

Chapter 2. "Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right: Rising Inequality and the Changing Structure of Political Conflict"

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
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
Figure 2.1 - Voting for left, democratic and labour parties in France, the US and Britain 1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using French, US and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1956, left parties (socialists-communists-others) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among top 10% educ. voters (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for democratic vote in the US and labour vote in Britain. It also holds with no control.

Figure 2.2 - Legislative elections in France, 1946-2017



Source: author's computations using official election results. **Note:** The scores obtained by left-wing parties (socialistes, communistes, radicals, greens and other parties from the center-left, left and extreme-left) and right-wing parties (all parties from center-right, right and extreme-right combined) have oscillated between 40% and 58% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. The score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center-left and center-right.


Figure 2.3 - Educational expansion and left vote by education in France



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education). In 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtains 47% of the vote among voters with no degree and 57% among university graduates.


Figure 2.4 - Left vote by education in France: election by election



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education).


**Figure 2.5 - Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).

Reading: in 1956, left parties obtain a score that is 17 point lower among univ. graduates than among non-univ. graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among university graduates. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).


Figure 2.6 - Left-wing vote by income decile in France, 1958-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 46% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% income, 23% of the vote among top 10% income voters, and 17% among top 1%. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile is relatively flat within the bottom 90%, and strongly declining for the top 10%, especially at the beginning of the period.


Figure 2.7 - Left-wing vote by wealth decile in France, 1974-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 69% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% wealth, 23% of the vote among voters with top 10% wealth, and 13% among top 1% wealth holders. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile is strongly declining, all along the distribution, especially at the beginning of the period.


**Figure 2.8 - Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.


**Figure 2.9 - Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal? (after controls)**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.


Figure 2.10 - Left-wing vote by religion in France, 1967-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtains 38% of the vote among voters reporting to be practicing catholics (going to church at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing catholics, and 64% among voters reporting no religion.


Figure 2.11 - Left-wing vote by religion in France: the case of Islam



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtains 38% of the vote among practicing catholics (at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing catholics, 52% among voters reporting another religion (protestantism, judaism, buddhism, etc., except islam), 64% among voters with no religion and 91% among muslims. Islam is classified with "other religion" in 1973-1978.


**Figure 2.12 - Political conflict in France, 1986-2012:
muslim vote leaning to the left**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtained a score among muslim voters that was 42 points higher than among other voters; the gap falls to 38 points after controls for age, sex, educ., income, wealth, father's occupation.

Figure 2.13 - Two-dimensional political conflict & the four-quarter electorate



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 2002-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 2017, 21% of voters are "internationalists-egalitarians" (they consider that there are not too many migrants, and that we should reduce inequality between rich and poor); 26% are "nativists-inegalitarians" (they consider that there are too many migrants and that we should not reduce rich-poor gap); 23% are "internationalists-inegalitarians" & 30% "nativists-egalitarians".

Table 2.1 - Two-dimensional political conflict in France 2017: an electorate divided into four quarters

Presidential election 2017 (1 st round)	All voters	Mélenchon /Hamon ("Egalitarian- Internationalist")	Macron ("Inegalitarian- Internationalist")	Fillon ("Inegalitarian- Nativist")	Le Pen /Dupont-Aignan ("Egalitarian- Nativist")
	100%	28%	24%	22%	26%
"There are too many immigrants in France" (% agree)	56%	32%	39%	62%	91%
"In order to achieve social justice we need to take from the rich and give to the poor" (% agree)	51%	67%	46%	27%	61%
University graduates (%)	33%	39%	41%	36%	16%
Monthly income > 4000€ (%)	15%	9%	20%	26%	8%
Home ownership (%)	60%	48%	69%	78%	51%


Source: author's computations using French post-electoral survey 2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict). **Note:** in 2017, 28% of first-round voters voted for Mélenchon/Hamon; 32% of them believe that there are too many migrants in France (vs 56% among all voters) and 67% that we should take from the rich and give to the poor (vs 51% on average). This electorate can therefore be viewed as "egalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrants, pro-poor), while the Macron electorate is "inegalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrant, pro-rich), the Fillon electorate "inegalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-rich) and the Le Pen/DupontAignan electorate "inegalitarian-internationalist" (anti-migrant, pro-poor). The votes for Arthaud/Poutou (2%) and Asselineau/Cheminade/Lassale (2%) were added to the votes for Melenchon-Hamon and Fillon respectively.

Figure 2.14 - Presidential elections in the US, 1948-2016



Source: author's computations using official election results. **Reading:** The scores obtained by democratic and republican parties candidates in presidential elections conducted in the U.S. between 1948 and 2016 have generally varied between 40% and 60% of the vote (popular vote, all States combined). The scores obtained by other candidates have generally been relatively small (less than 10% of the vote), with the exception of Wallace in 1968 (14%) and Perot in 1992 and 1996 (20% and 10%).

Figure 2.15 - Vote for democratic party by education in the US, 1948-2016




Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2016, the democratic party candidate (Clinton) obtained 45% of the vote among high-school graduates and 75% among PhDs.

Primary: voters with no high-school degree. Secondary: high-school degree but not bachelor degree. Higher (BA): bachelor degree. Higher (MA): advanced degree (master, law/medical school). Higher (PhD): PhD degree.


**Figure 2.16 - Voting for the democratic party in the US, 1948-2016:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 21 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90%; in 2016, the score of the democratic candidate is 23 points higher among top 10% education voters.


**Figure 2.17 - Political conflict in the US, 1948-2016:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the democratic vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.


Figure 2.18 - Vote for democratic party by ethnic origin in the US, 1948-2016



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2016, the democratic party candidate (Clinton) obtains 37% of the vote among white voters, 89% of the vote among black voters and 64% of the vote among latino and other voters.


**Figure 2.19 - Minority vote in the US, 1948-2016:
before and after controls**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 11 points higher among minority voters than among whites; in 2016, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 39 points higher among minority voters.


Figure 2.20 - Political conflict and national-ethnic origins: France vs the US



Source: author's computation using French and US post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 2012, the French left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grand-parent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origins (mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal, etc.), and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (mostly Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa). In 2016, the US democratic candidate (Clinton) obtains 37% of the vote among Whites, 64% of the vote among Latinos/others, and 89% of the vote among Blacks.

Figure 2.21 - Legislative elections in Britain 1945-2017



Source: author's computations using official election results. **Note:** in the 1945 legislative elections, the Labour party obtained 48% of the vote and the Conservatives 36% of the vote (hence a total of 84% of the vote for the two main parties). In the 2017 legislative elections, the Conservatives obtained 42% of the vote, and the Labour party 40% of the vote (hence a total of 82%). Liberals / Lib-Dem: Liberals, Liberals-democrats, SDP Alliance. SNP: Scottish National Party. UKIP: UK Independence Party. Other parties include green and regionalist parties.


**Figure 2.22 - Voting for the labour party in Britain, 1955-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1955, the labour party obtained a score that was 25 points lower among top 10% education voters (registered voters are ranked by highest degree); in 2017, the score of the labour party is 13 points higher among top 10% education voters. Controls alter levels but do not affect trends.


**Figure 2.23 - Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this scenario seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.


Figure 2.24 - Labour vote by religion in Britain 1964-2017



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2017, the labour party obtains 39% of the vote among self-reported Christians (inc. Anglicans, other Protestants, Catholics), 56% among voters reporting other religions (Judaism, Hinduism, etc., except Islam), 54% among voters reporting no religion, and 96% among self-reported Muslims. Before 1979, Islam is included with other religions.

Figure 2.25 - Labour vote by ethnic group in Britain 1979-2017



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2017, the labour party obtains 41% of the vote among self-reported ethnic "Whites", 81% among among "Africans-Caribbeans", 82% among "Indians-Pakistanis-Bengladeshis" and 69% among "Other" (including "Chinese", "Arabs", etc.). In 2017, 5% of voters refused to answer the ethnic identity question (and 77% of them voted Labour) (not shown here).