Figure 19.1 - Legislative election results in Turkey, 1987-2018

Secular centre right (DYP / ANAP)
Islamic right (RP / FP / AKP)
Centre left (SHP / DSP / CHP)
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)
Kurdish parties

Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Turkish political parties in legislative elections between 1987 and 2018.
Figure 19.2 - The religious cleavage in Turkey, 1991-2015

- Difference between (% of religious voters) and (% of non-religious voters) voting right / Islamic
- After controlling for income, education, age, gender, region
- Difference between (% of religious voters) and (% of non-religious voters) voting CHP
- After controls

Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of religious voters and the share of non-religious voters voting for right-wing and Islamic parties, and the same difference for the CHP, before and after controls. In 2015, religious voters were more likely to vote for these parties by 30 percentage points. Religious voters are defined as those who declare being "A religious person" (World Values Survey) or "Very religious / Somewhat religious" (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems).
Figure 19.3 - The AKP vote by income in Turkey, 2007-2018

Source: authors’ computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) by income quintile. In 2018, 48% of the poorest 20% of voters (Q1) voted AKP, compared to 32% of the top 20% (Q5).
Figure 19.4 - The educational cleavage in Turkey, 1991-2017

Source: authors’ computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for right-wing (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic (RP/FP) parties before 2007 or for the AKP after that date, before and after controls. In 2018, highest-educated voters were less likely to vote AKP by 14 percentage points.
Figure 19.5 - The Turkish-Kurdish cleavage in Turkey, 1995-2018

Source: authors’ computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Kurdish speakers and the share of speakers of Turkish and other languages voting for right-wing and Islamic parties before 2007 and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after that date, before and after controls. Kurdish speakers were less likely to vote AKP by 32 percentage points in 2015.
Figure 19.6 - Legislative election results in Iraq, 2005-2018

Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Iraqi political parties in legislative elections between 2005 (January, labelled here as 2004) and 2018.
Figure 19.7 - Geographical distribution of main ethno-religious groups in Iraq

Source: authors.
Vote for Shia Islamic lists by region


Source: authors’ computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by region. In 2018, Shia Islamic Lists received 53% of votes in Southern Iraq, compared to 0% in North-Eastern Iraq. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.
Figure 19.9 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among low-income voters in Iraq, 2005-2018

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners and the share of top 50% earners voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity. In 2018, low-income voters were more likely to vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by 3 percentage points. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.
Figure 19.10 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group in Iraq, 2005-2018

Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group. In 2018, 22% of the 50% least educated voters supported secular or anti-sectarian lists. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.
Figure 19.11 - Trust deficit towards the government by region in Iraq, 2005-2018

Source: authors’ computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure decomposes distrust expressed towards the government by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.
Figure 19.12 - Legislative election results in Algeria, 2002-2017

Source: authors’ computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main parties or groups of political parties in legislative elections held in Algeria between 2002 and 2017. FFS: Front des forces socialistes; RCD: Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie; PT: Parti des travailleurs.
Figure 19.13 - Vote for the secular opposition by region / language in Algeria, 2002-2017

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular opposition parties (Front des forces socialistes, FFS and Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie, RCD) by region. In 2017, 11% of Kabyle voters supported the secular opposition, compared to 6% of other voters. In 2002, speaking Amazigh at home is taken as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.
Figure 19.14 - Vote for FLN / RND and income in Algeria, 2002-2017

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the ruling parties (Front de libération nationale, FLN and Rassemblement national démocratique, RND), before and after controls. In 2002, top-income voters were less likely to vote FLN by 6 percentage points.
Figure 19.15 - The generational cleavage in Algeria, 2002-2017
Vote for FLN by age group

Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Liberal Front (FLN) by age group. In 2002, 27% of voters aged below 25 voted for the FLN, compared to 48% of those aged over 55.
Figure 19.16 - Political activism by income group in Algeria, 2002-2017

Source: authors’ computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of individuals declaring having already attended a demonstration or signed a petition by income group. This share grew from 22% to 33% among the poorest 50% between 2002 and 2017.