and Arab parties). Tel Aviv used to be more right-leaning and less left-leaning than the general public in the first election. It gradually became more left-leaning.
Figure 18.4 - Residual identity component in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1981-2015

Difference between (% of left-wing voters in Tel Aviv) and (% of left-wing voters in Israel)

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of votes received by left-wing parties in Tel Aviv and the share of votes received by left-wing parties in the rest of Israel, after controlling for self-reported social class, ethnicity, religiosity, gender, education, household size, and age. It illustrates a stable residual left-leaning identity component in Tel Aviv.
Figure 18.5 - Vote for right-wing and left-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in Israel, 2003-2015

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of unemployed/inactive voters voting for left/right-wing parties and the share of employed voters voting for left/right-wing parties. There is a mild trend of increasing support for right-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in recent years.
Figure 18.6 - The educational cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019

Difference between (% of top 10% educated) and (% of bottom 90% educated) voting left

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for left-wing parties, after controlling for age, social class, religiosity, ethnic origin, household size, and gender. In 2013-2019, higher-educated voters were more likely to vote for left-wing parties by 14 percentage points.
Figure 18.7 - Vote for right-wing parties among Sepharadic voters in Israel, 1969-2019

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Sepharadic (or Mizrachi) voters and the share of non-Sepharadic voters voting for right-wing parties, before and after controls. In 2013-2019, Sepharadic voters were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 22 percentage points.
Figure 18.8 - The religious cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019

Difference between (% of religious voters) and (% of non-religious voters) voting right

After controlling for age, gender, education, social class, ethnicity

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of religious voters and the share of non-religious voters voting for right-wing parties. In 2013-2019, religious voters were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 36 percentage points.
Figure 18.9 - The gender cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019

Difference between (% of women) and (% of men) voting left

After controlling for age, education, social class, religiosity, ethnicity

Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties. Women have consistently been more left-leaning than men, but only to a rather small degree, and only when controlling for other effects.