Table 1.1 - A New Dataset on Political Cleavages and Social Inequalities

	Time period	Elections	Data quality	Avg. sample size	Low-income party / coalition / candidates
Western Europe					
Austria	1971-2017	10	Medium	3831	Social Democratic Party, KPÖ, Greens, NEOS, Other left
Belgium	1971-2014	14	High	4817	Socialist Party, Socialist Party Differently, Ecolo, Agalev, PTB
Denmark	1960-2015	21	High	2819	Social Democrats, SF, Social Liberal Party, Red-Green Alliance
Finland	1972-2015	11	High	2452	Social Democratic Party, Green League, Left Alliance, Other left
France	1956-2017	17	High	3208	Socialist Party, Communist Party, Other left
Germany	1949-2017	19	High	2782	Social Democratic Party, Alliance 90/The Greens, Die Linke
Iceland	1978-2017	12	High	1488	Left-Green Movement, Social Democratic Alliance, People's Party
Ireland	1973-2020	13	Medium	7115	Fianna Fáil, Sinn Féin, Other left
Italy	1953-2018	14	High	2147	Democratic Party, Free and Equal
Luxembourg	1974-2018	9	Low	3890	Socialist Workers' Party, Greens, Other left
Netherlands	1967-2017	15	High	2068	Labour Party, Socialist Party, D66, Greens, Other left
Norway	1957-2017	15	High	1964	Labour Party, Green Party, Socialist Left Party
Portugal	1983-2019	10	High	1822	Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Unitary Democratic Coalition
Spain	1979-2019	14	High	8996	Socialist Workers' Party, Podemos, United Left, Other left
Sweden	1956-2014	19	High	3088	Social Democratic Party, Left Party, Green Party
Switzerland	1967-2019	14	High	3328	Social Democrats, Party of Labour, Green Party, Green Liberal Party
United Kingdom	1955-2017	16	High	5262	Labour Party
Post-communist Eastern Europe					
Czech Republic	1990-2017	7	High	1565	Social Democratic Party, Communist Party, Greens, Pirate Party
Hungary	1998-2018	6	High	1679	Fidesz, Jobbik
Poland	1991-2015	8	High	2555	Law and Justice
North America / Oceania					
Australia	1963-2019	18	High	2382	Labor Party, Greens
Canada	1963-2019	17	High	3302	Liberal Party, Green Party, New Democratic Party
New Zealand	1972-2017	16	High	2555	Labour Party, Greens, Other left

United States	1948-2020	18	High	2179	Democratic Party
Asia					
Hong Kong	1998-2016	5	Low	864	Pro-Beijing camp
India	1962-2014	10	High	13412	Indian National Congress, left-wing parties, other center / left
Indonesia	1999-2014	4	High	1850	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, NasDem, Golkar
Japan	1953-2017	14	Medium	1909	Constitutional Democratic Party, Communist Party, Soc. Dem. Party
Malaysia	2004-2013	3	Low	1213	Barisan Nasional
Pakistan	1970-2018	8	High	3682	Pakistan Peoples Party
Philippines	1998-2016	4	Medium	1200	Grace Poe, Jejomar Binay
South Korea	2000-2016	5	Medium	1160	Liberty Korea Party
Taiwan	1996-2016	6	Medium	1744	Democratic Progressive Party
Thailand	2001-2011	3	Low	1431	Pheu Thai
Latin America					
Argentina	1995-2019	6	Medium	2056	Peronist parties
Brazil	1989-2018	8	High	10225	Workers' Party
Chile	1989-2017	7	Medium	1135	Broad Front, Progressive Party, País
Colombia	2002-2018	5	Medium	3340	Democratic Center, Mejor Vargas Lleras
Costa Rica	1974-2018	12	Medium	1083	National Liberation Party
Mexico	1952-2018	9	Medium	1339	Institutional Revolutionary Party
Peru	1995-2016	5	Medium	1592	Popular Force
Africa and Middle East					
Algeria	2002-2017	3	Low	1226	National Liberation Front, Democratic National Rally
Botswana	1999-2019	5	Low	1680	Botswana Democratic Party
Ghana	2000-2016	4	Low	2600	National Democratic Congress
Iraq	2005-2018	5	Low	1984	Shia lists
Israel	1969-2019	15	High	1381	Likud, Other conservative / ultra-orthodox
Nigeria	1999-2019	6	Low	2853	All Progressives Congress
Senegal	2000-2019	4	Low	1800	Alliance for the Republic
South Africa	1994-2019	6	High	3514	African National Congress
Turkey	1991-2018	7	Medium	1564	Justice and Development Party (AKP)

Source: authors' elaboration using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the table presents, for each country, the time coverage of the dataset, the number of elections covered, the quality of electoral surveys, the average sample size of these surveys, and the main significant party or group of parties whose support is concentrated among the bottom 50% of income earners in the last election available (see corresponding case studies).

Figure 1.1 - The emergence of multi-elite party systems in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: in the 1960s, both higher-educated and high-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing (democratic / labor / social-democratic / socialist / green) parties than lower-educated and low-income voters by more than 10 percentage points. The left vote has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system". Figures correspond to five-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies.
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.2 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies. Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In nearly all countries, higher-educated voters used to be significantly more likely to vote for conservative parties and have gradually become more likely to vote for these parties. Estimates control for income, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.
Panel A. English-speaking and Northern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in English-speaking and Northern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.3 - The stability/decline of income divides in Western democracies.
Panel B. Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Continental and Southern European countries. In all countries, top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than low-income voters. Estimates control for education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.4 - The transformation of Western party systems, 1945-2020



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the average share of votes received by selected families of political parties in Western democracies between the 1940s and the 2010s. Communist parties saw their average scores collapse from 7% to less than 0.5%, while green and anti-immigration parties have risen until reaching average vote shares of 8% and 11% respectively. Decennial averages over all Western democracies except Spain and Portugal (no democratic elections before 1970s) and the United States and the United Kingdom (two-party systems).

Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel A. 1960-1980



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. In the 1960s-1980s, socialist and social democratic parties were supported by both low-income and lower-educated voters, while conservative, Christian, and liberal parties were supported by both high-income and higher-educated voters. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.5 - The fragmentation of Western cleavage structures. Panel B. 2000-2020



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of high-income (top 10%) and low-income (bottom 90%) voters voting for selected groups of parties on the y-axis, and the same difference between higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters on the x-axis. Education most clearly distinguishes anti-immigration from green parties, while income most clearly distinguishes conservative and Christian parties from socialist and social-democratic parties. Averages over all Western democracies. Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.6 - The decline of self-perceived class cleavages in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters self-identifying as belonging to the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class", the "upper class" or "no class" voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. Self-perceived class cleavages have declined significantly over the past decades. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, rural/urban, region, race/ethnicity, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.7 - Income and educational divides in non-Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of low-income (bottom 50%) and high-income (top 50%) voters voting for selected "pro-poor parties" (see table 1.1) on the x-axis, and the same difference between lower-educated (bottom 50%) and higher-educated (top 50%) voters on the y-axis in non-Western democracies. South Africa and Botswana display particularly strong income and educational divides, while education and income only play a minor role in determining electoral behaviors in Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Income and education are shown as identical for Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal given lack of data on income.

Figure 1.8 (panel a) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: English-speaking and Northern-European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Protestants declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, Protestants have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure 1.8 (panel b) - Religious-secular cleavages in Western democracies: Continental and Southern European countries



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of Catholics (or Catholics and Protestants in mixed countries) declaring going to church at least once a year and the share of other voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, religious voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than other voters.

Figure 1.9 - Religious-secular cleavages in Latin America



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters declaring belonging to no religion and the share of other voters voting for left-wing / secular parties (Peronist parties in Argentina) in the last election available (Argentina 2015, Brazil 2018, Chile 2017, Colombia 2018, Costa Rica 2018, Mexico 2018, Peru 2016). Non-religious voters are more likely to vote for left-wing / secular parties in all countries, but this gap is large in Costa Rica and almost insignificant in Argentina. See case studies for more details on classification of parties.

Figure 1.10 - Religious-secular cleavages in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the evolution of the vote of religious minorities or non-religious voters in Israel, Turkey, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia. In the past decades, religious cleavages have risen in India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, while they have remained stable at high levels in Indonesia, Turkey, and Israel. INC: Indian National Congress; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; DAP: Democratic Action Party; PKR: People's Justice Party; PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party.

Figure 1.11 - The native-immigrant cleavage in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of voters born in non-Western countries (all countries excluding Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States) and the share of natives (voters born in the country considered) voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In nearly all Western countries, immigrants are much more likely to vote for these parties than natives. US and Iceland figures include voters born in Western countries given lack of data on exact country of origin. Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure 1.12 - The Muslim vote in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world) and the European Social Survey for Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslims voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties over the 2010-2020 period. In all Western countries, Muslims are substantially more likely to vote for these parties than non-Muslims. This cleavage is stronger in countries with strong far-right parties (e.g. Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, France). Excludes Fianna Fáil in Ireland.

Figure 1.13 - Sociocultural cleavages and disadvantaged minorities in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of specific sociocultural minorities and the share of other voters voting for selected "pro-poor" parties in the last election available. The Turkish AKP corresponds to a "social-exclusive party": it is supported by low-income voters of the majority but not by the disadvantaged Kurdish minority. The Democratic Party in the United States is a "social-inclusive party", supported by both low-income voters and disadvantaged Black voters. Ethnic minorities correspond to non-Tswana groups in Botswana and speakers of Fulani / Serer / Mande languages in Senegal.

Figure 1.14 - The strength and persistence of sociocultural cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of a specific sociocultural group and the rest of the electorate voting for selected parties or groups of parties. In the United States in the 1940s, Black voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic Party by 12 percentage points, compared to 49 percentage points in the 2010s. Sociocultural cleavages have risen or remained stable at high levels in the majority of represented countries. They are highest in South Africa and lowest in Indonesia. For India, the gap corresponds to SCs/STs vs. Upper castes.

Figure 1.15 - The rural-urban cleavage in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties. In all countries, rural areas have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than cities, with no clear trend over time. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, and marital status (in country-years for which these variables are available).

Figure 1.16 - Rural-urban cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the main pro-poor party in the last election available in the dataset. In the majority of countries, parties oriented towards low-income voters also tend to make significantly higher scores in rural areas than in cities. Western democracies: cross-country average over all countries with data.

Figure 1.17 - Rural-urban cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant parties by geographical location



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by geographical location in a selected number of countries and time periods. In all these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties systematically receive greater support from rural areas than from cities. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan). Centers correpond to Alger (Algeria), Gaborone (Botswana), Delhi (India), Wards (Japan), the Central region (Malaysia), the Center region (Mexico), the Western region (Senegal), Gauteng and Western Cape (South Africa), and the North region (Taiwan).

Figure 1.18 - Regional cleavages in comparative perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in the last election available. Thailand, Iraq, India, and Belgium are the countries with the deepest regional cleavages, with over a quarter of political cleavages amounting to regional differences in vote choices. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Figure 1.19 - Regional cleavages in historical perspective



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of variations in electoral behaviors that can be explained by regional divides in a selected number of countries. Regional divides have grown significantly in India, Belgium, Pakistan, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom in the past decades, driven by the regionalization of existing coalitions and the formation of new regionally based parties. The indicator corresponds to McFadden's pseudo R-squared of a multinomial logistic regression of regional location on the full voting variable (including all parties). Notice that the interpretation is not strictly equivalent to the share of variance explained (values between 20% and 40% generally correspond to excellent fits).

Figure 1.20 - Class and regionalism: vote for independentist parties in Belgium, Spain, Canada, and the United Kingdom by income group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the share of votes received by selected nationalist parties by income group in Flanders, Catalonia, Québec, and Scotland. Nationalist parties receive greater support from top-income voters in Flanders and Catalonia and from low-income voters in Québec and Scotland. Parties and time periods represented: VU / N-VA in Flanders in the 2010s, nationalist parties in Catalonia in the 2010s, Bloc Québécois in Québec in the 1990s, and Scottish National Party in Scotland in the 2010s.

Figure 1.21 - Generational cleavages and party system fragmentation in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by selected groups of parties in Western democracies by age in the last election available. Green parties and "New left" parties (Die Linke, Podemos, France Insoumise, Bloco de Esquerda, Norwegian Socialist Left Party) make much higher scores among the youth than among older generations. By contrast, there is no clear age profile in the case of far-right or anti-immigration parties. 20 correponds to voters aged 20 or younger; 70 corresponds to voters 70 or older.

Figure 1.22 - The reversal of educational divides in Western democracies: the role of generational replacement



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the difference between the share of higher-educated (top 10%) and lower-educated (bottom 90%) voters voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties within specific cohorts. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, lower-educated voters born in the early decades of the twentieth century remained significantly more likely to vote for these parties than higher-educated voters born during the same period. In the last decade, on the contrary, young lower-educated voters were significantly less likely to vote for these parties than young higher-educated voters. Figures correspond to ten-year averages for Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

Figure 1.23 - Generational cleavages in one-party dominant systems: vote for dominant party by age group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by dominant parties by age group in a selected number of countries and time periods. In the majority of these one-party dominant systems, dominant parties receive greater support from older voters than from younger generations. Dominant parties: FLN/RND (Algeria), BDP (Botswana), Congress (India), LDP (Japan), BN (Malaysia), PRI (Mexico), APR (Senegal), ANC (South Africa), Kuomintang (Taiwan).

Figure 1.24 - Generational cleavages, political integration, and foreign policy: vote for selected parties by age group



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure represents the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan in the 1960s, the Saenuri Party in South Korea in 2016, the pro-Beijing camp in Hong Kong in 2016, and the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom in 2017 by age group. All these parties received significantly higher support among older generations than among the youth, which can be linked to the particular strength of cleavages over foreign policy and national integration in these party systems (war memory and remilitarization in Japan, attitudes towards the North Korean regime in South Korea, attitudes towards Mainland China in Hong Kong, and attitudes towards Brexit in the United Kingdom).

Figure 1.25 - The reversal of gender cleavages in Western democracies



Source: authors' computations using the World Political cleavages and Inequality Database (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure displays the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for democratic / labor / social democratic / socialist / green parties in Western democracies. In the majority of countries, women have gradually shifted from being significantly more conservative than men in the 1950s-1960s to being significantly more left-wing in the 2000s-2010s.

Figure 2.1 - Voting for left-wing, democratic, and labour parties in France, the United States, and Britain, 1948-2020: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using French, US, and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2020 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1956, left parties (socialists-communists-others) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among top 10% education voters (after controls for age, gender, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar in the case of the Democratic vote in the US and the Labour vote in Britain. It also holds with no control.

Figure 2.2 - Legislative elections in France, 1946-2017



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the scores obtained by left-wing parties (socialists, communists, radicals, greens, and other parties from the center left, left, and extreme left) and right-wing parties (all parties from the center right, right, and extreme right combined) have oscillated between 40% and 58% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. The score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center left and center right.

Figure 2.3 - Educational expansion and left-wing vote by education in France, 1956-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtained 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education). In 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtained 47% of the vote among voters with no degree and 57% among university graduates.

Figure 2.4 - Left-wing vote by education in France, 1956-2017: election by election



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad.,etc.) obtain 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education).

Figure 2.5 - Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1956, left-wing parties obtained a score that was 17 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates; in 2012, their score was 8 points higher among university graduates. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).

Figure 2.6 - Left-wing vote by income decile in France, 1958-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1958-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtained 46% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% income, 23% of the vote among top 10% income voters, and 17% among the top 1%. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile is relatively flat within the bottom 90%, and strongly declining for the top 10%, especially at the beginning of the period.

Figure 2.7 - Left-wing vote by wealth decile in France, 1974-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1974-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtained 69% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% wealth, 23% of the vote among voters with top 10% wealth, and 13% among top 1% wealth holders. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile is strongly declining, all along the distribution, especially at the begining of the period.

Figure 2.8 - Political conflict in France, 1956-2017: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal?



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: the left-wing vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 2.9 - Political conflict in France, 1956-2017: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal? (after controls)



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: the left-wing vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rising to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 2.10 - Left-wing vote by religion in France, 1967-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 38% of the vote among voters reporting to be practicing Catholics (going to church at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing Catholics, and 64% among voters reporting no religion.

Figure 2.11 - Left-wing vote by religion in France: the case of Islam



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1997-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 38% of the vote among practicing Catholics (at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing Catholics, 52% among voters reporting another religion (protestantism, judaism, buddhism, etc., except islam), 64% among voters with no religion, and 91% among Muslims.

Figure 2.12 - Political conflict in France, 1986-2012: Muslim vote leaning to the left



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1986-2012 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained a score among Muslim voters that was 42 points higher than among other voters; the gap falls to 38 points after controlling for age, gender, education, income, wealth, and father's occupation.

Figure 2.13 - Two-dimensional political conflict and four-quarter electorate in France



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 2002-2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2017, 21% of voters are "internationalists-egalitarians" (they consider that there are not too many migrants, and that we should reduce inequality between rich and poor); 26% are "nativists-inegalitarians" (they consider that there are too many migrants and that we should not reduce rich-poor gaps); 23% are "internationalists-inegalitarians and 30% "nativists-egalitarians".

Table 2.1 - Two-dimensional political conflict in France 2017: an electorate divided into four quarters

Presidential election 2017 (1st round)	All voters	Mélenchon /Hamon ("Egalitarian-Internationalist")	Macron ("Inegalitarian-Internationalist")	Fillon ("Inegalitarian-Nativist")	Le Pen /Dupont-Aignan ("Egalitarian-Nativist")
	100%	**28%**	**24%**	**22%**	**26%**
"There are too many immigrants in France" (% agree)	**56%**	32%	39%	62%	91%
"In order to achieve social justice we need to take from the rich and give to the poor" (% agree)	**51%**	67%	46%	27%	61%
University graduates (%)	**33%**	39%	41%	36%	16%
Monthly income > 4000€ (%)	**15%**	9%	20%	26%	8%
Home ownership (%)	**60%**	48%	69%	78%	51%

Source: author's computations using French post-electoral survey 2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2017, 28% of first-round voters voted for Mélenchon/Hamon; 32% of them believed that there were too many migrants in France (vs 56% among all voters) and 67% that we should take from the rich and give to the poor (vs 51% on average). This electorate can therefore be viewed as "egalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrants, pro-poor), while the Macron electorate is "inegalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrant, pro-rich), the Fillon electorate "inegalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-rich) and the Le Pen/Dupont-Aignan electorate "inegalitarian-internationalist" (anti-migrant, pro-poor). The votes for Arthaud/Poutou (2%) and Asselineau/Cheminade/Lassalle (2%) were added to the votes for Mélenchon-Hamon and Fillon respectively.

Figure 2.14 - Presidential elections in the US, 1948-2020



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the scores obtained by Democratic and Republican parties candidates in presidential elections conducted in the US between 1948 and 2016 have generally varied between 40% and 60% of the vote (popular vote, all States combined). The scores obtained by other candidates have generally been relatively small (less than 10% of the vote), with the exception of Wallace in 1968 (14%) and Perot in 1992 and 1996 (20% and 10%).

Figure 2.15 - Vote for Democratic Party by education in the US, 1948-2016



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2016, the Democratic Party candidate (Clinton) obtained 45% of the vote among high-school graduates and 75% among PhDs. Primary: voters with no high-school degree. Secondary: high-school degree but not bachelor degree. Higher (BA): bachelor degree. Higher (MA): advanced degree (master, law/medical school). Higher (PhD): PhD degree.

Figure 2.16 - Voting for the Democratic Party in the US, 1948-2020: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2020 (ANES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1948, the Democratic candidate obtained a score that was 21 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90%; in 2016, the score of the Democratic candidate was 23 points higher among top 10% education voters.

Figure 2.17 - Political conflict in the US, 1948-2020: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal?



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2020 (ANES) (see wpid.world).
Note: the Democratic vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs income); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, leading to a great reversal and complete realignment of the party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 2.18 - Vote for Democratic Party by ethnic origin in the US, 1948-2020



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2020 (ANES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2016, the Democratic Party candidate (Clinton) obtained 37% of the vote among White voters, 89% of the vote among Black voters and 64% of the vote among Latino and other voters.

Figure 2.19 - Minority vote in the US, 1948-2020: before and after controls



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2020 (ANES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1948, the Democratic candidate obtained a score that was 11 points higher among minority voters than among Whites; in 2016, the Democratic candidate obtained a score that was 39 points higher among minority voters.

Figure 2.20 - Political conflict and national-ethnic origins: France vs US



Source: author's computations using US and French post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2012, the French left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grandparent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origins (mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal, etc.), and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (mostly Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa). In 2016, the US democratic candidate (Clinton) obtains 37% of the vote among Whites, 64% of the vote among Latinos/others, and 89% of the vote among Blacks.

Figure 2.21 - Legislative elections in Britain, 1945-2017



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: in the 1945 legislative elections, the Labour party obtained 48% of the vote and the Conservatives 36% of the vote (hence a total of 84% of the vote for the two main parties). In the 2017 legislative elections, the Conservatives obtained 42% of the vote, and the Labour party 40% of the vote (hence a total of 82%). Liberals / Lib-Dem: Liberals, Liberal Democrats, SDP–Liberal Alliance. SNP: Scottish National Party. UKIP: UK Independence Party. Other parties include green and regionalist parties.

Figure 2.22 - Voting for the Labour Party in Britain, 1955-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1955-2017 (BES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 1955, the Labour Party obtained a score that was 25 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters (registered voters are ranked by highest degree); in 2017, the score of the Labour Party was 13 points higher among top 10% education voters. Controls alter levels but do not affect trends.

Figure 2.23 - Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017: toward a multi-elite party system, or a great reversal?



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1955-2017 (BES) (see wpid.world).
Note: the Labour vote used to be associated with lower-educated and low-income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system" (education vs income); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, but at this stage this scenario seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 2.24 - Labour vote by religion in Britain, 1964-2017



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1964-2017 (BES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2017, the Labour Party obtained 39% of the vote among self-reported Christians (inc. Anglicans, other Protestants, Catholics), 56% among voters reporting other religions (Judaism, Hinduism, etc., except Islam), 54% among voters reporting no religion, and 96% among self-reported Muslims. Before 1979, Islam is included with other religions.

Figure 2.25 - Labour vote by ethnic group in Britain, 1979-2017



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1979-2017 (BES) (see wpid.world).
Note: in 2017, the Labour Party obtained 41% of the vote among self-reported ethnic "Whites", 81% among "Africans-Caribbeans", 82% among "Indians-Pakistanis-Bangladeshis" and 69% among "Other" (including "Chinese", "Arabs", etc.). In 2017, 5% of voters refused to answer the ethnic identity question (and 77% of them voted Labour) (not shown here).

Figure 3.1 - Federal election results in Germany, 1949-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes (Zweitstimme) received by selected German political parties in federal elections between 1949 and 2017.

Figure 3.2 - The reversal of the educational cleavage in Germany (left-wing parties), 1949-2017



Source: authors' computations using German post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for selected left-wing parties. In the 1950s, left-wing parties (jointly) obtained a score that was 21 points lower among top 10% educated voters than among other voters; in the 2010s, their score was 6 points higher.

Figure 3.3 - The reversal of the educational cleavage in Germany (right-wing parties), 1949-2017



Source: authors' computations using German post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for selected right-wing parties. In the 1950s, right-wing parties (jointly) obtained a score that was 21 points higher among top 10% educated voters than among other voters; in the 2010s, their score was 6 points lower.

Figure 3.4 - The reversal of the gender cleavage in Germany, 1949-2017



Source: authors' computations using German post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for selected left-wing parties. In the 1950s, left-wing parties (jointly) obtained a score that was 12 points lower among women than among men; in the 2010s, their score was 2 points higher.

Figure 3.5 - Left-wing voting and generational cleavages in Germany, 1949-2017



Source: authors' computations using German post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged below the median age and the share of median-aged voters voting for selected left-wing parties. In the 1950s, left-wing parties (jointly) obtained a score that was 5 points higher among young voters than among median-aged voters; in the 2010s, their score was 4 points higher.

Figure 3.6 - Left-wing voting and income in Germany, 1949-2017



Source: authors' computations using German post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for selected left-wing parties. In the 1950s, left-wing parties (jointly) obtained a score that was 20 points lower among top 10% income voters than among other voters; in the 2010s, their score was 10 points lower.

Figure 4.1 - Election results in Norway, 1945-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in parliamentary elections held in Norway between 1945 and 2017. The Labour Party received 27% of the votes in 2017.

Figure 4.2 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in Norway, 1957-2017



Source: authors' computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party, and other affiliated parties. In the 1950s-1960s, top-income and highest-educated voters were less likely to vote labour / socialist / communist than low-income and lower-educated voters. The labour / socialist / communist / green vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, gender, age, marital status, employment status, region, and union membership.

Figure 4.3 - The decline of class voting in Norway, 1957-2009

Source: authors' computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party, and affiliated parties by subjective social class. In 1957-1965, 74% of voters identifying with the "working class" or the "lower class" voted labour / socialist and affiliated, compared to 52% in the 2000s. No data available in the 2010s.

Table 4.1 - The structure of political cleavages in Norway, 2013-2017

	Share of votes received (%)							
	Socialist Left Party	Labour Party	Green Party	Liberal Party	Centre Party	Christian Democrats	Conservative Party	Progress Party
Education								
Primary	5%	30%	1%	3%	8%	5%	25%	20%
Secondary	4%	27%	3%	4%	9%	5%	29%	16%
Tertiary	8%	27%	4%	8%	5%	5%	30%	8%
Income								
Bottom 50%	6%	28%	4%	5%	8%	5%	25%	15%
Middle 40%	6%	30%	3%	5%	7%	3%	30%	11%
Top 10%	4%	20%	1%	8%	5%	1%	46%	11%
Gender								
Women	9%	30%	3%	6%	6%	6%	27%	10%
Men	4%	25%	3%	5%	8%	4%	31%	16%
Age								
20-39	9%	25%	5%	8%	7%	5%	25%	12%
40-59	5%	28%	2%	5%	7%	4%	33%	12%
60+	4%	30%	1%	4%	8%	8%	27%	15%
Religion								
No religion	16%	30%	7%	7%	3%	3%	18%	7%
Catholic	9%	9%	0%	0%	4%	10%	49%	14%
Protestant	4%	27%	2%	5%	8%	5%	31%	14%
Muslim	11%	59%	0%	4%	0%	4%	13%	5%
Other	6%	15%	9%	9%	2%	25%	17%	6%

Source: authors' computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Norwegian parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2013-2017 period. The Labour Party was supported by 9% of Catholic voters, compared to 59% of Muslim voters, during this period.

Figure 4.4 - Election results in Denmark, 1945-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Denmark between 1945 and 2019. The Social Democratic Party received 26% of votes in 2019.

Figure 4.5 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in Denmark, 1960-2015



Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party, the Social Liberal Party, the Red-Green Alliance, and affiliated parties. In the 1960s, top-income and highest-educated voters were less likely to vote social democratic / socialist / social liberal / communist than low-income and lower-educated voters. The social democratic / socialist / social liberal / communist / green vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, gender, age, marital status, employment status, region, and union membership.

Figure 4.6 - The decline of class voting in Denmark, 1960-2015



Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party, the Socialist People's Party, the Social Liberal Party, the Red-Green Alliance, and affiliated parties by subjective social class. In the 1960s, 94% of voters identifying with the "working class" or the "lower class" voted for these parties, compared to 52% in the 2010s. No data available in the 2000s.

Table 4.2 - The structure of political cleavages in Denmark, 2011-2015

	Share of votes received (%)						
	Red-Green Alliance	Socialist People's Party	Social Democratic Party	Social Liberal Party	Venstre	Conservative People's Party	Danish People's Party
Education							
Primary	6%	4%	32%	3%	25%	2%	23%
Secondary	9%	7%	32%	8%	24%	4%	13%
Tertiary	9%	8%	32%	12%	22%	6%	7%
Income							
Bottom 50%	11%	7%	32%	7%	19%	3%	17%
Middle 40%	7%	6%	34%	8%	25%	5%	13%
Top 10%	3%	3%	29%	13%	30%	8%	6%
Gender							
Women	9%	8%	34%	8%	22%	4%	12%
Men	7%	5%	29%	7%	25%	4%	17%
Age							
20-39	11%	7%	28%	11%	21%	4%	12%
40-59	7%	7%	34%	8%	24%	5%	14%
60+	4%	5%	35%	3%	28%	4%	19%
Sector							
Private/Mixed	4%	5%	30%	10%	36%	5%	9%
Public	11%	14%	45%	16%	18%	4%	6%
Location							
Urban	10%	7%	34%	9%	21%	4%	12%
Rural	5%	6%	29%	6%	28%	4%	18%

Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Danish parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2015 period. 45% of public sector employees voted for the Social Democratic Party, compared to 30% of other active voters.

Figure 4.7 - Election results in Sweden, 1948-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Sweden between 1948 and 2018. The Social Democratic Party received 28% of votes in 2018.

Figure 4.8 - Towards a multi-elite party system in Sweden, 1956-2014



Source: authors' computations using Swedish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, the Green Party, and affiliated parties. In the 1950s-1960s, highest-educated and top-income voters were less likely to vote social democratic / socialist / communist that low-income and lower-educated voters. The social democratic / socialist / communist / green vote has become increasingly associated with higher-educated voters, leading Sweden to get closer to becoming a multi-elite party system. Estimates control for income/education, gender, age, marital status, employment status, union membership and region.

Figure 4.9 - Class voting in Sweden, 1956-2014



Source: authors' computations using Swedish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, the Green Party, and affiliated parties by subjective social class. In the 1950s-1960s, 76% of voters identifying with the "working class" or "lower class" voted for these parties, compared to 60% in the 2010s.

Table 4.3 - The structure of political cleavages in Sweden, 2010-2014

	Share of votes received (%)				
	Left Party	Green Party	Social Democrats	Alliance	Sweden Democrats
Education					
Primary	5%	4%	38%	37%	12%
Secondary	6%	7%	31%	46%	9%
Tertiary	8%	15%	18%	53%	2%
Income					
Bottom 50%	7%	9%	33%	37%	10%
Middle 40%	5%	8%	28%	51%	6%
Top 10%	5%	6%	16%	67%	4%
Gender					
Women	6%	11%	28%	47%	5%
Men	6%	6%	30%	46%	10%
Age					
20-39	7%	12%	25%	44%	6%
40-59	6%	8%	27%	50%	7%
60+	6%	6%	34%	44%	9%
Sector					
Private/Mixed	4%	9%	22%	54%	8%
Public	10%	12%	30%	42%	4%

Source: authors' computations using Swedish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, the Green Party, the Alliance Coalition (Moderate Party, Centre Party, Christian Democrats, and Liberals) and the Sweden Democrats over the 2010-2014 period. 38% of primary-educated voters voted for Social Democrats during this period, compared to 18% of university graduates.

Figure 4.10 - Election results in Finland, 1945-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in parliamentary elections held in Finland between 1945 and 2019. The Social Democratic Party received 18% of votes in 2019.

Figure 4.11 - Towards a multi-elite party system in Finland, 1972-2015



Source: authors' computations using Finnish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Social Democratic Party, the Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance, the Green League, and affiliated parties. In the 1970s, top-income and highest-educated voters were less likely to vote social democratic / socialist / communist than low-income and lower-educated voters. The social democratic / socialist / communist / green vote has increasingly become associated with higher-educated voters, leading Finland to get closer to becoming a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, gender, age, employment status, union membership, and region.

Figure 4.12 - Vote for Social Democrats / Communists / Socialists / Greens by occupation in Finland, 1972-2015



Source: authors' computations using Finnish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party, the Finnish People's Democratic League / Left Alliance, the Green League, and affiliated parties by occupation. In the 1970s, 66% of workers voted social democratic / communist / socialist, compared to 9% of farmers. The "Entrepreneur and self-employed" category is not reported separately from other categories during the 1972-1979 period.

Table 4.4 - The structure of political cleavages in Finland, 2011-2015

	Share of votes received (%)					
	Left Alliance	Green League	Social Democrats	Centre Party	National Coalition Party	True Finns
Education						
Primary	5%	3%	28%	19%	10%	24%
Secondary	8%	5%	21%	20%	14%	22%
Tertiary	8%	13%	10%	17%	31%	10%
Income						
Bottom 50%	9%	8%	20%	21%	12%	20%
Middle 40%	7%	8%	17%	17%	23%	18%
Top 10%	6%	9%	11%	16%	32%	15%
Age						
20-39	15%	17%	12%	17%	4%	9%
40-59	7%	15%	17%	20%	4%	8%
60+	3%	23%	23%	20%	6%	6%
Gender						
Women	9%	10%	17%	18%	18%	16%
Men	7%	6%	18%	19%	20%	21%
Location						
Urban	8%	9%	18%	15%	22%	17%
Rural	6%	4%	16%	28%	13%	22%

Source: authors' computations using Finnish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Finnish parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2015 period. 28% of primary-educated voters voted for Social Democrats, compared to 10% of university graduates.

Figure 4.13 - Election results in Iceland, 1946-2017



Source : authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note : the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in parliamentary elections held in Iceland between 1946 and 2017. The Independence Party received 25% of votes in 2017.

Figure 4.14 - The persistence of a multi-elite party system in Iceland, 1978-2017



Source: authors' computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Social Democratic Alliance, the Left-Green movement, and affiliated parties. Since the 1970s-1980s, the social democratic / socialist / green vote has always been associated with higher-educated voters, while top-income voters have remained more likely to vote for right-wing parties. Iceland has thus been characterized by a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, gender, age, employment status, marital status, union membership, and region. The 1983 survey does not contain information on income.

Figure 4.15 - Vote for Social Democrats / Socialists / Greens by occupation in Iceland, 1978-2017



Source: authors' computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Alliance, the Left-Green movement, and affiliated parties by occupation. In the 1970s, 51% of workers voted social democratic / socialist / green, compared to 27% of voters employed in higher managerial occupations or who were entrepreneurs or self-employed.

Table 4.5 - The structure of political cleavages in Iceland, 2016-2017

	Share of votes received (%)						
	Left-Green Movement	Social Democratic Alliance	Pirate Party	Bright Future	Reform Party	Progressive Party	Independence Party
Education							
Primary	15%	6%	8%	3%	5%	16%	27%
Secondary	16%	9%	9%	3%	7%	12%	30%
Tertiary	20%	12%	8%	6%	13%	7%	24%
Income							
Bottom 50%	21%	9%	10%	3%	6%	13%	23%
Middle 40%	15%	10%	8%	5%	11%	12%	28%
Top 10%	12%	12%	7%	4%	17%	11%	32%
Gender							
Women	23%	10%	6%	4%	8%	11%	24%
Men	12%	9%	10%	3%	10%	12%	30%
Location							
Urban	18%	9%	9%	5%	12%	7%	27%
Rural	16%	9%	7%	2%	4%	18%	28%
Sector							
Private/Mixed	14%	7%	9%	4%	12%	12%	30%
Public	26%	13%	7%	5%	8%	11%	19%
EU Membership							
Against	13%	3%	6%	2%	5%	16%	40%
Pro	18%	22%	16%	8%	17%	6%	7%

Source: authors' computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Icelandic parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2016-2017 period. 22% of voters favorable to Iceland joining the European Union voted for the Social Democratic Alliance during this period, compared to 3% of voters opposed to Iceland joining the EU.

Figure 5.1 - Election results in Australia, 1946-2019



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in federal elections held in Australia between 1946 and 2019. The Labor Party received 33% of votes in 2019.

Figure 5.2 - The decline of class voting in Australia, 1963-2019



Source: author's computations using Australian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters identifying with the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class" or "no class" voting for the Labor Party or the Australian Greens, before and after controls. Class voting has significantly declined in Australia in the past decades.

Figure 5.3 - The religious cleavage in Australia
Vote for ALP / Greens by religious affiliation, 1963-2019



Source: author's computations using Australian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Greens by religious affiliation. Between the 1960s and the 2010s, support for these parties declined significantly among Catholic voters, while it increased slightly among non-religious voters.

Figure 5.4 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in Australia, 1963-2019



Source: author's computations using Australian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Labor Party and the Australian Greens. In the 1960s, top-income and highest-educated voters were less likely to vote Labor than low-income and lower-educated voters. The Labor / Green vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, employment status, marital status, subjective class, home ownership, and location.

Table 5.1 - The structure of political cleavages in Australia, 2010-2019				
	Share of votes received (%)			
	Labor	Greens	Liberal	National
Education				
Primary	36%	7%	44%	5%
Secondary	34%	7%	45%	4%
Tertiary	36%	17%	39%	2%
Postgraduate	36%	16%	38%	2%
Income				
Bottom 50%	36%	9%	42%	5%
Middle 40%	36%	13%	41%	3%
Top 10%	30%	12%	53%	1%
Social class				
Working / lower class	42%	7%	37%	5%
Middle / no class	30%	13%	48%	3%
Country of birth				
Australia	34%	11%	42%	4%
Europe-US-Canada	35%	10%	44%	2%
Non-Western countries	40%	8%	45%	1%

Source: author's computations using Australian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Australian political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2010-2019 period. During the past decade, the Australian Greens have received greater support from higher-educated voters, high-income voters, voters identifying with the middle class or with no class, and voters born in Australia.

Figure 5.5 - Election results in New Zealand, 1946-2020



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in New Zealand between 1946 and 2020. The Labour Party received 50% of votes in 2020.

Figure 5.6 - The decline of class voting in New Zealand, 1972-2017



Source: author's computations using New Zealand electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters identifying with the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class" or "no class" voting for the Labour Party / the Greens / other left-wing parties, before and after controls. Class voting has significantly declined in New Zealand in the past decades.

Figure 5.7 - The ethnic cleavage in New Zealand, 1972-2017
Vote for Labour / Green / Other left by ethnic group



Source: author's computations using New Zealand electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the New Zealand Labour Party, the Green Party, and other left-wing parties by ethnic group. Voters identifying as "European" or "Asian" have remained significantly less likely to vote for these parties than voters identifying as "Māori" or "Pacific".

Figure 5.8 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in New Zealand, 1972-2017



Source: author's computations using New Zealand electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the New Zealand Labour Party, the Green Party, and other left-wing parties. In the 1970s-1980s, top-income and highest-educated voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income and lower-educated voters. The left-wing vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, occupation, home ownership, marital status, ethnic affiliation, religion, church attendance, country of birth, location, and union membership.

Table 5.2 - The structure of political cleavages in New Zealand, 2011-2017				
	Share of votes received (%)			
	Labour	Greens	National	NZF
Education				
Primary	35%	4%	43%	11%
Secondary	27%	9%	49%	7%
Tertiary	27%	17%	44%	3%
Postgraduate	36%	15%	33%	5%
Income				
Bottom 50%	34%	8%	37%	9%
Middle 40%	25%	10%	51%	5%
Top 10%	18%	9%	63%	4%
Social class				
Working / lower class	34%	7%	32%	14%
Middle / upper / no class	21%	11%	48%	6%
Ethnicity				
European	27%	10%	48%	7%
Māori	47%	8%	11%	12%
Pacific	64%	0%	23%	11%
Asian	29%	5%	57%	0%

Source: author's computations using New Zealand electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main New Zealand political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2017 period. During the past decade, the NZF has received greater support from lower-educated voters, low-income voters, and voters identifying as Māori.

Figure 5.9 - Election results in Canada, 1945-2019



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in federal elections held in Canada between 1945 and 2019. The Liberal Party received 33% of votes in 2019. The Conservative Party corresponds to the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada before 2002. The New Democratic Party corresponds to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation before 1962.

Figure 5.10 - The religious cleavage in Canada, 1963-2019



Source: author's computations using Canadian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of voters belonging to specific religious groups for the main Canadian political parties, after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, country of birth, and union membership. Protestant voters have remained significantly more likely to vote conservative than non-Protestants, while non-religious voters have remained more supportive of the New Democratic Party and the Green Party.

Figure 5.11 - Political conflict and income in Canada, 1963-2019



Source: author's computations using Canadian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Canadian political parties, after controlling for education, religion, age, gender, employment status, marital status, country of birth, and union membership. With the exception of the 1960s, the Conservative Party has always been more popular among high-income voters, while support for the New Democratic Party has become increasingly concentrated among low-income voters.

Figure 5.12 - Educational divides in Canada, 1963-2019



Source: author's computations using Canadian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Canadian political parties, after controlling for income, religion, age, gender, employment status, marital status, country of birth, and union membership. The Liberal Party, the New Democratic Party, and the Green Party have always received greater support from higher-educated voters, while the conservative vote has become increasingly concentrated among the lower educated since the 1990s.

Table 5.3 - The structure of political cleavages in Canada, 2011-2019					
	Share of votes received (%)				
	New Democratic Party	Green Party	Liberal Party	Conservative Party	Bloc Québécois
Education					
Primary	22%	3%	22%	43%	7%
Secondary	23%	5%	27%	37%	7%
Tertiary	25%	4%	34%	32%	5%
Postgraduate	21%	6%	37%	29%	6%
Income					
Bottom 50%	26%	5%	28%	32%	8%
Middle 40%	23%	4%	30%	36%	6%
Top 10%	15%	3%	34%	43%	4%
Religion					
None	27%	7%	32%	26%	6%
Catholic	25%	3%	27%	31%	13%
Other Christian	18%	4%	25%	51%	1%
Jewish	6%	2%	41%	49%	0%
Buddhist	31%	4%	41%	21%	2%
Hindu	33%	2%	38%	27%	0%
Muslim	27%	1%	63%	9%	1%
Sikh	26%	1%	54%	19%	0%
Other	18%	8%	31%	39%	1%
Country of birth					
Canada	24%	5%	28%	35%	7%
Europe / US	25%	4%	29%	39%	1%
Non-Western countries	18%	3%	42%	36%	1%

Source: author's computations using Canadian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Canadian political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2019 period. The Liberal Party received greater support from high-income, higher-educated, and Muslim voters.

Figure 6.1 - Election results in Italy, 1948-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Italy between 1948 and 2018. The Five Star Movement received 33% of votes in 2018.

Figure 6.2 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in Italy, 1953-2018



Source: authors' computations using Italian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of university graduates and top-income earners for social democratic / socialist / communist / green parties / the M5S. In the 1950s-1960s, highest-educated and top-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income and lower-educated voters. The left-wing vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, employment status, marital status, union membership, location, and region.

Table 6.1 - The structure of political cleavages in Italy, 2018

	Share of votes received (%)				
	Socialists / Soc. Democrats	Five Star Movement	Conservatives / Liberals	Lega	Fratelli d'Italia
Education					
Primary	16%	33%	19%	29%	1%
Secondary	24%	38%	7%	22%	5%
Tertiary	34%	30%	10%	14%	7%
Income					
Bottom 50%	33%	31%	9%	18%	5%
Middle 40%	24%	38%	8%	20%	6%
Top 10%	12%	42%	12%	28%	4%
Age					
20-39	24%	38%	9%	21%	5%
40-59	32%	37%	5%	14%	4%
60+	26%	37%	8%	19%	5%
Religion					
No religion	33%	36%	7%	16%	3%
Catholic	23%	34%	8%	25%	8%
Other	20%	45%	7%	17%	10%
Region					
North	30%	24%	9%	29%	4%
Center	28%	33%	9%	18%	7%
South	23%	51%	8%	8%	6%
Islands	22%	51%	11%	8%	6%

Source: authors' computations using Italian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the table shows the share of votes received by the main Italian political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2018. 16% of primary-educated voters voted social democratic / socialist, compared to 34% of tertiary-educated voters.

Figure 6.3 - Election results in Spain, 1977-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Spain between 1977 and 2019 (November 2019 elections represented as 2020). The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) received 28% of votes in 2020.

Figure 6.4 - Towards a multi-elite party system in Spain, 1982-2019



Source: authors' computations using Spanish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of university graduates and top-income earners for left-wing parties. In the 1980s, highest-educated and top-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income and lower-educated voters. The left-wing vote has become increasingly associated with higher-educated voters, leading Spain to come closer to becoming a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, region, church attendance, sector of employment, type of employment, union membership, subjective soccial class, and location.

Figure 6.5 - Nationalist vote, education, and income in Catalonia, Spain, 1982-2019



Source: authors' computations using Spanish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for nationalist parties in Catalonia, after controlling for income/education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, church attendance, type of employment, sector of employment, union membership, subjective social class, and location. During the 2015-2019 period, highest-educated voters were more likely to vote for nationalist parties by 8 percentage points on average.

Table 6.2 - The structure of political cleavages in Spain, 2019

	Share of votes received (%)					
	Podemos	PSOE	Ciudadanos	PP	VOX	Nationalist parties
Education						
Primary	7%	38%	7%	32%	5%	8%
Secondary	16%	27%	11%	16%	16%	10%
Tertiary	20%	22%	15%	17%	9%	12%
Postgraduate	18%	20%	21%	17%	5%	19%
Income						
Bottom 50%	13%	35%	9%	23%	11%	6%
Middle 40%	17%	26%	13%	15%	14%	10%
Top 10%	15%	20%	14%	16%	15%	17%
Age						
20-39	23%	21%	14%	11%	17%	8%
40-59	15%	28%	13%	16%	13%	11%
60+	7%	35%	7%	31%	7%	11%
Location						
Urban areas	15%	28%	12%	18%	13%	10%
Rural areas	6%	30%	8%	28%	10%	13%
Religion						
Catholic	6%	30%	13%	26%	15%	7%
Other	17%	39%	9%	10%	9%	11%
No religion	35%	24%	8%	4%	7%	17%

Source: authors' computations using Spanish electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Spanish political parties by selected individual characteristics during the two elections held in 2019. 7% of primary-educated voters supported Podemos, compared to 18% of voters with postgraduate degrees.

Figure 6.6 - Election results in Portugal, 1975-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in legislative elections held in Portugal between 1975 and 2019. The Socialist Party received 38% of votes in 2019.

Figure 6.7 - The absence of multi-elite party system in Portugal, 1983-2019



Source: authors' computations using Portuguese electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of university graduates and top-income voters for socialists / communists / greens / the Left Bloc. Both highest-educated and top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote for left-wing parties throughout the period considered. In contrast to the majority of Western democracies, Portugal has therefore not become a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, religion, church attendance, employment status, subjective social class, union membership, region, and location.

Figure 6.8 - Class voting in Portugal, 1983-2019



Source: authors' computations using Portuguese electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters identifying with the "working class" or the "lower class" and the share of voters identifying with the "middle class" or with "no class" voting for socialists / communists / greens / the Left Bloc, before and after controls. During the 2015-2019 period, self-identified working-class voters were more likely to vote for left-wing parties by 13 percentage points.

Table 6.3 - The structure of political cleavages in Portugal, 2015-2019				
	Share of votes received (%)			
	Left Bloc	Socialist Party	Greens / Communists	Social Democratic Party / Social Democratic Center-People's Party
Education				
Primary	5%	43%	11%	39%
Secondary	13%	37%	9%	37%
Tertiary	14%	24%	6%	52%
Income				
Bottom 50%	8%	43%	10%	37%
Middle 40%	9%	35%	10%	41%
Top 10%	15%	24%	6%	54%
Religion				
No religion	24%	32%	17%	23%
Catholic	9%	37%	9%	42%
Other	15%	42%	7%	34%
Age				
20-39	15%	31%	6%	43%
49-59	12%	35%	10%	39%
60+	6%	43%	11%	39%
Country of birth				
Portugal	10%	37%	10%	40%
Brazil	10%	59%	0%	30%
Other ex-colony	9%	31%	12%	48%
Region				
North	10%	38%	5%	42%
Center	8%	29%	5%	57%
Lisbon	12%	40%	16%	29%
Alentejo	7%	54%	23%	12%
Algarve	15%	36%	11%	36%

Source: authors' computations using Portuguese electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Portuguese political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2015-2019 period. During this period, 43% of primary-educated voters voted for the Socialist Party, compared to 24% of university graduates.

Figure 6.9 - Election results in Ireland, 1948-2020



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Ireland between 1948 and 2020. The Sinn Féin received 25% of votes in 2020.

Figure 6.10 - The absence of multi-elite party system in Ireland, 1973-2020



Source: authors' computations using Irish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of university graduates and top-income voters for Fianna Fáil (FF) and left-wing parties (Labour / Green / Other left). Both highest-educated and top-income voters have remained significantly less likely to vote FF / left throughout the period considered. In contrast to the majority of Western democracies, Ireland has therefore not become a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, and church attendance.

Table 6.4 - The structure of political cleavages in Ireland, 2020					
	Share of votes received (%)				
	Sinn Féin	Labour Party	Green Party	Fianna Fáil	Fine Gael
Education					
Primary	43%	4%	1%	23%	13%
Secondary	27%	4%	7%	24%	19%
Tertiary	20%	5%	8%	21%	24%
Income					
Bottom 50%	30%	4%	5%	21%	17%
Middle 40%	20%	5%	8%	25%	22%
Top 10%	16%	4%	8%	22%	33%
Religion					
No religion	29%	5%	16%	12%	15%
Catholic	23%	4%	3%	28%	22%
Protestant	16%	8%	7%	13%	40%
Age					
20-39	27%	5%	14%	16%	18%
40-59	26%	4%	5%	21%	20%
60+	20%	5%	4%	30%	24%

Source: authors' computations using Irish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the share of votes received by the main Irish political parties by selected individual characteristics in 2020. 43% of primary-educated voters supported Sinn Féin during this election, compared to 20% of university graduates.

Figure 7.1 - Election results in Belgium, 1946-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in federal elections held in Belgium between 1946 and 2019. Flemish nationalists received 16% of votes in 2019.

Figure 7.2 - Towards a multi-elite party system in Belgium, 1971-2014



Source: authors' computations using Belgian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for left-wing parties (PS / SP / Ecolo / Agalev / PTB). In the 1970s, highest-educated and top-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income and lower-educated voters. The left-wing vote has become increasingly associated with higher-educated voters, leading Belgium to come closer to becoming a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, church attendance, region, and language.

Figure 7.3 - The regional cleavage in Belgium, 1971-2014



Source: authors' computations using Belgian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of the main Belgian regions for left-wing parties (PS / SP / Ecolo / Agalev / PTB), after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, and church attendance. Wallonia has remained significantly more likely to vote for left-wing parties than Flanders throughout the past decades, while Brussels has become increasingly supportive of left-wing parties.

Table 7.1 - The structure of political cleavages in Belgium, 2011-2014

	Share of votes received (%)					
	PS / SP / PTB	Ecolo / Groen	VLD / MR	CD&V / CdH	N-VA	Vlaams Belang
Education						
Primary	34%	3%	14%	20%	20%	4%
Secondary	27%	6%	18%	20%	20%	4%
Tertiary	16%	16%	25%	20%	18%	1%
Income						
Bottom 50%	30%	7%	17%	22%	16%	3%
Middle 40%	22%	11%	21%	18%	21%	3%
Top 10%	13%	11%	28%	17%	26%	2%
Religion						
No religion	25%	12%	20%	12%	22%	4%
Catholic	17%	5%	21%	34%	17%	2%
Protestant	30%	9%	12%	24%	18%	2%
Muslim	65%	7%	8%	13%	4%	0%
Region						
Brussels	35%	16%	26%	13%	2%	1%
Flanders	15%	8%	15%	24%	31%	5%
Wallonia	41%	10%	29%	14%	0%	0%
Language						
Dutch	12%	10%	15%	27%	32%	4%
French	36%	12%	34%	13%	1%	0%
Other	65%	4%	10%	13%	3%	5%

Source: authors' computations using Belgian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Belgian political parties by selected individual characteristics during the 2011 and 2014 elections. The PS, SP, and PTB received greater support from lower-educated voters, low-income voters, and Muslim voters. Total vote shares correspond to those reported in surveys and may not match exactly official election results.

Figure 7.4 - Election results in the Netherlands, 1946-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in the Netherlands between 1946 and 2017. Conservative-liberal parties received 21% of votes in 2017.

Figure 7.5 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in the Netherlands, 1967-2017



Source: authors' computations using Dutch electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for left-wing and liberal parties (PvdA / SP / GroenLinks / D66 / Other left). The left-wing / liberal vote has become increasingly associated with highest-educated voters, while top-income voters have remained more likely to vote for right-wing parties, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, church attendance, region, location, union membership, and subjective social class.

Figure 7.6 - The decline of class voting in the Netherlands, 1967-2017



Source: authors' computations using Dutch electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of voters identifying with the "working class" and of voters identifying with the "upper class" for left-wing / liberal parties (PvdA / SP / GroenLinks / D66 / Other left). Class voting has declined significantly in the Netherlands in the past decades. Estimates control for income, education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, church attendance, region, location, and union membership.

Table 7.2 - The structure of political cleavages in the Netherlands, 2010-2017

	Share of votes received (%)						
	SP	**PvdA**	**GL**	**D66**	**CDA**	**VVD**	**PVV**
Education							
Primary	13%	21%	3%	3%	17%	13%	20%
Secondary	11%	15%	4%	7%	13%	26%	11%
Tertiary	5%	16%	10%	17%	9%	28%	3%
Income							
Bottom 50%	12%	18%	6%	7%	13%	18%	13%
Middle 40%	7%	16%	7%	12%	11%	28%	8%
Top 10%	3%	12%	6%	15%	12%	39%	6%
Social class							
Working	16%	22%	5%	3%	10%	9%	24%
Upper working	14%	22%	4%	4%	12%	17%	13%
Middle	9%	15%	6%	10%	14%	25%	9%
Upper middle	3%	13%	9%	17%	9%	36%	4%
Upper	3%	9%	4%	23%	8%	45%	2%
Location							
Very rural	9%	16%	4%	7%	20%	24%	9%
Rural	9%	14%	4%	9%	17%	25%	10%
Medium	8%	15%	5%	8%	12%	29%	11%
Urban	10%	16%	7%	10%	10%	23%	11%
Very urban	8%	21%	10%	14%	6%	21%	10%
Religion							
No religion	11%	18%	7%	12%	5%	27%	12%
Catholic	10%	14%	3%	7%	24%	25%	12%
Protestant	4%	8%	5%	5%	27%	19%	5%
Muslim	4%	48%	7%	6%	3%	14%	0%

Source: authors' computations using Dutch electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Dutch political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2010-2017 period. The SP and PVV both received greater support from low-income and lower-educated voters. Total vote shares correspond to those reported in surveys and may not match exactly official election results.

Figure 7.7 - Election results in Switzerland, 1947-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in federal elections held in Switzerland between 1947 and 2019. Far-right parties received 26% of votes in 2019.

Figure 7.8 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in Switzerland, 1967-2019



Source: authors' computations using Swiss electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for left-wing and green parties (SP/PS, GPS/PES, GLP/PVL, Other left). In the 1960s-1970s, highest-educated and top-income voters were less likely to vote for left-wing parties than low-income and lower-educated voters. The left-wing / green vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, region, home ownership, and union membership.

Table 7.3 - The structure of political cleavages in Switzerland, 2011-2019

	Share of votes received (%)				
	Left wing SP/PS PdA/PST	**Christ. Democrats** CVP/PDC	**Conserv. Liberals** FDP/PRD	**Greens** GPS/PES GLP/PVL	**Far right** SVP/UDC FPS/PSL SD/DS
Education					
Primary	17%	19%	12%	8%	33%
Secondary	18%	11%	16%	13%	29%
Tertiary	26%	11%	20%	23%	10%
Income					
Bottom 50%	20%	12%	12%	12%	30%
Middle 40%	21%	11%	18%	16%	21%
Top 10%	15%	12%	26%	21%	19%
Region					
German	19%	11%	15%	15%	27%
French	25%	13%	22%	15%	18%
Italian	18%	19%	25%	7%	14%
Location					
Urban	25%	9%	17%	19%	19%
Rural	16%	13%	17%	12%	29%

Source: authors' computations using Swiss electoral surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Swiss political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2019 period. Far-right parties received greater support from low-income and lower-educated voters, as well as in German-speaking regions and in rural areas. Total vote shares correspond to those reported in surveys and may not match exactly official election results.

Figure 7.9 - Election results in Austria, 1945-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Austria between 1945 and 2019. The Social Democratic Party received 21% of votes in 2019.

Figure 7.10 - The emergence of a multi-elite party system in Austria, 1971-2017



Source: authors' computations using Austrian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for left-wing, green, and social-liberal parties (SPÖ / KPÖ / Greens / NEOS). In the 1970s, highest-educated and top-income voters were less likely to vote for these parties than low-income and lower-educated voters. The left-wing / green / social-liberal vote has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise to a "multi-elite party system". Estimates control for income/education, age, gender, employment status, marital status, religion, and location.

Table 7.4 - The structure of political cleavages in Austria, 2013-2017

	Share of votes received (%)				
	SPÖ / KPÖ	**Greens**	**NEOS**	**ÖVP**	**FPÖ / BZÖ**
Education					
Primary	33%	5%	4%	31%	25%
Secondary	29%	7%	5%	31%	26%
Tertiary	26%	21%	11%	34%	5%
Income					
Bottom 50%	35%	6%	5%	27%	23%
Middle 40%	27%	11%	6%	32%	22%
Top 10%	20%	12%	8%	43%	14%
Location					
Urban	33%	11%	7%	26%	20%
Rural	25%	7%	4%	37%	25%
Religion					
No religion	38%	14%	8%	13%	21%
Catholic	24%	8%	5%	39%	23%
Protestant	35%	10%	7%	25%	23%
Muslim	66%	2%	18%	10%	4%

Source: authors' computations using Austrian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Austrian political parties by selected individual characteristics over the 2013-2017 period. Left-wing parties (SPÖ / KPÖ) received greater support from low-income and lower-educated voters, as well as in urban areas. Total vote shares correspond to those reported in surveys and may not match exactly official election results.

Figure 8.1a - Election results in the Czech Republic, 1990-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: labels show parties that received more than 5% of total votes.

Figure 8.1b - Election results in Hungary, 1990-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: list votes are reported. After 2006 votes for Fidesz include votes for KDNP.

Figure 8.1c - Election results in Poland, 1991-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: labels show parties that obtained more than 3% of total votes.

Figure 8.2a - Vote and income in the Czech Republic, 1990-2017



Source: authors' computations using post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Czech parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and education. In 1996, left-wing parties obtained a score that was 16 points lower among top 10% earners than among the bottom 90%; in 2017, their score was 5 points lower. The right includes Civic Forum in 1990 and STAN in 2017.

Figure 8.2b - Vote and income in Hungary, 1998-2018



Source: authors' computations using post-election surveys for 1998 and 2002, ESS for all other years (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Hungarian parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and education. In 1998, top 10% earners were less likely to vote Fidesz by 9 percentage points, while they were more likely to do so by 19 percentage points in 2018. No data on income in 2006.

Figure 8.2c - Vote and income in Poland, 1991-2015



Source: authors' computations using POLPAN (1991-1997), CSES (2001, 2005), and ESS (2007-2015) (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Polish parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and education. During the 2007-2015 period, top 10% earners were less likely to vote PiS by between 8 and 12 percentage points, while they were more likely to vote for the Civic Platform by 12 to 19 percentage points.

Figure 8.3a - The educational cleavage in the Czech Republic, 1990-2017



Source: authors' computations using post-electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the main Czech parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and income. In 1996, university graduates were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 3 percentage points, compared to 11 points in 2017.

Figure 8.3b - The educational cleavage in Hungary, 1998-2018



Source: authors' computations using post-election surveys for 1998 and 2002, ESS for all other years (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the main Hungarian parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and income. In 1998, university graduates were more likely to vote Fidesz by 1 percentage point, while they were less likely to do so by 11 points in 2018. No data on income in 2006.

Figure 8.3c - The educational cleavage in Poland, 1991-2015



Source: authors' computations using POLPAN (1991-1997), CSES (2001, 2005), and ESS (2007-2015) (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the main Polish parties or groups of parties, after controlling for age, gender, and income. During the 2007-2015 period, university graduates were less likely to vote PiS by 1 to 11 percentage points, while they were more likely to vote for the Civic Platform by 5 to 11 percentage points.

Figure 9.1 - Election results in India, 1952-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main Indian political parties or groups of parties in Lok Sabha elections between 1952 and 2019.

Figure 9.2 - The Congress vote by caste and religion in India, 1962-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Indian National Congress and other centrist parties by caste and religion. In 2014, 45% of Muslim voters voted Congress / center, compared to 37% of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST), 34% of Other Backward Classes (OBC), 28% of upper castes (excluding Brahmins), and 19% of Brahmins.

Figure 9.3 - The BJP vote by caste and religion in India, 1962-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and affiliated parties by caste and religion. In 2014, 10% of Muslim voters voted BJP and affiliated, compared to 31% of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST), 42% of Other Backward Classes (OBC), 52% of upper castes (excluding Brahmins), and 61% of Brahmins.

Figure 9.4 - Caste cleavages in India, 1962-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of upper castes and the share of other voters voting for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and affiliated parties, before and after controls. Upper castes have always been more likely than other voters to vote for the BJP (as well as for its predecessor the BJS) and other affiliated parties since the 1960s.

Figure 9.5 - The religious cleavage in India, 1962-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of non-Muslims and the share of Muslims voting for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and affiliated parties, before and after controls. Muslim voters have always been much less likely than non-Muslims to vote for the BJP (as well as for its predecessor the BJS) and other affiliated parties since the 1960s, but this gap has grown dramatically, from 9 percentage points in 1962 to 32 points in 2014.

Figure 9.6 - The educational cleavage in India, 1962-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and affiliated parties, before and after controls. Higher-educated voters have always been more likely than other voters to vote for the BJP (as well as for its predecessor the BJS) and other affiliated parties since the 1960s, but this gap has gradually decreased since the 1990s.

Figure 9.7 - Class cleavages in India, 1996-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of upper-class voters and the share of middle- and lower-class voters voting for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and affiliated parties, before and after controls. Upper-class voters have always been more likely than other voters to vote for the BJP since 1996, but this gap becomes statistically non-significant after controls, so that upper classes are not more or less likely to vote BJP at a given caste and other characteristics.

Figure 9.8 - State elections and the transformation of Indian party systems, 1963-2020



Source: authors' computations combining data from F. R. Jensenius, “Competing Inequalities? On the Intersection of Gender and Ethnicity in Candidate Nominations in Indian Elections," *Government and Opposition* 51, no. 3 (2016): 440–463 before 2015 and hand coded data after 2015 (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the number of Indian states ruled by selected parties or groups of parties between 1963 and 2020. Excludes union territories and states where no elections have been held. The number of states ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party grew from 3 states in 1990 to 11 states in 2020 (october).

Figure 9.9 - Caste and religious cleavages in state elections in India



Source: authors' computations using Indian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties by caste and religion in state elections for selected Indian states. The BJP has systematically received greater support from upper castes than from lower castes and Muslims. Caste and religious cleavages are lower in Tamil Nadu and West Bengal. Figures are aggregated over the period available for each state (see appendix Table A3). BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party; SHS: Shiv Sena; AIADMK: All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam; AITC: All India Trinamool Congress.

Figure 10.1 - Geographical distribution of major ethnic groups in Pakistan

Source: D. Mustafa and K. E. Brown, "The Taliban, public space, and terror in Pakistan," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51, no. 4 (2010): 496-512. **Note**: this map provides a simple description of the spatial distribution of major ethnic groups in Pakistan. Pashtuns mainly live in the north-west of the country, Punjabis in the north-east, Sindhis in the south-east, and Baloch people in the south-west.

Figure 10.2 - Election results in Pakistan, 1970-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Pakistan between 1970 and 2018. Figures for 1970 correspond to West Pakistan only.

Figure 10.3 - The PPP vote by language, 1970-2018



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) by linguistic group. Sindhi speakers have always been more likely to vote PPP than the rest of the electorate. This cleavage has been reinforced over time, as the PPP vote has become increasingly restricted to Sindhis.

Figure 10.4 - Ethnolinguistic cleavages and the PPP vote in Pakistan, 1970-2018



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Sindhi speakers and the share of speakers of other languages voting for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), before and after controls. Sindhi voters have always been more likely to vote PPP since 1970, a pattern that is barely affected by the introduction of controls.

Figure 10.5 - The PML / IJI / PNA vote by language, 1970-2018



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Pakistan Muslim League (PML) parties or the associated alliances (IJI / PNA) by linguistic group. Pakistan Muslim League parties have seen their electorate become increasingly restricted to Saraiki and Punjabi speakers in the past decades.

Figure 10.6 - Ethnolinguistic cleavages and the PML / IJI / PNA vote in Pakistan, 1970-2018



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Punjabi speakers and the share of speakers of other languages voting for Pakistan Muslim League (PML) parties or the associated alliances (IJI / PNA), before and after controls. This difference has grown over time, from 6 percentage points in 1970 to 24 percentage points in 2018.

Figure 10.7 - The PPP vote by income decile in Pakistan, 1970-2018



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of voters supporting the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) by income decile. In 2018, 20% of bottom 10% income earners (D1) voted PPP, compared to 9% of top 10% income earners (D10).

Figure 10.8 - The PPP vote and income in Pakistan, 1970-2018



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), before and after controls. The PPP has always received greater support from bottom income earners since 1970, but this difference has declined over time, from 8 percentage points in 1970 to 5 percentage points in 2018 before controls, and from 7 points to 0 after controlling for region and ethnolinguistic affiliation.

Figure 10.9 - The PTI vote by income and education in Pakistan, 2013-2018



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note : the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in the general elections of 2013 and 2018, before and after controls. The PTI received greater support from top-income and highest-educated voters in these two elections. This difference is maintained after controls.

Figure 10.10 - The religious cleavage in Pakistan, 1970-2018
The PPP vote by religious affiliation



Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of voters supporting the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) by religious affiliation. In 2018, the PPP was supported by 11% of Sunni Muslims, 29% of Shia Muslims, and 46% of non-Muslim voters.

Table 10.1 - Composition of the Pakistani population, 1988-2018			
	1988	2002	2018
Provinces			
Punjab	58%	57%	54%
Sindh	24%	24%	28%
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	14%	14%	12%
Baluchistan	5%	5%	6%
Languages			
Punjabi	44%	44%	44%
Saraiki	11%	10%	10%
Sindhi	12%	15%	16%
Urdu	8%	8%	8%
Pashto	15%	15%	15%
Balochi	4%	4%	4%
Others	7%	4%	3%

Source: authors' computations using census statistics covering the entire Pakistani population (see wpid.world).
Interpretation: in 2018, Punjab concentrated 54% of the Pakistani population.

Table 10.2 - Ethnolinguistic cleavages in Pakistan, 2018						
Language \ Party	PPP	PML	PTI	Islamic	MQM	Others
Balochi	7%	7%	15%	18%	0%	52%
Pashto	8%	7%	54%	15%	0%	15%
Punjabi	5%	41%	31%	7%	0%	17%
Saraiki	8%	32%	34%	5%	1%	20%
Sindhi	54%	7%	21%	8%	1%	9%
Urdu	6%	20%	30%	11%	18%	16%

Source: authors' computations using Pakistani polls (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the share of votes received by the main Pakistani political parties by linguistic group in 2018. PPP: Pakistan Peoples Party; PML: Pakistan Muslim League parties; PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf; Islamic parties include the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal and the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan; MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement; Others mainly includes independent candidates. In 2018, 54% of Sindhi speakers voted PPP, compared to only 5% of Punjabi speakers.

Figure 11.1 - Election results in Japan, 1946-2017



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Japan between 1946 and 2017. The Liberal Democratic Party received 33% of votes in 2017.

Figure 11.2 - The conservative vote by education in Japan, 1953-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by education level. The conservative vote has been concentrated among primary-educated voters since the 1950s, a cleavage that has persisted until the 2010s.

Figure 11.3 - The educational cleavage in Japan, 1953-2017: between decline and persistence



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Liberal Democratic Party and other conservative parties, before and after controls. In 1953, university graduates were 20 percentage points less likely to vote conservative, compared to 8 percentage points over the 2012-2017 period.

Figure 11.4 - The conservative vote by degree of urbanization in Japan, 1963-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by rural-urban location. In 1963-1967, the LDP received 60% of votes in rural areas, compared to 37% in big cities. The difference in conservative votes between cities and rural areas has declined over time.

Figure 11.5 - The decline of the rural-urban cleavage in Japan, 1963-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of big cities and the share of other cities and rural areas voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties, before and after controls. The vote share received by conservative parties in big cities was 18 percentage points lower than in other cities and rural areas in the 1960s, compared to 6 percentage points in the 2010s.

Figure 11.6 - The conservative vote by income in Japan, 1963-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by income decile. In the 1960s, the LDP was supported by 57% of bottom 10% income earners (D1) and 65% of top 10% income earners (D10).

Figure 11.7 - The conservative vote among top-income earners in Japan, 1963-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties, before and after controls. In the 1960s, top 10% earners were 16 percentage points more likely to vote conservative, compared to 0 percentage points in the 2010s.

Figure 11.8 - The depoliticization of inequality in Japan, 1963-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference in the vote share received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties between specific categories of voters (upper-class voters, homeowners, wage earners, and union members) and other voters. In the 1960s, upper-class voters were 29 percentage points more likely to vote conservative than the rest of the electorate, compared to 5 percentage points in the 2010s. Upper classes are defined as the top 10% of social classes, based on survey questions on the self-perceived position of respondents on the social ladder.

Figure 11.9 - The reversal of the generational cleavage in Japan, 1953-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters younger than 39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties, before and after controls. In 1953, voters younger than 39 were 19 percentage points less likely to vote conservative. In the 2010s, they had become 5 percentage points more likely to do so.

Figure 11.10 - The conservative vote and generational renewal in Japan, 1953-2017



Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and other conservative parties by decade of birth. In 1953, 89% of voters born in the 1890s voted conservative, compared to 52% of those born in the 1930s. In the 2010s, by contrast, new generations had become more likely to vote conservative than the post-war generations, with 60% of voters born in the 1990s supporting the LDP and other conservative parties.

Table 11.1 - Composition of the Japanese electorate, 1953-2017						
	1953	**1963-67**	**1976**	**1990-96**	**2003-09**	**2012-17**
Education						
Primary	69%	63%	45%	25%	17%	14%
Secondary	29%	27%	41%	57%	63%	61%
Tertiary	2%	9%	14%	18%	20%	25%
Location						
Towns and villages		34%	27%	23%	18%	10%
Medium-sized cities		48%	54%	55%	60%	57%
Big cities		18%	19%	21%	22%	33%
Age						
20-39	56%	48%	44%	30%	23%	21%
40-59	33%	37%	42%	47%	38%	35%
60+	11%	15%	14%	24%	39%	44%

Source: author's computations using Japanese political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the table shows the evolution of the structure of the Japanese electorate between 1953 and 2017. This period has been marked by a strong increase in the general level of education, urbanization, and the ageing of the population. In 2012-2017, 33% of voters lived in big cities and 25% had an university degree.

Figure 12.1 - Election results in Thailand, 2001-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected political parties or groups of parties in general elections held in Thailand between 2001 and 2019.

Figure 12.2 - Regional inequalities in Thailand



Source: authors' computations using Thai political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the composition of income groups (quintiles (Q1 to Q5) and the top decile (D10)) by region in 2011. In 2011, 45% of top 10% income earners lived in Bangkok, compared to only 12% in the Northeast. This region concentrated alone more than half of bottom 20% income earners.

Figure 12.3 - The educational cleavage in Thailand, 2001-2011



Source: authors' computations using Thai political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% educated voters and the share of top 50% educated voters voting for the Thai Rak Thai, the Pheu Thai, and other pro-Thaksin parties, before and after controls. In 2001, bottom 50% educated voters were 6 percentage points more likely to vote for these parties, compared to 26 percentage points in 2011.

Figure 12.4 - The rural-urban cleavage in Thailand, 2001-2011



Source: authors' computations using Thai political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for the Thai Rak Thai, the Pheu Thai, and other pro-Thaksin parties, before and after controls. In 2001, the vote share of these parties was 3 percentage points lower in rural areas than in urban areas; by 2011, it had become 28 percentage points higher.

Figure 12.5 - Election results in the Philippines, 1992-2016



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received in the first round of presidential elections by selected parties, group of parties, or candidates in the Philippines. The candidate Rodrigo Duterte received 39% of votes in the 2016 election.

Figure 12.6 - The educational cleavage in the Philippines, 1998-2016



Source: authors' computations using Filipino electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for Joseph Estrada (1998, 2010), Fernando Poe (2004), Grace Poe (2016), and Jejomar Binay (2016) in the first round of presidential elections, before and after controls. These candidates all received higher support among the least educated. In 2004, higher-educated voters were less likely to vote for Joseph Estrada by 22 percentage points.

Figure 12.7 - The regional cleavage in the Philippines, 1998-2016



Source: authors' computations using Filipino electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in the Visayas geographical zone and the share of voters living in other regions of the Philippines voting for the candidates Joseph Estrada (1998, 2010), Fernando Poe (2004), Grace Poe (2016), and Jejomar Binay (2016) in the first round of presidential elections, as well as the same difference between Mindanao and the rest of the country, before and after controlling for education, employment status, age, gender, religion, religious attendance, income, and rural-urban location. In 2016, the vote share of Grace Poe and Jejomar Binay was 20 percentage points lower in Mindanao than in other regions.

Table 12.1 - Structure of the vote in the 2016 Filipino presidential election				
	Rodrigo Duterte *PDP-Laban*	Mar Roxas *Liberal Party*	Grace Poe *Independent*	Jejomar Binay *UNA*
Education				
Primary	42%	24%	19%	13%
Secondary	35%	24%	24%	12%
Tertiary	43%	21%	21%	12%
Region				
National Capital Region	33%	16%	27%	19%
Luzon	29%	26%	27%	16%
Visayas	39%	31%	17%	8%
Mindanao	62%	16%	12%	7%
Religion				
Catholic	37%	25%	22%	12%
Protestant	31%	21%	30%	18%
Muslim	75%	5%	3%	13%
Location				
Urban areas	43%	15%	21%	15%
Rural areas	36%	30%	22%	11%

Source: authors' computations using Filipino electoral surveys.

Notes: the table shows the share of votes received by the main Filipino presidential candidates by selected individual characteristics in 2016. Rodrigo Duterte received his highest vote share in Mindanao (62%) and in urban areas (43%).

Figure 12.8 - Election results in Malaysia, 1955-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main Malaysian parties in general elections held between 1955 and 2018. The National Front coalition (Barisan National, BN) received 34% of the vote in 2018.

Figure 12.9 - The ethnoreligious cleavage in Malaysia, 2004-2013
The Barisan National vote by religious affiliation



Source: authors' computations using Asian Barometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Barisan Nasional by religious affiliation. In 2013, 29% of Buddhist and Taoist voters voted BN, compared to 53% of Muslim voters and 62% of Hindu and Sikh voters.

Figure 12.10 - Vote and income in Malaysia, 2004-2013



Source: authors' computations using Asian Barometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the Barisan Nasional, before and after controls. In 2013, bottom 50% income earners were 17 percentage points less likely to vote BN. After controls (all other things being equal), this difference is reduced to 5 percentage points.

Figure 12.11 - Ethnoreligious cleavages and class cleavages in Malaysia, 2004-2013



Source: authors' computations using Asian Barometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Barisan Nasional by income group among Muslims and non-Muslims. The BN has been most strongly supported among bottom 50% income earners within these two groups. In 2013, 53% of the bottom 50% of Muslim income earners voted BN, compared to 16% of the top 10% of Muslim income earners.

Figure 12.12 - Election results in Indonesia, 1977-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected Indonesian political parties or groups of parties in legislative elections between 1977 and 2019. The PDI-P received 19% of votes in 2018. PD: Democratic Party; PDI: Indonesian Democratic Party; PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; NasDem: National Democratic Party; Islamic Parties: PAN, PBB, PBR, PKB, PKNU, PKS, and PPP.

Figure 12.13 - The PDI-P / NasDem vote by religious affiliation in Indonesia, 1999-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indonesian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and the National Democratic Party (NasDem) by religious affiliation. In 2014, 51% of non-Muslims supported these two parties, compared to 22% of practicing Muslims (reporting participating "Often" or "Very often / Always" to collective prayers).

Figure 12.14 - The religious cleavage in Indonesia, 1999-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indonesian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of practicing Muslims voting for Islamic parties and the share of non-practicing Muslims and non-Muslims voting for Islamic parties, and the same difference for Golkar / Gerindra / Hanura and PDI-P / NasDem, after controlling for income, education, rural-urban location, employment status, age, and gender. Religious cleavages have weakened in Indonesia in the past decades: practicing Muslims were 25 percentage points less likely to vote PDI-P / NasDem in 1999, compared to 5 percentage points in 2014.

Figure 12.15 - Vote and income in Indonesia, 1999-2014



Source: authors' computations using Indonesian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for Islamic parties, and the same difference for Golkar / Gerindra / Hanura and PDI-P / Nasdem, after controlling for religion, education, rural-urban location, employment status, age, and gender. The link between income and the vote has weakened in Indonesia in the past decades: top 10% earners were 9 percentage points less likely to vote PDI-P / NasDem in 1999, while they were 2 percentage points more likely to do so in 2014.

Figure 13.1 - Election results in South Korea, 1985-2020



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of South Korean political parties in legislative elections between 1985 and 2020. The results correspond to those of single-member constituencies. Other names of the Hannara Party include United Future, Saenuri, Democratic Justice, Democratic Liberal, New Korea, and Liberty Korea. The conservatives (United Future) received 41% of votes in 2020.

Figure 13.2 - The generational cleavage in South Korea, 2000-2016
The conservative vote by age group



Source: authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Hannara / Saenuri Party by age group. Generational cleavages rose considerably in South Korea between 2000 and 2016. In 2016, 82% of voters aged over 70 voted for the Saenuri Party, compared to only 15% of voters aged 18 to 29.

Figure 13.3 - The regional cleavage in South Korea, 2000-2016
The conservative vote by region



Source: authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Hannara / Saenuri Party by region. In 2016, the conservatives received 51% of the vote in Gyeongsang, while they only received 1% in Honam. Honam represented in 2016 approximately 10% of the electorate, Chungcheong 10%, Gangwon 4%, Seoul-Gyeonggi 50%, and Gyeongsang 26%.

Figure 13.4 - The educational cleavage in South Korea, 2000-2016



Source: authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Hannara / Saenuri Party, before and after controls. The educational cleavage has significantly increased over time. In 2016, university graduates were less likely to vote conservative by 19 percentage points.

Figure 13.5 - Vote and income in South Korea, 2000-2016



Source: authors' computations using South Korean electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners and the share of top 50% earners voting for the Hannara / Saenuri Party, before and after controls. Bottom 50% income earners were 6 percentage points less likely to vote conservative in 2000, while they were 3 percentage points more likely to do so in 2016.

Figure 13.6 - Presidential election results in Taiwan, 1996-2020



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected parties or groups of parties in presidential elections held in Taiwan between 1996 and 2020. The vote share of the Democratic Progressive Party increased from 21% in 1996 to 57% in 2020.

Figure 13.7 - The DPP vote by ethnic group in Taiwan, 1996-2016



Source: authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) by ethnic group. In 2016, the DPP was supported by 62% of Minnan voters, compared to only 16% of Mainlanders.

Figure 13.8 - The ethnic cleavage in Taiwan, 1996-2016



Source: authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of Minnan voters and Mainlanders for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), before and after controlling for income, education, age, gender, employment, marital status, union membership, religion, and region of residence. In 2016, Minnan voters were 27 percentage points more likely to vote DPP, while Mainlanders were 43 percentage points less likely to do so.

Figure 13.9 - The regional cleavage in Taiwan, 1996-2016



Source: authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Southern region residents and the share of residents of other regions voting for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), before and after controls. In 2016, the vote share of the DPP was 10 percentage points higher in the Southern region than in the rest of the country.

Figure 13.10 - Vote, income, and education in Taiwan, 1996-2016



Source: authors' computations using Taiwanese electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of low-income and lower-educated voters for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), after controlling for income/education, ethnicity, age, gender, occupation, marital status, union membership, religion, and region. In 2016, bottom 50% income earners were 3 percentage points more likely to vote DPP.

Figure 13.11 - Election results in Hong Kong, 1991-2016



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of political parties in geographical constituencies in Legislative Council elections held in Hong Kong between 1991 and 2016. The Pro-Beijing camp received 40% of votes in the 2016 elections.

Figure 13.12 - The generational cleavage in Hong Kong, 1998-2016



Source: authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 39 or younger and the share of voters aged 40 or more voting for the pro-democracy camp, before and after controls. Generational cleavages have considerably risen in Hong Kong. In 2016, voters younger than 40 were 32 percentage points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp.

Figure 13.13 - The generational cleavage in Hong Kong, 1998-2016
The pro-democracy vote by decade of birth



Source: authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the pro-democracy camp by decade of birth. In 2016, 89% of voters born in the 1990s voted for the pro-democracy camp, compared to only 31% of those born in the 1930s.

Figure 13.14 - The native-mainlander cleavage in Hong Kong, 2012-2016



Source: authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of voters born in Hong Kong for the pro-democracy camp, before and after controls. In 2016, natives were 25 percentage points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp. This difference is reduced to 15 percentage points after controlling for education and age (at a given education level and age, natives are 15 points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp). Voters born outside of Hong Kong are mostly Mainlanders (born in continental China).

Figure 13.15 - The pro-democracy vote by income and education in Hong Kong, 1998-2016



Source: authors' computations using Hong Kong electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for the pro-democracy camp. In 2016, top 10% educated voters and top 10% income earners were respectively 18 and 5 percentage points more likely to vote for the pro-democracy camp.

Figure 13.16 - Attitudes towards Hong Kong identity, immigration, and integration with China by age, 2015



Source: authors' computations using the Hong Kong Election Study 2015 (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure decomposes by age group the share of voters who (1) think that closer integration with Mainland China would not be beneficial for Hong Kong, (2) consider themselves more Hong Konger than Chinese, Hong Konger-Chinese, Chinese-Hong Konger or Other, (3) believe that Hong Kong does not have a democratic political system, (4) think that there are too many immigrants coming from Mainland China and (5) consider that income inequality is among the three most important problems in Hong Kong today. In 2015, 72% of voters aged 18 to 25 considered closer integration with Mainland China would not benefit Hong Kong, compared to 43% of voters older than 56.

Figure 14.1 - Literacy and political participation in Brazil, 1872-2018



Source: literacy rate from Ipeadata, except 1950 and 1960, which are from the *Censo Demográfico* 1960 (IBGE). The estimates for 1872-1890 are imputed from the literacy rates of the total population. Estimates for 1900-2018 are imputed from the literacy rates of the population aged 15 and over. Voter data is from the IBGE Censuses and Love (1970) for 1886-1930, and from the International IDEA Voter Turnout Database for 1945-2018 (see wpid.world).

Note: the literacy rate refers to the proportion of the voting age population who can read and write. Voters are the people who actually voted in all presidential and parliamentary elections as a share of the voting age population. Between 1886 and 1934 no data was found for parliamentary elections. Between 1960 and 1989 no direct elections for the president were held.

Figure 14.2 - Presidential election results in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Brazilian political parties in the second round of presidential elections between 1989 and 2018. In 2018, the PT (Fernando Haddad) received 45% of votes. PT: Partido dos Trabalhadores; PRN: Partido da Reconstrução Nacional; PSDB: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira; PSL: Partido Social Liberal.

Figure 14.3 - The PT vote by income in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Workers' Party in the second round of presidential elections by household income group. In 2018, 54% of bottom 50% income earners voted PT, compared to 34% of top 10% income earners.

Figure 14.4 - The PT vote by education level in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Workers' Party in the second round of presidential elections by education level. In 2018, 58% of primary-educated voters (or illiterates) voted PT, compared to 37% of university graduates.

Figure 14.5 - Political conflict and income in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voting PT and the share of top 50% earners voting PT in the second round of presidential elections, before and after controls. Support for the PT has become increasingly concentrated among low-income earners since 1989. In 2018, low-income voters were more likely to vote PT by 19 percentage points.

Figure 14.6 - The educational cleavage in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary-educated voters (or illiterates) voting PT and the share of other voters voting PT in the second round of presidential elections, before and after controls. Support for the PT has become increasingly concentrated among lower-educated voters since 1989. In 2018, primary-educated voters were more likely to vote PT by 18 percentage points.

Figure 14.7 - The PT vote by region in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Workers' Party in the second round of presidential elections by region. In 2018, 65% of voters of the Northeast Region voted PT, compared to 33% of voters of the South Region.

Figure 14.8 - The regional cleavage in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in the Northeast Region voting PT and the share of voters living in other regions voting PT in the second round of presidential elections, before and after controls. Support for the PT has become increasingly concentrated in the Northeast Region, where the PT's vote share was 27 percentage points higher than in the rest of Brazil in 2018.

Figure 14.9 - The rural-urban cleavage in Brazil, 1989-2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in rural areas voting PT and the share of voters living in cities voting PT in the second round of presidential elections, before and after controls. The vote share obtained by the PT in rural areas was 21 percentage points lower than in urban areas in 1989, compared to 2 percentage points higher in 2018.

Figure 14.10 - The racial cleavage in Brazil, 2018



Source: authors' computations using Brazilian electoral surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of self-declared non-White voters voting PT and the share of White voters voting PT in the second round of presidential elections, before and after controls. In 2018, non-White voters were 17 percentage points more likely to vote PT before controls and 10 percentage points more likely to do so after controls (all other things being equal).

Figure 14.11 - The religious cleavage in Brazil, 2002-2018



Source: authors' computations using electoral (CSES) surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Protestants and the share of Catholics, non-believers, and other voters voting PT in the second round of presidential elections, before and after controls. In 2018, Protestant voters were less likely to vote PT by 17 percentage points.

Figure 14.12 - Reasons determining candidate choice in the 2018 presidential election by income group in Brazil



Source: authors' computations using a survey conducted by the Datafolha institute in October 2017 (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure decomposes answers to the question of the issue that would be most decisive in respondents' vote choice in the 2018 election by income group. In 2017, 53% of bottom 50% income earners considered that employment and health would be the key issues determining their vote, compared to 30% of top 10% income earners.

Figure 15.1 - Election results in Argentina, 1995-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Argentinian political parties in general elections between 1995 and 2019. Peronist parties received 48% of votes in the 2019 election. Anti-peronist parties are the Radical Civic Union (UCR), the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO), Acción por la Republica, Coalición Cívica ARI, Cambiemos, Frente de Izquierda, and Recrear.

Figure 15.2 - The Peronist vote by income and education in Argentina, 1995-2019



Source: authors' computations using Argentinian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for Peronists, after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, employment status, marital status, occupation, rural-urban location, region, ethnicity, and perceived social class. In 2015-2019, top 10% income earners were 8 percentage points less likely to vote for Peronists.

Table 15.1 - The structure of political cleavages in Argentina, 2015-2019		
	Share of votes received (%)	
	Peronists	Non-Peronists
Education		
Primary	55%	45%
Secondary	51%	49%
Tertiary	38%	62%
Income		
Bottom 50%	55%	45%
Middle 40%	44%	56%
Top 10%	34%	66%
Occupation		
Public worker	39%	61%
Private worker	34%	66%
Entrepreneur	27%	73%
Self-employed	38%	62%
Subjective social class		
Working class	57%	43%
Upper/Middle class	32%	68%
Location		
Urban area	47%	53%
Rural area	40%	60%

Source: authors' computations using Argentinian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows the average share of votes received by Peronists and non-Peronists by selected individual characteristics in 2015-2019. 55% of primary-educated voters voted for Peronists in this period, compared to only 38% of university graduates.

Figure 15.3 - Election results in Chile, 1989-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Chilean political parties in presidential elections between 1989 and 2017. The Communists are included inside the Concertación in 2013 and 2017, as they run together in the election and the DC is included inside the Concertación in 2017, even though they run separately for the first time in that election. The right bloc received 45% of the vote in 2017.

Figure 15.4 - The left-wing vote by income and education in Chile, 1989-2017



Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of top-income and highest-educated voters for center-left and left-wing parties, after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, religiosity, employment status, marital status, union membership, ethnicity, and region. In 2013-2017, top 10% income earners were 7 percentage points less likely to vote for the left. The left is defined as Concertación minus DC plus other left-wing parties that do not belong to the center-left alliance.

Figure 15.5 - Vote and income in Chile, 1993-2017



Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Chilean parties or group of parties. In 2013-2017, top 10% income earners were 5 percentage points more likely to vote for the Independent Democratic Union and National Renewal.

Figure 15.6 - Vote and education in Chile, 1989-2017



Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Chilean political parties or groups of parties. In 2013-2017, top 10% educated voters were 10 percentage points less likely to vote for Concertación.

Table 15.2 - The structure of political cleavages in Chile, 2017				
	Share of votes received (%)			
	Communist Party / Humanist Party / Broad Front / Other left	The Force of the Majority (excl. Communists)	Christian Democratic Party	Independent Democratic Union / National Renewal
Education level				
Primary	19%	27%	6%	48%
Secondary	27%	23%	5%	45%
Tertiary	24%	29%	4%	43%
Income group				
Bottom 50%	26%	24%	5%	45%
Middle 40%	21%	26%	6%	47%
Top 10%	16%	31%	3%	51%
Region				
North	25%	26%	2%	47%
Center	26%	27%	5%	42%
South	21%	25%	4%	51%
Age				
20-39	33%	19%	2%	47%
40-59	21%	29%	5%	44%
+60	16%	34%	9%	42%

Source: authors' computations using Chilean political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Notes: the table presents the share of votes received by the main Chilean political groups in the 2017 election by selected individual characteristics. In 2017, 48% of primary-educated voters voted for the Independent Democratic Union or National Renewal, compared to 43% of university graduates.

Figure 15.7 - Election results in Costa Rica, 1953-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected Costa Rican political parties and groups of parties in presidential elections between 1953 and 2018. The National Restoration Party received 26% of the vote in 2018.

Figure 15.8 - Vote and income in Costa Rica, 1974-2018



Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Costa Rican political parties. In 2010-2018, top 10% income earners were 16 percentage points more likely to vote for the Citizens' Action Party.

Table 15.3 - The structure of political cleavages in Costa Rica, 2010-2018						
Share of votes (%)						
	FA	**PAC**	**PLN**	**ML**	**PUSC**	**PRN**
Education						
Primary	4%	27%	40%	4%	5%	15%
Secondary	6%	34%	26%	4%	6%	17%
Tertiary	8%	40%	20%	4%	14%	9%
Postgraduate	5%	46%	25%	3%	10%	7%
Income						
Bottom 50%	6%	28%	32%	3%	6%	20%
Middle 40%	5%	34%	27%	5%	8%	15%
Top 10%	5%	47%	25%	4%	12%	5%
Region						
Metropolitan Area of San José	7%	33%	27%	2%	10%	13%
Central-Urban	5%	42%	29%	4%	6%	8%
Central-Rural	3%	31%	34%	6%	6%	14%
Lowlands-Urban	6%	27%	33%	5%	7%	19%
Lowlands-Rural	5%	28%	33%	3%	5%	21%
Worker type						
Business owner/partner	6%	37%	21%	4%	10%	14%
Wage earner	7%	34%	28%	4%	8%	13%
Self-employed	4%	33%	29%	5%	7%	15%
Sector of employment						
Private/mixed sector	6%	34%	28%	4%	7%	15%
Public	8%	37%	28%	5%	10%	9%
Ethnicity						
White	6%	31%	33%	4%	7%	13%
Mestizo	5%	35%	29%	4%	8%	14%

Indigenous	7%	34%	31%	2%	6%	11%
Black / Mulatto	5%	38%	25%	2%	5%	18%
Other	5%	35%	25%	3%	4%	26%

Source: authors' computations using Costa Rican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Costa Rican political parties by selected individual characteristics over the period 2010-2018. 40% of primary-educated voters voted PLN during this period, compared to 25% of postgraduates.

Figure 15.9 - Election results in Colombia, 2002-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Colombian political parties in general elections between 2002 and 2018. Right-wing parties (Uribists): Partido de la U (2010), Partido Conservador, Cambio Radical, Primero Colombia, Movimiento Si Colombia, and Centro Democrático. Left-wing parties (Anti-Uribists): Polo Democrático, Partido de la U (2014), Partido Liberal, Alianza Social Independiente, Partido Verde, Colombia Humana, and Compromiso Ciudadano. Left-wing parties received 51% of the vote in 2018.

Figure 15.10 - The anti-uribist vote by income and education in Colombia, 2002-2018



Source: authors' computations using Colombian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of tertiary-educated and top-income voters for left-wing (anti-uribist) parties, after controlling for age, gender, region, rural-urban location, employment status, marital status, sector of employment, ethnicity, and religious affliation. In 2018, university graduates were 9 percentage points more likely to vote for anti-uribists.

Figure 15.11 - The anti-uribist vote in Colombia, 2002-2018: public workers, new generations, and urban areas



Source: authors' computations using Colombian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of public workers, young voters, and urban areas for left-wing (anti-uribist) parties, after controlling for income, education, gender, region, employment status, marital status, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. In 2018, voters aged 20 to 39 were 12 percentage points more likely to vote for anti-uribists.

Figure 15.12 - The anti-uribist vote in Colombia, 2002-2018: non-religious voters, Afro-Colombians, and women



Source: authors' computations using Colombian post-electoral and political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of non-religious voters, Afro-Colombians, and women for left-wing (anti-uribist) parties, after controlling for income, education, age, region, rural-urban location, employment status, marital status, and sector of employment. In 2018, non-religious voters were 19 percentage points more likely to vote for anti-uribists.

Figure 15.13 - Election results in Mexico, 1952-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Mexican political parties in presidential elections between 1952 and 2018. The Institutional Revolutionary Party received 16% of the vote in 2018.

Figure 15.14 - The social democratic vote by income and education in Mexico, 1979-2018



Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for social democratic parties (PRD / MORENA / Other social democrats and progressives), after controlling for age, gender, religion, employment status, marital status, occupation, perceived class, union membership, rural-urban location, region, and ethnicity. Over the period 2012-2018, university graduates were 6 percentage points more likely to vote for social democratic and progressive parties.

Figure 15.15 - Vote and education in Mexico, 1952-2018



Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Mexican political parties. Over the 2012-2018 period, top 10% educated voters were 12 percentage points less likely to vote for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

Figure 15.16 - Vote and income in Mexico,1952-2018



Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Mexican political parties. Over the 2012-2018 period, top 10% income earners were 10 percentage points less likely to vote for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

Table 15.4 - The structure of political cleavages in Mexico, 2018

	Share of votes received (%)		
	PRI	PAN	PRD / Morena
Education			
Primary	25%	19%	48%
Secondary	17%	18%	57%
Tertiary	13%	26%	50%
Income			
Bottom 50%	19%	19%	54%
Middle 40%	18%	20%	55%
Top 10%	14%	26%	53%
Age			
20-39	16%	21%	52%
40-59	20%	20%	54%
60+	21%	19%	53%
Region			
North	20%	22%	53%
Center West	15%	25%	46%
Center	22%	20%	49%
South	12%	14%	69%
Ethnic group			
White	25%	30%	39%
Mestizo	18%	17%	56%
Indigenous	6%	14%	74%
Other	19%	28%	48%

Source: authors' computations using Mexican political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the main Mexican political parties by selected individual characteristics in the 2018 election. 25% of primary-educated voters voted for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in 2018, compared to only 13% of university graduates. PAN: National Action Party; PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution.

Figure 15.17 - Election results in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected Peruvian political parties or groups of parties in presidential elections between 1995 and 2016. Note that the APRA still exists in the 2010s but does not appear separately in the survey. Fujimorists (Keiko Fujimori, Popular Force) received 40% of the vote in 2016.

Figure 15.18 - The socialist / progressive vote by income and education in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the relative support of highest-educated and top-income voters for center-left and left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left), after controlling for age, gender, religious affiliation, employment status, marital status, rural-urban location, ethnicity, and region. In 2016, university graduates were 5 percentage points more likely to vote for socialists / progressives.

Figure 15.19 - Vote and education in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for the main Peruvian political parties. In 2016, the top 10% educated were 10 percentage points less likely to vote for Fujimorists (Keiko Fujimori, Popular Force).

Figure 15.20 - Vote and income in Peru, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the main Peruvian political parties. In 2016, top 10% income earners were 12 percentage points less likely to vote for Fujimorists (Keiko Fujimori, Popular Force).

Figure 15.21 - The socialist / progressive vote by region, 1995-2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left and left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left) by region. The socialists and progressives received 29% of the vote in the South in 2016.

Figure 15.22 - The ethnic cleavage in Peru, 2016



Source: authors' computations using Peruvian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by center-left / left-wing parties (UPP / PP / PNP / GP / APRA / Other left) by ethnic affiliation. In 2016, 36% of Quechua voters voted for the socialists and progressives, compared to 9% of White voters.

Figure 16.1 - Election results in South Africa, 1994-2019



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected South African political parties between 1994 and 2019. In 2019, the ANC received 58% of votes, while the Democratic Alliance received 21%.

Figure 16.2 - The racial cleavage in South Africa, 1994-2019
Vote for the ANC by population group



Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the African National Congress among voters belonging to different population groups between 1994 and 2019. The ANC was supported by more than 70% of African voters, compared to less than 10% of White voters in all years.

Figure 16.3 - The racial cleavage in South Africa, 1994-2019
Vote for the ANC among Africans



Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of votes received by the African National Congress among Africans and the share of votes received by the ANC among other population groups between 1994 and 2019, before and after controls. Africans have always been more likely to support the ANC than other population groups by over 60 percentage points.

Figure 16.4 - The ANC vote by income in South Africa, 1994-2019



Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of voters supporting the ANC in general elections by income quintile (Q1 to Q4) and among the ninth decile and 10th decile of income (D9 and D10). The vote for the ANC declines strongly with income in all elections held between 1994 and 2019. Between 74% and 86% of bottom 20% earners (Q1) have supported the ANC in all years, as compared to between 8% and 35% of those belonging to the top 10% (D10).

Figure 16.5 - The ANC vote and income in South Africa, 1994-2019
The role of racial inequalities



Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners voting ANC and the share of top 50% earners voting ANC in general elections, before and after controls. The bottom 50% have been more likely to support the ANC than other voters by 15-30 percentage points in all years. This difference is strongly reduced after controlling for population group, indicating that the link between vote and income in South Africa is to a large extent driven by racial inequalities, as Africans have the lowest income levels and vote massively for the ANC.

Figure 16.6 - Vote for the ANC among top African income earners in South Africa, 1994-2019



Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% African earners voting ANC and the share of bottom 90% African voters voting ANC in general elections, before and after controls. The top 10% of African voters used to be more likely to support the ANC in 1994, while they were less likely to do so by 25 percentage points in 2019.

Figure 16.7 - The ethnolinguistic cleavage in South Africa, 1994-2019
Vote for the ANC by language



Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of voters supporting the ANC in general elections depending on the first language spoken at home. Less than 25% of Afrikaans and English speakers supported the ANC in every election since 1994, compared to more than 75% of Xhosa speakers.

Figure 16.8 - The ethnolinguistic cleavage in South Africa, 1994-2019
Vote for the ANC among Xhosa and Zulu speakers



Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Zulu-speaking African voters voting ANC and the share of other African voters voting ANC in general elections, and the same difference between Xhosa speakers and other African voters, before and after controls. Zulu speakers used to be less likely to vote for the ANC by 27 percentage points, relative to other African voters. This difference has progressively disappeared over time.

Table 16.1 - The composition of the South African electorate, 1994-2019						
	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Population groups						
Black / African	69%	71%	72%	72%	74%	76%
White / European	19%	17%	15%	14%	13%	11%
Coloured	10%	9%	10%	11%	10%	10%
Indian / Asian	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%	3%
Languages						
Afrikaans	19%	18%	18%	18%	16%	14%
English	12%	11%	11%	11%	10%	10%
Zulu	23%	20%	24%	22%	20%	22%
Xhosa	14%	16%	14%	16%	16%	14%
North Sotho	7%	10%	9%	7%	9%	10%
South Sotho	8%	9%	8%	7%	8%	9%
Tswana	8%	9%	7%	8%	9%	9%
Other	9%	8%	10%	11%	12%	12%
Regions						
Eastern / Western / Northern Cape	31%	27%	27%	29%	27%	25%
Free State	6%	7%	6%	6%	5%	5%
KwaZulu-Natal	22%	21%	21%	20%	18%	19%
Other provinces	40%	45%	46%	45%	50%	51%

Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the table shows descriptive statistics for selected variables. In 2014, 74% of the voting age population considered itself to be "Black / African", compared to 13% of "Whites / Europeans".

Table 16.2 - Political opinions of Black South Africans by income group, 2017

	Bottom 50%	Middle 40%	Top 10%
Most important issue: HIV/AIDS	14%	20%	12%
Most important issue: Unemployment	70%	67%	59%
Most important issue: Racism / Xenophobia	2%	1%	5%
Most important issue: Crime and Safety	7%	8%	16%
Most important issue: Other	7%	4%	8%
Agrees government should redistribute land to Blacks	81%	82%	73%
Trusts national governments	31%	30%	40%
Knows no white people, even as acquaintances	56%	45%	38%

Source: author's computations using South African political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).

Note: the table decomposes the political opinions of Black South Africans by income group in 2017 (SASAS survey). 70% of the poorest 50% Black South Africans believed that unemployment was the most important problem of South Africa, as compared to 59% of top 10% Black South African earners.

Figure 17.1 - Election results in Botswana, 1965-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of political parties in Botswana in general elections between 1965 and 2019. The Botswana Democratic Party received 53% of votes in 2019.

Figure 17.2 - Ethnolinguistic educational inequalities in Botswana



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by language in Botswana in 2019. Speakers of Sotho-Tswana languages represented 80% of voters with no diploma and 83% of tertiary-educated voters. Illiterates represented about 11% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 18%, secondary-educated respondents 49%, and tertiary-educated respondents 22%.

Figure 17.3 - Vote for the Botswana Democratic Party by language, 2004-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) by language. In 2019, 55% of speakers of Sotho-Tswana languages voted BDP, compared to 70% of Kalanga speakers. Sotho-Tswana then represented about 81% of the electorate, Kalanga 10%, Kgaladi 5%, and other languages 5%.

Figure 17.4 - The rural-urban cleavage in Botswana, 1999-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters from rural areas and the share of voters living in cities voting for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), before and after controls. The BDP always made better scores in rural areas than in urban areas throughout the period considered. Rural areas represented about 32% of the electorate in 2019, down from 55% in 1999.

Figure 17.5 - The educational cleavage in Botswana, 1999-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), before and after controls. In 2019, university graduates were less likely to vote BDP by 35 percentage points. Tertiary-educated voters represented about 22% of the electorate in 2019, compared to 9% in 1999.

Figure 17.6 - Presidential election results in Ghana, 1960-2016



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of political parties in Ghana in the first round of presidential elections between 1960 and 2016. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) received 44% of votes in 2016.

Figure 17.7 - Regional educational inequalities in Ghana



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by region in Ghana in 2016. The Northern region includes the Upper East and the Upper West. In 2016, 46% of voters with no diploma lived in the Northern region, compared to 10% of tertiary-educated individuals. Illiterates then represented 18% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 16%, secondary-educated respondents 38%, and post-secondary-educated respondents (including high school graduates) 28%.

Figure 17.8 - The NDC vote by linguistic group in Ghana, 2000-2016



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) by language. In 2016, 22% of Akan speakers voted NDC, compared to 79% of Ewe speakers. Ewe speakers then represented about 15% of the electorate, speakers of Gur languages 19%, speakers of Ga-Dangbe languages 8%, and Akan speakers 53%.

Figure 17.9 - The NDC vote by region in Ghana, 2004-2016



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) by region. The Northern region includes the Upper East and the Upper West. In 2016, the NDC received 80% of votes in the Volta region, compared to 13% of votes in the Ashanti region. The Ashanti region then represented about 19% of the electorate, Brong Ahafo 9%, Eastern 10%, Central 9%, Western 9%, Greater Accra 18%, Northern 16%, and Volta 9%.

Figure 17.10 - The rural-urban cleavage in Ghana, 2000-2016



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters living in rural areas and the share of voters living in cities voting for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), before and after controls. In 2016, rural areas were more likely to vote NDC by 12 percentage points. Rural areas then represented about 46% of the electorate, down from 63% in 2000.

Figure 17.11 - The educational cleavage in Ghana, 2000-2016



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of secondary/tertiary-educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the National Democratic Congress (NDC), before and after controls. In 2016, higher-educated voters were less likely to vote NDC by 6 percentage points. They then represented about 28% of the electorate.

Figure 17.12 - Presidential election results in Nigeria, 1999-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Nigerian political parties in presidential elections between 1999 and 2019. The People's Democratic Party received 41% of votes in 2019, down from 63% in 1999.

Figure 17.13 - Ethnoreligious educational inequalities in Nigeria



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by religion in Nigeria in 2019. Muslims then represented over 85% of voters with no diploma, compared to 32% of university graduates. Overall, Muslims represented about 41% of the electorate, Catholics 5%, and other Christians 53%. Illiterates represented 14% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 13%, secondary-educated respondents 45%, and tertiary-educated respondents 28%.

Figure 17.14 - The PDP vote by religion in Nigeria, 2003-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the People's Democratic Party (PDP) by religious affiliation. In 2019, the PDP was supported by 12% of Muslims, compared to 90% of Catholics. Muslims then represented about 41% of the electorate, Catholics 5%, and other Christians 53%.

Figure 17.15 - The ethnoreligious cleavage in Nigeria, 2003-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Muslim voters and the share of non-Muslim voters voting for the People's Democratic Party (PDP), and the same difference for Catholics, before and after controls. In 2019, Muslims were less likely to vote PDP by 51 percentage points. Muslims then represented about 41% of the electorate, Catholics 5%, and other Christians 53%.

Figure 17.16 - The educational cleavage in Nigeria, 1999-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of secondary- and tertiary-educated voters and the share of primary-educated voters and illiterates voting for the People's Democratic Party (PDP), before and after controls. In 2019, highest-educated voters were more likely to vote PDP by 34 percentage points. Illiterates then represented 14% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 13%, secondary-educated respondents 45%, and tertiary-educated respondents 28%.

Figure 17.17 - Presidential election results in Senegal, 2000-2019



Source: authors' computations using official election results(voir wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main parties of groups of parties in presidential elections held in Senegal between 2000 and 2019. The Alliance for the Republic (Macky Sall) received 58% of votes in 2019.

Figure 17.18 - Ethnolinguistic educational inequalities in Senegal



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the composition of education groups by linguistic group in Senegal in 2019. Fulani speakers then represented 31% of voters with no diploma, compared to 17% of university graduates. Overall, Wolof represented about 44% of the electorate, Fulani 28%, Serer 12%, Mande 7%, and other languages 8%. Illiterates represented 51% of the electorate, primary-educated respondents 18%, secondary-educated respondents 23%, and tertiary-educated respondents 9%.

Figure 17.19 - Vote PDS / APR by language in Senegal, 2000-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and/or the Alliance for the Republic (APR) by language. In 2019, 69% of Fulani speakers voted APR, compared to 55% of Wolof speakers. Wolof then represented about 44% of the electorate, Fulani 28%, Serer 12%, Mande 7%, and other languages 8%.

Figure 17.20 - The rural-urban cleavage in Senegal, 2000-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and/or the Alliance for the Republic (APR) by rural-urban location. The APR received 48% of votes in urban areas in 2019, compared to 67% of votes in rural areas. Rural areas then represented about 54% of the electorate.

Figure 17.21 - The educational cleavage in Senegal, 2000-2019



Source: authors' computations using Afrobarometer surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of university graduates and the share of non-university graduates voting for the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) and/or the Alliance for the Republic (APR), before and after controls. In 2019, university graduates were less likely to vote APR by 27 percentage points. University graduates then represented about 9% of the electorate, up from 6% in 2000.

Figure 18.1 - Legislative election results in Israel, 1949-2019



Source: author's computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by different political blocs in Israel. The definition of each party by bloc and a historical breakdown of blocs by party are given in appendix Table A1 (see wpid.world).

Figure 18.2 - Class cleavages in Israel, 1969-2019



Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows how the vote for left-wing parties depends on self-reported social class, after controlling for age, gender, education, and household size. Until the late 1980s, lower classes were as likely to vote left (including center and Arab parties) as the general public. They became much less likely to do so during the last three decades. The opposite occured, to a lower extent, among the top 10% upper classes.

Figure 18.3 - Vote for right and left in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1949-2019



Source: author's computations using historical election results (multiple sources) (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of votes received by right-wing parties (including ultra-orthodox parties) in Tel Aviv and the share of votes received by right-wing parties in Israel as a whole, as well as the same difference for left-wing parties (including center and Arab parties). Tel Aviv used to be more right-leaning and less left-leaning than the general public in the first election. It gradually became more left-leaning.

Figure 18.4 - Residual identity component in Tel Aviv, Israel, 1981-2015



Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of votes received by left-wing parties in Tel Aviv and the share of votes received by left-wing parties in the rest of Israel, after controling for self-reported social class, ethnicity, religiosity, gender, education, household size, and age. It illustrates a stable residual left-leaning identity component in Tel Aviv.

Figure 18.5 - Vote for right-wing and left-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in Israel, 2003-2015



Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of unemployed/inactive voters voting for left/right-wing parties and the share of employed voters voting for left/right-wing parties. There is a mild trend of increasing support for right-wing parties among unemployed and inactive voters in recent years.

Figure 18.6 - The educational cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019



Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for left-wing parties, after controlling for age, social class, religiosity, ethnic origin, household size, and gender. In 2013-2019, higher-educated voters were more likely to vote for left-wing parties by 14 percentage points.

Figure 18.7 - Vote for right-wing parties among Sepharadic voters in Israel, 1969-2019



Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Sepharadic (or Mizrachi) voters and the share of non-Sepharadic voters voting for right-wing parties, before and after controls. In 2013-2019, Sepharadic voters were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 22 percentage points.

Figure 18.8 - The religious cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019



Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of religious voters and the share of non-religious voters voting for right-wing parties. In 2013-2019, religious voters were more likely to vote for right-wing parties by 36 percentage points.

Figure 18.9 - The gender cleavage in Israel, 1969-2019



Source: author's computations using INES election surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties. Women have consistently been more left-leaning than men, but only to a rather small degree, and only when controlling for other effects.

Figure 19.1 - Legislative election results in Turkey, 1987-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Turkish political parties in legislative elections between 1987 and 2018.

Figure 19.2 - The religious cleavage in Turkey, 1991-2015



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of religious voters and the share of non-religious voters voting for right-wing and Islamic parties, and the same difference for the CHP, before and after controls. In 2015, religious voters were more likely to vote for these parties by 30 percentage points. Religious voters are defined as those who declare being "A religious person" (World Values Survey) or "Very religious / Somewhat religious" (Comparative Study of Electoral Systems).

Figure 19.3 - The AKP vote by income in Turkey, 2007-2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) by income quintile. In 2018, 48% of the poorest 20% of voters (Q1) voted AKP, compared to 32% of the top 20% (Q5).

Figure 19.4 - The educational cleavage in Turkey, 1991-2017



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of bottom 90% educated voters voting for right-wing (DYP/ANAP) and Islamic (RP/FP) parties before 2007 or for the AKP after that date, before and after controls. In 2018, highest-educated voters were less likely to vote AKP by 14 percentage points.

Figure 19.5 - The Turkish-Kurdish cleavage in Turkey, 1995-2018



Source: authors' computations using Turkish political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of Kurdish speakers and the share of speakers of Turkish and other languages voting for right-wing and Islamic parties before 2007 and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after that date, before and after controls. Kurdish speakers were less likely to vote AKP by 32 percentage points in 2015.

Figure 19.6 - Legislative election results in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Iraqi political parties in legislative elections between 2005 (January, labelled here as 2004) and 2018.

Figure 19.7 - Geographical distribution of main ethno-religious groups in Iraq



Source: authors.

Figure 19.8 - The regional cleavage in Iraq, 2005-2018
Vote for Shia Islamic lists by region



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Shia Islamic lists by region. In 2018, Shia Islamic Lists received 53% of votes in Southern Iraq, compared to 0% in North-Eastern Iraq. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

Figure 19.9 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists among low-income voters in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of bottom 50% earners and the share of top 50% earners voting for secular and anti-sectarian lists, before and after controlling for ethno-religious identity. In 2018, low-income voters were more likely to vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by 3 percentage points. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

Figure 19.10 - Vote for secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular and anti-sectarian lists by education group. In 2018, 22% of the 50% least educated voters supported secular or anti-sectarian lists. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

Figure 19.11 - Trust deficit towards the government by region in Iraq, 2005-2018



Source: authors' computations using Iraqi political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure decomposes distrust expressed towards the government by region. Middle-Northern Iraq is predominantly Sunni, Baghdad is mixed, Southern Iraq is predominantly Shia. January 2005 elections represented as 2004.

Figure 19.12 - Legislative election results in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using official election results (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the main parties or groups of political parties in legislative elections held in Algeria between 2002 and 2017. FFS: Front des forces socialistes; RCD: Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie; PT: Parti des travailleurs.

Figure 19.13 - Vote for the secular opposition by region / language in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by secular opposition parties (Front des forces socialistes, FFS and Rassemblement pour la culture et la démocratie, RCD) by region. In 2017, 11% of Kabyle voters supported the secular opposition, compared to 6% of other voters. In 2002, speaking Amazigh at home is taken as a proxy as the regional decomposition is not available.

Figure 19.14 - Vote for FLN / RND and income in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of bottom 90% earners voting for the ruling parties (Front de libération nationale, FLN and Rassemblement national démocratique, RND), before and after controls. In 2002, top-income voters were less likely to vote FLN by 6 percentage points.

Figure 19.15 - The generational cleavage in Algeria, 2002-2017
Vote for FLN by age group



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Liberal Front (FLN) by age group. In 2002, 27% of voters aged below 25 voted for the FLN, compared to 48% of those aged over 55.

Figure 19.16 - Political activism by income group in Algeria, 2002-2017



Source: authors' computations using Algerian political attitudes surveys (see wpid.world).
Note: the figure shows the share of individuals declaring having already attended a demonstration or signed a petition by income group. This share grew from 22% to 33% among the poorest 50% between 2002 and 2017.