



Figure 8.1a - Election results in the Czech Republic, 1990-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: labels show parties that received more than 5% of total votes.


Figure 8.1b - Election results in Hungary, 1990-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: list votes are reported. After 2006 votes for Fidesz include votes for KDNP.


Figure 8.1c - Election results in Poland, 1991-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: labels show parties that obtained more than 3% of total votes.


Figure 8.2a - Vote and income in the Czech Republic, 1990-2017



Source: authors' computations using post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Czech parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and education. In 1996, left-wing parties obtained a score that was 16 points lower among top 10% earners than among the bottom 90%; in 2017, their score was 5 points lower. The right includes Civic Forum in 1990 and STAN in 2017.


Figure 8.2b - Vote and income in Hungary, 1998-2018



Source: authors' computations using post-election surveys for 1998 and 2002, ESS for all other years (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Hungarian parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and education. In 1998, top 10% earners were less likely to vote Fidesz by 9 percentage points, while they were more likely to do so by 19 percentage points in 2018. No data on income in 2006.


Figure 8.2c - Vote and income in Poland, 1991-2015



Source: authors' computations using POLPAN (1991-1997), CSES (2001, 2005), and ESS (2007-2015) (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Polish parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and education. During the 2007-2015 period, top 10% earners were less likely to vote PiS by between 8 and 12 percentage points, while they were more likely to vote for the Civic Platform by 12 to 19 percentage points.


Figure 8.3a - The educational cleavage in the Czech Republic, 1990-2017



Source: authors' computations using post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the main Czech parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and income. In 1996, university graduates were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 3 percentage points, compared to 11 points in 2017.


Figure 8.3b - The educational cleavage in Hungary, 1998-2018



Source: authors' computations using post-election surveys for 1998 and 2002, ESS for all other years (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the main Hungarian parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and income. In 1998, university graduates were more likely to vote Fidesz by 1 percentage point, while they were less likely to do so by 11 points in 2018. No data on income in 2006.

Figure 8.3c - The educational cleavage in Poland, 1991-2015



Source: authors' computations using POLPAN (1991-1997), CSES (2001, 2005), and ESS (2007-2015) (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the main Polish parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and income. During the 2007-2015 period, university graduates were less likely to vote PiS by 1 to 11 percentage points, while they were more likely to vote for the Civic Platform by 5 to 11 percentage points.