Figure 2.1 - Voting for left-wing, democratic, and labour parties in France, the United States, and Britain, 1948-2020: from the worker party to the high-education party

France: difference between (% of top 10% educated) and (% of bottom 90% educated) voting left (after controls)
US: same difference for Democratic Party (after controls)
Britain: same difference for Labour Party (after controls)

Note: in 1956, left parties (socialists-communists-others) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among top 10% education voters (after controls for age, gender, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar in the case of the Democratic vote in the US and the Labour vote in Britain. It also holds with no control.
Figure 2.2 - Legislative elections in France, 1946-2017

Electoral left (SFIO-PS, PCF, radicals, various left, greens, extreme left)
Electoral right (MRP, CNIP, UNR, RPR, UDF, UMP, LR, various right, FN, extreme right)
Other parties (difficult to rank on a left-right scale: regionalists, hunters, etc.)

Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the scores obtained by left-wing parties (socialists, communists, radicals, greens, and other parties from the center left, left, and extreme left) and right-wing parties (all parties from the center right, right, and extreme right combined) have oscillated between 40% and 58% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. The score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center left and center right.
Figure 2.3 - Educational expansion and left-wing vote by education in France, 1956-2012

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtained 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education). In 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtained 47% of the vote among voters with no degree and 57% among university graduates.
Figure 2.4 - Left-wing vote by education in France, 1956-2017: election by election

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education).
Figure 2.5 - Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party

Difference between (% of university graduates voting left) and (% of non-univ. graduates voting left)
After controlling for age, gender
After controlling for age, gender, income, wealth
After controlling for age, gender, income, wealth, father's occupation

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1956, left-wing parties obtained a score that was 17 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates; in 2012, their score was 8 points higher among university graduates. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).
Figure 2.6 - Left-wing vote by income decile in France, 1958-2012

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1958-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtained 46% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% income, 23% of the vote among top 10% income voters, and 17% among the top 1%. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile is relatively flat within the bottom 90%, and strongly declining for the top 10%, especially at the beginning of the period.
Figure 2.7 - Left-wing vote by wealth decile in France, 1974-2012

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1974-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtained 69% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% wealth, 23% of the vote among voters with top 10% wealth, and 13% among top 1% wealth holders. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile is strongly declining, all along the distribution, especially at the beginning of the period.
Figure 2.8 - Political conflict in France, 1956-2017: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal?

Difference between (% of university graduates) and (% of non-univ. graduates) voting left
Difference between (% of top 10% income voters) and (% of bottom 90% income voters) voting left
Difference between (% of top 10% wealth voters) and (% of bottom 90% wealth voters) voting left

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).

Note: the left-wing vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.9 - Political conflict in France, 1956-2017: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal? (after controls)

Difference between (% of top 10% education voters) and (% of bottom 90% education voters) voting left (after controls)

Difference between (% of top 10% income voters) and (% of bottom 90% income voters) voting left (after controls)

Difference between (% of top 10% wealth voters) and (% of bottom 90% wealth voters) voting left (after controls)

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).

Note: the left-wing vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.10 - Left-wing vote by religion in France, 1967-2012

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 38% of the vote among voters reporting to be practicing Catholics (going to church at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing Catholics, and 64% among voters reporting no religion.
Figure 2.11 - Left-wing vote by religion in France: the case of Islam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pract. Catholics</th>
<th>Non-pract. Catholics</th>
<th>Other religion</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s computations using French post-electoral surveys 1997-2012 (see wpid.world).

Note: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 38% of the vote among practicing Catholics (at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing Catholics, 52% among voters reporting another religion (protestantism, judaism, buddhism, etc., except islam), 64% among voters with no religion, and 91% among Muslims.
Figure 2.12 - Political conflict in France, 1986-2012: Muslim vote leaning to the left

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1986-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained a score among Muslim voters that was 42 points higher than among other voters; the gap falls to 38 points after controlling for age, gender, education, income, wealth, and father's occupation.
Figure 2.13 - Two-dimensional political conflict and four-quarter electorate in France

- Internationalists-Egalitarians (pro-migrants, pro-poor)
- Internationalists-Inegalitarians (pro-migrants, pro-rich)
- Nativists-Inegalitarians (anti-migrants, pro-rich)
- Nativists-Egalitarians (anti-migrants, pro-poor)

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 2002-2017 (see wpid.world).

Note: in 2017, 21% of voters are "internationalists-egalitarians" (they consider that there are not too many migrants, and that we should reduce inequality between rich and poor); 26% are "nativists-inegalitarians" (they consider that there are too many migrants and that we should not reduce rich-poor gaps); 23% are "internationalists-inegalitarians and 30% "nativists-egalitarians".

Lecture: en 1956, les partis de gauche (SFIO-PS, PCF, MRG, divers gauche et écologistes, extrême-gauche) obtiennent un score 12 point
### Table 2.1 - Two-dimensional political conflict in France 2017: an electorate divided into four quarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential election 2017 (1st round)</th>
<th>All voters</th>
<th>Mélenchon/Hamon (&quot;Egalitarian-Internationalist&quot;)</th>
<th>Macron (&quot;Inegalitarian-Internationalist&quot;)</th>
<th>Fillon (&quot;Inegalitarian-Nativist&quot;)</th>
<th>Le Pen/Dupont-Aignan (&quot;Egalitarian-Nativist&quot;)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;There are too many immigrants in France&quot; (% agree)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In order to achieve social justice we need to take from the rich and give to the poor&quot; (% agree)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University graduates (%)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income &gt; 4000€ (%)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership (%)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** author's computations using French post-electoral survey 2017 (see wpid.world).

**Note:** in 2017, 28% of first-round voters voted for Mélenchon/Hamon; 32% of them believed that there were too many migrants in France (vs 56% among all voters) and 67% that we should take from the rich and give to the poor (vs 51% on average). This electorate can therefore be viewed as "egalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrants, pro-poor), while the Macron electorate is "inegalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrant, pro-rich), the Fillon electorate "inegalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-rich) and the Le Pen/Dupont-Aignan electorate "inegalitarian-internationalist" (anti-migrant, pro-poor). The votes for Arthaud/Poutou (2%) and Asselineau/Cheminade/Lassalle (2%) were added to the votes for Mélenchon-Hamon and Fillon respectively.
Figure 2.14 - Presidential elections in the US, 1948-2020

Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the scores obtained by Democratic and Republican parties candidates in presidential elections conducted in the US between 1948 and 2016 have generally varied between 40% and 60% of the vote (popular vote, all States combined). The scores obtained by other candidates have generally been relatively small (less than 10% of the vote), with the exception of Wallace in 1968 (14%) and Perot in 1992 and 1996 (20% and 10%).
Figure 2.15 - Vote for Democratic Party by education in the US, 1948-2016

Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2016, the Democratic Party candidate (Clinton) obtained 45% of the vote among high-school graduates and 75% among PhDs. Primary: voters with no high-school degree. Secondary: high-school degree but not bachelor degree. Higher (BA): bachelor degree. Higher (MA): advanced degree (master, law/medical school). Higher (PhD): PhD degree.
Figure 2.16 - Voting for the Democratic Party in the US, 1948-2020: from the worker party to the high-education party

Difference between (% of top 10% education voters) and (% of bottom 90% education voters) voting Democratic

- After controlling for age, gender
- After controlling for age, gender, income, race


Note: in 1948, the Democratic candidate obtained a score that was 21 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90%; in 2016, the score of the Democratic candidate was 23 points higher among top 10% education voters.
Figure 2.17 - Political conflict in the US, 1948-2020: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal?


Note: the Democratic vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs income); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.18 - Vote for Democratic Party by ethnic origin in the US, 1948-2020


Note: in 2016, the Democratic Party candidate (Clinton) obtained 37% of the vote among White voters, 89% of the vote among Black voters and 64% of the vote among Latino and other voters.
Figure 2.19 - Minority vote in the US, 1948-2020: before and after controls


Note: in 1948, the Democratic candidate obtained a score that was 11 points higher among minority voters than among Whites; in 2016, the Democratic candidate obtained a score that was 39 points higher among minority voters.
Figure 2.20 - Political conflict and national-ethnic origins: France vs US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France 2012</th>
<th>United States 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No foreign origin</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European foreign origin</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-European foreign origin</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s computations using US and French post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: in 2012, the French left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grandparent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origins (mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal, etc.), and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (mostly Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa). In 2016, the US democratic candidate (Clinton) obtains 37% of the vote among Whites, 64% of the vote among Latinos/others, and 89% of the vote among Blacks.
Figure 2.21 - Legislative elections in Britain, 1945-2017

Source: author’s computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: in the 1945 legislative elections, the Labour party obtained 48% of the vote and the Conservatives 36% of the vote (hence a total of 84% of the vote for the two main parties). In the 2017 legislative elections, the Conservatives obtained 42% of the vote, and the Labour party 40% of the vote (hence a total of 82%). Liberals / Lib-Dem: Liberals, Liberal Democrats, SDP–Liberal Alliance. SNP: Scottish National Party. UKIP: UK Independence Party. Other parties include green and regionalist parties.
Figure 2.22 - Voting for the Labour Party in Britain, 1955-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party

Difference between (% of top 10% education voters) and (% of bottom 90% education voters) voting Labour

After controlling for age, gender

After controlling for age, gender, income, ethnic group


Note: in 1955, the Labour Party obtained a score that was 25 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters (registered voters are ranked by highest degree); in 2017, the score of the Labour Party was 13 points higher among top 10% education voters. Controls alter levels but do not affect trends.
**Figure 2.23 - Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal?**

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Difference between (% of top 10% education voters) and (% of bottom 90% education voters) voting Labour (after controls)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue</td>
<td>Difference between (% of top 10% income voters) and (% of bottom 90% income voters) voting Labour (after controls)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Difference between (% of top wealth holders) and (% of bottom wealth holders) voting Labour (after controls)</td>
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</table>

**Source:** author’s computations using British post-electoral surveys 1955-2017 (BES) (see wpid.world).

**Note:** the Labour vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs income); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, but at this stage this scenario seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.24 - Labour vote by religion in Britain, 1964-2017

![Bar chart showing Labour vote percentages by religion from 1964 to 2017.]

- **Christians**: 96%, 67%, 57%, 47%, 43%
- **Other religions**: 1%, 1%, 4%, 3%, 4%
- **No religion**: 3%, 31%, 37%, 47%, 48%
- **Islam**: 1%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 5%

**Source**: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1964-2017 (BES) (see wpid.world).

**Note**: in 2017, the Labour Party obtained 39% of the vote among self-reported Christians (inc. Anglicans, other Protestants, Catholics), 56% among voters reporting other religions (Judaism, Hinduism, etc., except Islam), 54% among voters reporting no religion, and 96% among self-reported Muslims. Before 1979, Islam is included with other religions.
Figure 2.25 - Labour vote by ethnic group in Britain, 1979-2017

Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1979-2017 (BES) (see wpid.world).

Note: in 2017, the Labour Party obtained 41% of the vote among self-reported ethnic "Whites", 81% among "Africans-Caribbeans", 82% among "Indians-Pakistanis-Bangladeshis" and 69% among "Other" (including "Chinese", "Arabs", etc.). In 2017, 5% of voters refused to answer the ethnic identity question (and 77% of them voted Labour) (not shown here).